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ARTICLE

Quantifying Partisan Gerrymandering:
An Evaluation of the
Efficiency Gap Proposal
Benjamin Plener Cover"
Abstract. Electoral districting presents a risk of partisan gerrymandering- the manipulation of electoral boundaries to favor one political party over another. For three decades, the
U.S. Supreme Court has failed to settle on a legal test for partisan gerrymandering, and such
claims have uniformly failed. Until recently. Plaintiffs prevailed before a three-judge federal
panel in Wisconsin by leveraging a new measure called the "efficiency gap," which quantifies partisan gerrymandering in terms of two parties' relative efficiency at translating votes
for their party into seats in government. The case is now before the Court, which may embrace the efficiency gap approach and thereby remake the law of electoral districting.
Through a synthesis of mathematical and legal analysis, this Article examines the efficiency
gap measure, focusing particularly on its underlying methodological choices and electoral
assumptions as well as its relationship to competitiveness, seats-votes proportionality, and
voter turnout.
The efficiency gap is a useful indicative measure of partisan gerrymandering under the circumstances of cases like the one currently before the Court, in which each party earns about
half the votes and a large efficiency gap persists under plausible variations in voter behavior.
Relying in part on the efficiency gap measure, the Court should rule in favor of the plaintiffs. However, a mapmaker can achieve a below-threshold efficiency gap with a skewed
bipartisan gerrymander that carves a state up into uncompetitive districts denying minority parties sufficient representation. For example, a party that earns only 59% of the vote
can secure a filibuster- and veto-proof 75% supermajority of the legislature with a belowAssociate Professor, University of Idaho College of Law. J.D., Yale Law School; M.Sc., London
School of Economics. For helpful discussions as I developed these ideas, I extend my thanks to
Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Eric McGhee, Heather Gerken, Richard Re, Raymond Dacey, Lisa
Carlson, Steven Radil, Michele Wiest, and Kenton Bird, as well as participants in the Fifth
Annual State & Local Government Law Works-in-Progress Conference; the Rocky
Mountain Junior Scholars Forum; the Malcolm M. Renfrew Interdisciplinary Colloquium;
and the Political Science, Economics, and Geography Working Group at the University of
Idaho. For useful feedback during the writing process, I am grateful to Justin Levitt, Moon
Duchin, Wendy Couture, Kate Evans, David Pimentel, and Sandy Mayson. Kacey Jones, Cody
Witko, Justin Bowles, and Kelsey Gooden provided excellent research assistance. A special
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threshold efficiency gap. For this and other reasons, the Court should not adopt the efficiency gap as the exclusive definitional measure of partisan gerrymandering, such that a
plan would be invalid if and only if it exhibited a large, durable, and unjustified efficiency
gap. Instead, the Court should permit some flexibility for scholars, litigants, and courts to
refine measurement approaches over time and under varying circumstances. One approach
worth future exploration is a variation on the efficiency gap that defines a surplus vote in
terms of the full margin of victory and compares wasted vote shares instead of totals. Finally, the Court should be aware that any measure, like the efficiency gap, that compares
votes to seats entails the perverse risk that partisan voter suppression may operate to reduce
the apparent severity of partisan gerrymanders.
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Introduction
We may be approaching a watershed moment in the U.S. Supreme Court's
gerrymandering jurisprudence. In three cases over the last three decades, partisan gerrymandering has eluded the Court's grasp.' The Court has recognized
that partisan gerrymandering poses a problem of constitutional significance 2
but has repeatedly fractured on whether and how to intervene. A minority of
Justices have insisted that partisan gerrymandering presents a nonjusticiable political question susceptible to no judicially discernible and manageable standard,3
while a majority ofJustices have agreed that partisan gerrymandering is justiciable but have disagreed among themselves about the proper legal standard.4
Justice Kennedy, the current swing vote, has rejected each proposal for assessing
partisan gerrymandering claims while expressing hope that a suitable standard
may one day materialize. 5 In the first thirty years after the Court held partisan

1. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), 548 U.S. 399 (2006); Vieth v.
Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986), abrogated in part by
Vieth, 541 U.S. 267.
2. See Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658
(2015) ("'[P]artisan gerrymanders,' this Court has recognized, '[are incompatible] with
democratic principles."' (alterations in original) (quoting Vieth, 541 U.S. at 292 (plurality
opinion))). Even the Vieth plurality, while denying courts the ability to adjudicate partisan gerrymandering claims, conceded that "an excessive injection of politics is unlawful"
and that "setting out to segregate [voters] by political affiliation is ... lawful" only "so
long as one doesn't go too far." See 541 U.S. at 293, 305-06 (plurality opinion); see also Brief
of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Appellees at 4 n.2, Gill v. Whitford,
No. 16-1161 (U.S. Sept. 5,2017), 2017 WL 4311104 ("All nine Members of the Vieth Court
accepted the proposition that excessive partisan gerrymandering violates the Constitution.").
3. See LULAC, 548 U.S. at 511 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part) (joined by Justice Thomas); Vieth, 541 U.S. at 281 (plurality opinion) (authored by
Justice Scalia and joined by ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Thomas);
Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 144 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (joined by Chief
Justice Burger and then-Justice Rehnquist).
4. See LULAC, 548 U.S. at 413-14 (majority opinion) ("A plurality of the Court in Vieth would
have held [partisan gerrymandering] challenges to be nonjusticiable political questions,
but a majority declined to do so. We do not revisit the justiciability holding ... ." (citations omitted)); id. at 447, 456-57 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
id. at 483 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 491-92 (Breyer, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring
in the judgment); id. at 317, 321-23 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 344, 346-47 (Souter, J.,
dissenting); id. at 355, 364-67 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
5. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) ("I would not foreclose
all possibility of judicial relief if some limited and precise rationale were found .... "); see
also LULAC, 548 U.S. at 414 (affirming Vieth's five-Justice vote against declining to hear
all partisan gerrymandering cases on justiciability grounds).
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gerrymandering justiciable, 6 dozens of plaintiffs raised claims of partisan gerry7
mandering, but not one was granted relief -until recently.
In Whitford v. Gill,8 plaintiffs challenged the 2012 Wisconsin State Assembly
district map as a partisan gerrymander, relying in part on a newly proposed numeric measure and associated legal test called the "efficiency gap."9 In 2014,
10
political scientist Eric McGhee proposed the measure. In 2015, McGhee and
leading election law scholar Nicholas Stephanopoulos developed the measure
into a legal test specifically designed to address concerns with prior proposals
1
for assessing partisan gerrymandering.1 In brief, the efficiency gap measure
counts the relative number of votes "wasted" by each of two competing political
parties; it thereby quantifies the relative efficiency with which each party is able
2
to convert popular support (votes) into governmental power (seats).1 The legal
test classifies as an invalid partisan gerrymander any plan that produces a large,
13
durable, and unjustified efficiency gap.
6. See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 125-27.
7. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 279-80 (plurality opinion) ("[I]n all of the cases we are aware of involving [the] most common form of political gerrymandering, [that involving the
drawing of district lines,] relief was denied."); Nicholas 0. Stephanopoulos & Eric M.
McGhee, PartisanGerrymanderingand the Efficiency Gap, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 832-33
(2015) ("By our count, claimants' record over this generation-long period [from 1986 to
2015] is roughly zero wins and fifty losses."); Easha Anand, Comment, Finding a Path
Through the Political Thicket In Defense of Partisan Gerrymandering'sJusticiability, 102
CALIF.L. REV. 917,933 (2014) ("[0]f the thirty-nine decisions surveyed..., only one found
a gerrymander unconstitutional, and that one decision was subsequently dismissed as
moot.").
8. 218 F. Supp. 3d 837,854,910 (W.D. Wis. 2016), stay granted, 137 S. Ct. 2289, and jurisdiction

postponed, 137 S. Ct. 2268 (2017).
9. See Complaint It 1, 5, Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837 (No. 3:15-cv-00421-bbc), 2015 WL
4651084.
10. See Eric McGhee, Measuring Partisan Bias in Single-Member DistrictElectoral Systems, 39
LEGIs. STUD. Q. 55, 68, 77 (2014). In his 2014 article, McGhee called the metric "relative
wasted votes." See id. at 77.
11. See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 7, at 833-34. Throughout this Article, I refer
to Eric McGhee and Nicholas Stephanopoulos as the "academic proponents" or simply
the "proponents" of the proposed efficiency gap measure and legal test.
12. See id. at 851 (defining the "efficiency gap" as "the difference between the parties' respective wasted votes, divided by the total number of votes cast in the election" (emphasis
omitted)); id. at 852 ("A gap in a party's favor enables the party to claim more seats, relative to a zero-gap plan, without claiming more votes.").
13. See id. at 864-65, 885. Specifically, "large" means that the gap exceeds a set numeric threshold, see id. at 886-89 (recommending two seats for congressional plans and an 8%
efficiency gap for state house plans); "durable" means that the gap is robust to sensitivity
testing that models plausible shifts in voting patterns, see id. at 889-90; and "unjustified"
means that the gap cannot be explained as the product of consistently applying legitimate districting criteria to the jurisdiction's "underlying political geography," see id. at

891.
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Armed with this new measure and associated legal test, the Whitford plaintiffs not only survived the motions stage but also won at trial before a panel of
three federal judges.14 The majority opinion does not endorse wholesale the
plaintiffs' proposal, but it extensively discusses the efficiency gap as strong evidence in support of its conclusion that the map was a partisan gerrymander.15
Wisconsin appealed directly to the U.S. Supreme Court,16 which stayed the
panel's remedial order, ordered full briefing, and heard oral argument on
October 3, 2017.17 Whitford offers the Court the opportunity to decide whether
the efficiency gap provides the legal test it has been waiting for. Were the Court
to affirm the panel's finding of partisan gerrymandering-based on the
efficiency gap analysis, other evidence, or some combination thereof-it would
remake the law of electoral districting in advance of the 2020 redistricting
cycle. 18

14. Whiford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 843, 856-57, 930. When a plaintiff sues in federal court to
challenge the constitutionality of an electoral districting plan for "any statewide legislative body" or congressional delegation, Congress has required the convening of a threejudge panel, 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a) (2016), with direct appeal to the Supreme Court after injunctive relief is granted or denied, id. § 1253. See Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1464
n.2 (2017); see also Shapiro v. McManus, 136 S. Ct. 450, 454-55 (2015) (clarifying that
§ 2284's requirement of convening a three-judge panel is mandatory). See generallyJoshua
A. Douglas, The ProcedureofElection Law in FederalCourts,2011 UTAH L. REv. 433 (discussing the operation of relevant statutory provisions in election law cases).
15. See Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 903 ("[The] evidence is further bolstered by the plaintiffs'
use of the 'efficiency gap'.. . to demonstrate that ... their representational rights have
been burdened."); see also id. at 933 (Griesbach, J., dissenting) ("Despite the central role the
efficiency gap has played in the case from the beginning, ... the majority has declined the
Plaintiffs' invitation to adopt their standard and uses it only as confirming
evidence....").
16. See Defendants' Notice of Appeal at 1, Whitford v. Gill, No. 3:15-cv-00421-bbc (W.D.
Wis. Feb. 24, 2017).
17. See Gill v. Whitford, 137 S. Ct. 2289,2289 (2017) (mem.) (granting a stay of the three-judge
court's judgment pending appeal to the Court); Gill v. Whitford, 137 S. Ct. 2268, 2268
(2017) (mem.) (postponing consideration of the jurisdictional question pending hearing
the case on the merits); Transcript of Oral Argument, Gill v. Whitford, No. 16-1161 (U.S.
Oct. 3, 2017), 2017 WL 4517131.
18. Justice Kennedy was the swing vote in Vieth, see Vieth v.Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267,306 (2004)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment), and may remain the swing vote in Whitford
if each of the five Justices who joined the court since Vieth (Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch) votes like his or her predecessor on the
question of partisan gerrymandering. Cf, e.g., Kerr v. Hickenlooper, 759 F.3d 1186,1193,
1196 (10th Cir. 2014) (GorsuchJ., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (citing
Justice Scalia's plurality opinion in Vieth). But this possibility is no foregone conclusion.
And even if the Court embraces a partisan gerrymandering claim this Term in a predicted 5-4 decision, see, e.g., Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Takes Up Wisconsin as Test in
Partisan Gerrymandering Claims, WASH. PosT (Oct. 3, 2017), https://perma.cc/HN7V
-5GKS, the evolution and refinement of partisan gerrymandering doctrine over time
will be determined by the Court as a whole rather than by any single Justice.
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As the Court considers Whitford, the efficiency gap measure and associated
legal test warrant careful and comprehensive examination. Thus far, the reactions in popular media, 19 scholarship, 20 and litigation 21 have been strong and
conflicting. This Article contributes to this evaluative effort by offering a new
analysis of the proposed efficiency gap measure, focusing particularly on its underlying methodological choices and electoral assumptions, as well as its
relationship to competitiveness, seats-votes proportionality, and voter turnout.
19. For a small sampling of media coverage of the efficiency gap proposal, see David Daley,
Will Justice Kennedy Be the Supreme Court's Hero on Gerrymandering?Don't Count On It,
SALON (June 5, 2017, 1:59 AM), https://perma.cc/GRT5-G7VS; and Adam Liptak, When
Does PoliticalGerrymandering Cross a ConstitutionalLine?, N.Y. TIMES: SIDEBAR (May 15,

2017), https://perma.cc/S8RJ-M5LZ.
20. For scholarly examination of the efficiency gap proposal, see Theodore S. Arrington, A
PracticalProcedurefor Detecting a PartisanGerrymander, 15 ELECTION L.J. 385 (2016); Jowei
Chen, The Impact of Political Geography on Wisconsin Redistricting:An Analysis of Wisconsin's Act 43 Assembly DistrictingPlan, 16 ELECTION L.J. 443 (2017); Edward B. Foley, Due
Process, FairPlay, and Excessive Partisanship:A New Principlefor JudicialReview of Election
Laws, 84 U. CHI. L.REV. 655 (2017); AnthonyJ. McGann et al., A DiscernableandManageable
Standardfor Partisan Gerrymandering, 14 ELECTION L.J. 295 (2015); John F. Nagle, How
Competitive Should a FairSingle Member DistrictingPlan Be?, 16 ELECTION L.J. 196 (2017);
Samuel S.-H. Wang, Three Practical Testsfor Gerrymandering:Application to Maryland and
Wisconsin, 15 ELECTION L.J. 367 (2016); andJonathan Krasno et al., Can Gerrymanders Be
Measured?: An Examination of Wisconsin's State Assembly (May 28, 2016) (unpublished
manuscript), https://perma.cc/7TFY-JQFB.
21. In the Whitfordthree-judge panel's decision on the merits, both the majority and dissent

discussed the efficiency gap proposal in depth. See Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837,
854-57 (W.D. Wis. 2016), stay granted, 137 S. Ct. 2289, and jurisdictionpostponed, 137 S. Ct.
2268 (2017); id. at 933-34, 937-38 (Griesbach, J., dissenting). The panel also discussed the
proposal when denying Wisconsin's motions to dismiss and for summary judgment. See
Whitford v. Nichol, 151 F. Supp. 3d 918, 920-22 (W.D. Wis. 2015) (denying motion to

dismiss); Whitford v. Nichol, 180 F. Supp. 3d 583, 585, 588-93 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (denying
motion for summary judgment).
Meanwhile, a federal lawsuit challenging North Carolina's congressional redistricting
plan and relying on the efficiency gap measure also survived a motion to dismiss. See
Common Cause v. Rucho, 240 F. Supp. 3d 376, 377-78, 380 (M.D.N.C. 2017) (per curiam).
The three-judge panel convened in the Middle District of North Carolina consolidated
two cases, one brought by a group of plaintiffs led by Common Cause, the other by a
group of plaintiffs led by the League of Women Voters. See id. at 377 & n.1. The two
groups of plaintiffs make similar legal arguments, but only the League of Women Voters
plaintiffs have used the efficiency gap in the discriminatory effect element of the proffered legal test. See id. at 380. The Rucho panel briefly discussed the efficiency gap proposal
when denying the state's motion to dismiss. See id. at 380-81. It discussed the efficiency
gap in much greater detail when, in January 2018, it held that the state's congressional
districting plan was an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander. See Common Cause v.

Rucho, 279 F. Supp. 3d 587, 597, 658-64, 668-69 (M.D.N.C. 2018) (discussing evidence
related to the efficiency gap and concluding that the gap, along with other statistical
measures of partisan asymmetry, "provided 'strong proof" of the plan's discriminatory

effects (quoting Sylvester v. SOS Children's Vills. Ill., Inc., 453 F.3d 900, 903 (7th Cir.
2006))), stay granted, No. 17A745, 2018 WL 472142 (U.S.Jan. 18, 2018), and appeal docketed,
No. 17-1295 (U.S. Mar. 14, 2018).
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This analysis bears on the questions before the Court in Whitford. Is partisan
gerrymandering justiciable? If so, what is the governing legal standard? Under
that standard, is the Wisconsin State Assembly plan a partisan gerrymander?
And what role, if any, should the efficiency gap measure play in that standard? I
would suggest the following answers to the first three questions: Yes, partisan
gerrymandering is justiciable; the principle of partisan symmetry is an appropriate legal standard; and the Wisconsin plan is a partisan gerrymander. The
fourth question is the subject of this Article.
The efficiency gap is one of multiple useful indicative measures of partisan
asymmetry under circumstances like those in Whitford, where each party earns
about half the votes and a large efficiency gap persists under plausible variations
in voter behavior. However, the Court should not adopt the efficiency gap as the
exclusive definitional measure of partisan gerrymandering, such that a plan
would be invalid if and only if it exhibited a large, durable, and unjustified efficiency gap. Instead, the Court should permit some flexibility for scholars,
litigants, and courts to refine measurement approaches over time and under varying circumstances. Note that this is precisely the approach suggested by leading
academics in an amicus brief filed in Whitford.22 Furthermore, the Court should
acknowledge that partisan gerrymandering is not the only form of political gerrymandering that subverts democratic values and should signal its receptiveness
to efforts to define and proscribe other forms of political gerrymandering. Just
as excessive departures from partisan symmetry can trigger a partisan gerrymandering claim, perhaps excessive departures from competitiveness should
trigger a bipartisan gerrymandering claim or excessive departures from seatsvotes proportionality should trigger a minority protection claim.
Were the Court to embrace an approach of measurement refinement over
time, this Article would prove relevant to the process through which "lower

22. See Brief of Heather K. Gerken et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees at 4,
Whitford, No. 16-1161 (U.S. Aug. 30, 2017), 2017 WL 3774485 (urging the Court to announce "[p]artisan symmetry" as a "workable principle" for adjudicating partisan
gerrymandering cases, "one that lends itself to a manageable test, while allowing the
lower courts to work out the precise contours of that test with time and experience"); id.
at 25 ("Partisan-symmetry tests all answer the same, simple question and rely on a shared
standard. But they are flexible enough to accommodate contextual differences, thus allowing courts to choose the test best suited for assessing a particular plan. More
importantly, a court can assess a districting plan using more than one symmetry test.
Extreme gerrymanders will certainly perform poorly along more than one symmetry
measure. Judges can thereby use multiple symmetry tests to assure themselves of the robustness of their assessment and identify extreme outliers." (citations omitted)); see also
Brief of Robin Best et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees at 3, Whitford, No. 161161 (U.S. Sept. 5, 2017), 2017 WL 4311099 (classifying the Wisconsin State Assembly
plan as a partisan gerrymander based on an analysis employing an alternative measure
and 10,000 simulated alternative maps).
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courts ... work out the precise contours of [partisan gerrymandering claim analysis] with time and experience." 23 Additionally, the efficiency gap measure
represents a contribution to the election law and political science literatures independent from the role it may play in Whitford. Political scientists are
exploring the relationship between partisan gerrymandering and other variables of interest, using the efficiency gap measure as the operational definition of
partisan gerrymandering. 24 An evaluation of the efficiency gap measure is thus
relevant not only to whether and how courts proscribe partisan gerrymandering but also to how political scientists study it. Finally, in developing the
efficiency gap measure, McGhee has discovered significant, surprising relationships between seats-votes curves and properties of wasted vote measures, such
as the fact that under traditional definitions parties waste an equal number of
votes when a party translates a 1% increase in votes into a 2% increase in seats.25
This Article identifies other relationships of interest between wasted vote
measures, seats-votes proportionality, competitiveness, and voter turnout.
This Article proceeds in five Parts. Part I relates the necessary background
in a way that frames the subsequent analysis, suggesting the utility and limits of
the efficiency gap measure. Political gerrymandering is a multinormative structural problem the Court has struggled to regulate. The efficiency gap is designed
to better measure partisan asymmetry using the ideal of equal wasted votes. But
a legal standard for partisan gerrymandering must cohere with both an individual rights framework and a structural account of electoral democracy attentive
to the multiple norms at stake. This suggests an inquiry into the efficiency gap's
conceptual design and its relationship to competitiveness and seats-votes proportionality.
Part II explores the efficiency gap's conceptual design, examining five
choices underlying the measure: the "efficiency principle" McGhee developed as
a guide to the measure's design; the equal voter turnout assumption used to reduce the long-form equation to the simplified formula; the method of
aggregating wasted votes to produce a single number; the definition and weight
of surplus votes; and the two-party assumption.
Part III examines the efficiency gap's relationship to seats-votes proportionality and competitiveness. It shows that the efficiency gap can be understood as

23. Brief of Heather K. Gerken et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees, supra note 22,
at 4.
24. See, e.g., Devin Caughey et al., PartisanGerrymanderingand the PoliticalProcess Effects on
Roll-Call Voting and State Policies, 16 ELECTION L.J. 453, 454-55 (2017).
25. See McGhee, supra note 10, at 68-69 (presenting equation 5, which shows that the efficiency gap reduces to a simplified formula when the same number of ballots are cast in
each district, and determining that the balance of wasted votes under that simplified formula "willbe equal whenever the majority's margin in seats is twice its margin in votes");
id. app. B at 79-82 (deriving equation 5).

1140

.uantifying PartisanGerrymandering
70 STAN. L. REV. 1131 (2018)

a competitiveness gap expressed in terms of turnout and margin of victory rather than wasted votes or undeserved seats. The efficiency gap measure may
allow or even encourage mapmakers to draw plans that undermine electoral
competitiveness and proportionality between votes earned and seats won. This
creates a false positive problem, where the measure disfavors normatively desirable plans, and a false negative problem, where the measure favors normatively
undesirable plans. The doctrinal analyses of intent and justification, as well as
sensitivity analysis, only partially address the false positive problem because
mapmakers may fear not just invalidation but also litigation. And these tools fail
to address the false negative problem because the efficiency gap proposal offers
no mechanism to overcome the presumption of validity triggered by a belowthreshold gap. This analysis also suggests unacknowledged measure convergence, in which scholars or jurists invoke the competitiveness gap without
realizing that it is mathematically equivalent to the efficiency gap. Finally, the
definition and weight of surplus votes determines the efficiency gap's relationship to the norms of electoral competitiveness and seats-votes proportionality.
With a voter-centric definition of surplus votes (using the full margin of victory
rather than half the margin) and a party-centric scale (comparing wasted vote
totals rather than shares), the efficiency gap would idealize triple proportionality, exacerbating the extreme vote share problem.
Part IV presents a new wasted vote measure designed to exhibit greater discernibility and structural coherence. This measure defines a surplus vote as the
entire (rather than half of the) margin of victory and then compares the parties'
wasted vote shares (rather than totals). This conceptual design is more votercentric in terms of how wasted votes are measured and compared. And the measure bears a relationship to competitiveness and proportionality that better
aligns with structural values and electoral reality.
Part V concludes, drawing doctrinal implications from the mathematical
and legal analysis preceding it. First, questions of robustness and scope must be
addressed when setting the numeric threshold and computing a challenged
plan's efficiency gap. Second, given the measure's normatively fraught relationship with competing democratic norms, courts should use it only as an
indicative measure and not as the exclusive definition of partisan gerrymandering.
I.

The Efficiency Gap's Power and Limits

This Part contextualizes the efficiency gap within the broader effort to define and curb political gerrymandering. It describes the challenges posed by
gerrymandering, explains the appeal of the efficiency gap measure, and identifies the questions that motivate this Article's analysis.

1141

Quantiying PartisanGerrymandering
70 STAN.L.REv. 1131(2018)

A.

Gerrymandering as a Multinormative Structural Problem

Jurists, scholars, politicians, media, reformers, and ordinary citizens agree
that gerrymandering 26 poses a profound threat to democratic values. 27 And for
good reason. Electoral districting confers on the mapmaker the power to shape
electoral destiny-a power too easily abused. 28 To favor one party over another,
26. This Article employs the following terminology throughout: Gerrymandering refers
broadly to any manipulation of electoral boundaries; malapportionmentrefers to distortion of the population sizes of electoral districts; racial gerrymandering refers to
manipulation of electoral boundaries on the basis of race; political gerrymanderingrefers
to manipulation with political intent and effect; partisan gerrymanderingrefers to manipulation intended to benefit one party over another; and bipartisangerrymandering
refers to manipulation intended to preserve safe seats for incumbents from both parties.
Thus, partisan gerrymandering is one type of political gerrymandering.
27. See, e.g., Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n, 135 S. Ct. 2652,2658
(2015) ("[P]artisan gerrymanders... [are incompatible] with democratic principles." (first
and third alterations in original) (quoting Vieth v.Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267,292 (2004) (plurality opinion))); Jack M. Balkin, Closing Keynote Address, The Last Days of Disco: Why
the American PoliticalSystem Is Dysfunctional, 94 B.U. L. REv. 1159,1165 (2014) (including
"exclusively single-member districts," "first-past-the-post election rules," and "[plolitical
gerrymandering" in a list of causes of "features of our current system that make it dysfunctional"); Robert Draper, The League of Dangerous Mapmakers, ATLANTIC (Oct. 2012),
https://perma.cc/M8W5-YXAV ("[Redistricting today has become the most insidious
practice in American politics....").
28. See Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymanderingand Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593, 595 (2002)
("There is a core understanding in American politics, going back to the evocative imagery of the
gerrymander, that geographically districted elections are subject to ends-oriented manipulation"). The risk of gerrymandering is an inherent feature of the practice of geographic electoral
districting,by which I mean the system in which individual representatives for a multimember
body are selected through separate elections conducted in geographic subunits (called electoral
districts) of the jurisdiction. Many countries eschew districting entirely, opting instead for some
system of proportional representation, whereby representation of the entire body is distributed
according to the support each party earns in a single election conducted over the entire jurisdiction. See ElectoralSystems Around the World, FAIRVOTE, https.//perma.cc/VX93-UFQR (archived
Feb. 20,2018) (surveying 35 major democracies as of 2012 and finding that 29 of them use some
form of proportional or mixed proportional system). But from its inception to the present, the
US. electoral system has relied heavily on geographic electoral districting. See Paul L. McKaskle,
Essay, Of Wasted Votes and No Influence An Essay on Voting Systems in the United States, 35 Hous. L.
REV. 1119,1124, 1136 (1998). Most states have adopted a single-member simple plurality system, under which each electoral district is assigned one seat in the multimember body and each district
awards its seat to the candidate who earns the most votes in that district's race. See Bruce E. Cain,
Commentary, Garrett's Temptation, 85 VA. L.REv. 1589,1601 (1999); Justin Levitt, What Is Redistricting?, ALL ABouT REDISTRICTING, https-//perma.cc/5REF-W3LT (archived Feb. 20, 2018)
("Most of our federal legislators, all of our state legislators, and many of our local legislators in
towns and counties are elected from districts. These districts divide states and the people who
live there into geographical territories"). Electoral districting may in fact offer some advantages
over proportional representation systems. SeeNathaniel Persily, Reply, In Defense ofFoxes Guarding Henhouser The CaseforJudicialAcquiescence to Incumbent-ProtectingGerrymanders,116 HARV.L.
REV. 649,650 (2002); Peter H. Schuck, The Thickest Thicket PartisanGerrymanderingand Judicial
Regulation of Politics, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1325, 1350-51 (1987). But it has one profound disadvantage: It is vulnerable to manipulation by political cartographers.
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the mapmaker can simply dilute the influence of the disfavored party's supporters by assigning them to districts where their votes have less impact: either by
packing them into a few districts where their preferred candidates win by overwhelming margins or by cracking them into many districts so that their
preferred candidates lose each one. Aided by powerful computers-and prevailing patterns of residence and voting-the modern mapmaker can pack and crack
with exquisite precision, thereby distorting the way political parties translate
popular support (votes) into governmental power (seats).29 With the stroke of a
pen (or a few taps on a keyboard), the mapmaker can confer a legislative majority on a party supported by a minority of voters or a legislative supermajority
on a party supported by a slim majority of voters. As one state legislator put it,
the practice of gerrymandering turns the process of electoral districting into
"the business of rigging elections." 30 This is why legislatures guard their districting power so jealously,3 ' why the districting process is often so partisan and
secretive, 32 and why parties expend so many resources drawing and litigating
electoral districting plans. 33
Electoral districting entails districting power; such power invites abuse; we
call such abuse gerrymandering. The term-a portmanteau of the surname
29. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 345-46 (Souter,J., dissenting) (citing Issacharoff, supra note 28, at 624;
Pamela S. Karlan, The Fire Next Time: Reapportionment After the 2000 Census, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 731, 736 (1998); and Richard H. Pildes, Principled Limitations on Racial and Partisan
Redistricting, 106 YALE L.J. 2505, 2553-54 (1997)).
30. See id. at 317 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting John Hoeffel, Six Incumbents Are a Week Away from Easy Election, WINSTON-SALEM J., Jan. 27, 1998, at B3, B3).
31. For example, when Arizona voters, acting through initiative, transferred districting
power from the state legislature to an independent commission, the legislature (unsuccessfully) challenged the constitutionality of this initiative all the way up to the U.S.
Supreme Court. See Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2658-59.
32. For example, the Wisconsin State Assembly plan challenged in Whitford was produced
with the use of nondisclosure agreements, expedited legislative procedures, a war room
with limited access, and consultation exclusively with members of one party. See Emily
Bazelon, The New Front in the GerrymanderingWars Democracy vs. Math, N.Y. TIMES MAG.
(Aug. 29, 2017), https://perma.cc/E7EM-XG94 (noting that "[n]early all of the 79 Republicans in the Wisconsin Senate and Assembly [visited] the map room, signing the same
secrecy pledge to see the new shape of their districts," whereas "[nbo Democrat was invited," and adding that "[t]he Legislature passed the plan a week later, with the support
of every Republican ... and no Democrats").
33. See, e.g., Lisa Marshall Manheim, RedistrictingLitigation and the Delegation of Democratic

Design, 93 B.U. L. REV. 563, 612-13 (2013); David Daley, The House the GOP Built How Republicans Used Soft Money, Big Data, and High- Tech Mapping to Take Controlof Congress and
Increase Partisanship,NEW YORK(Apr. 24, 2016,9-02 PM), https://perma.cc/22ST-G8QV.
Former President Obama and former Attorney General Eric Holder are focusing on redistricting reform through a newly formed organization called the National Democratic
Redistricting Committee. See Edward-Isaac Dovere, Obama, Holder to Lead Post-Trump Re-

districting Campaign, PoLMco (Oct. 17, 2016, 5:06 AM EDT), https://perma.cc/C84D
-VTWD.
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"Gerry" and the word "salamander"-was coined in 1812 by a critic of the districting plan for the Massachusetts Senate, who likened its serpentine
appearance to a salamander and suggested that Governor Elbridge Gerry was
behind it. 34 The term colorfully captures our intuitive sense-and visceral disgust-that manipulation of electoral districts subverts fundamental democratic
norms.
But political gerrymandering, like its amphibian namesake, is slippery, repeatedly eluding efforts to curb it, in part because gerrymandering is a slippery
concept resistant to precise, consensus-garnering definition and quantification.
This is so because gerrymandering is an inherently structural phenomenon concerning the functioning of a healthy electoral system, 35 and the relevant
structural analysis is irreducibly multinormative. Electoral districting implicates, and gerrymandering threatens, multiple democratic norms-including
electoral competition, voter participation, majoritarianism, minority protection, and partisan fairness. There is a high-level consensus that districting power
may be abused but dissensus on the right way to draw electoral districts and thus
disagreement on precisely how to define and measure gerrymandering. 36 Just as
different doctors may disagree on the most salient components of health at stake
in any given treatment decision, legal scholars "are divided as to what [is] the
most important structural consideration" that "capture[s] what is truly at stake"
in electoral districting.37 As Stephanopoulos puts it, "Two approaches to redistricting have dominated the academic debate over the last generation: the
partisan fairness approach, advocating that district plans treat the major parties

34. See Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2658 n.1 (citing ELMER C. GRIFFITH, THE RISE AND
DEVELOPMENT OF THE GERRYMANDER 16-19 (Arno Press 1974) (1907)); Vieth, 541 U.S. at
274 (plurality opinion) (citing Gerrymander, WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL

DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1945)).
35. See Heather K. Gerken, Essay, Lost in the Political Thicket The Court, Election Law, and the
Doctrinal Interregnum, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 503, 508 (2004) ("It is hard to figure out what is
'fair' or 'equal' in districting without speaking in structural terms. Any such conclusion
would require a theory of representation, an idea about how a healthy democracy is supposed to function.").
36. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 307 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) ("No substantive definition of fairness in districting seems to command general assent."); Krasno et al., supra
note 20, at 1 ("Partisan gerrymandering shares both of the characteristics of pornography
that Potter Stewart famously wrestled with in his concurring opinion in Jacobellis- it is
difficult to measure objectively and (therefore) a matter of subjective opinion."); see also
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("[U]nder the First and
Fourteenth Amendments criminal laws in this area are constitutionally limited to hardcore pornography. I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description .... But I know it when I see
it .... "(footnote omitted)).
37. Nicholas 0. Stephanopoulos, Elections and Alignment, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 283, 295-96

(2014).
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symmetrically, and the competitiveness approach, advising that districts be
made as competitive as is feasible."38
Some of the key democratic norms at stake involve the relationship between the votes a party earns and the seats it wins. I will now introduce some
notation and basic properties that help to analyze this relationship; these will
feature prominently throughout this Article. Let V and S respectively denote the
total number of ballots cast and the total number of seats awarded in the election.
Assume that there is a set of parties (P), and for each party p e P let Vp,

Fp,

and V;

respectively denote that party's vote total, vote share, and vote margin, and let
SP, Sp, and S; respectively denote that party's seat total, seat share, and seat mar-

gin.3 9
A party p's vote total (Vp) is simply the number of ballots cast for that party
(across all districts); its vote share (W) is its vote total divided by the total number
of ballots cast (Vp = 1); and its vote margin (V;*) is the difference between its vote
V

share and 50% (,*

= V

-

2). For example, if 100 ballots are cast (V = 100) and a

party earns sixty of them (V, = 60), its vote share is 60% (V
and its vote margin is 10% (V* = V -

V

- -

--

60

100

0.6),

0.6 - 0.5 = 0.1).

~'2 =

The seat variables are defined similarly: A party p's seat total (Sp) is the number of seats won by candidates of that party; its seat share

(sp)

is its seat total

divided by the total number of seats (9p = sP); and its seat margin (S;) is the difS

ference between its seat share and 50% (S; = 9P

-

2). For example, if a

congressional plan consists of ten seats (S = 10) and a party earns four of them
(Sp = 4), its seat share is 40% (9, = p =
(S; =

SP

-

1

S

= 0.4 - 0.5 = -0.1).

10

= 0.4), and its seat margin is -10%

Note that under a two-party assumption, a

positive vote (seat) margin connotes majority status while a negative vote (seat)
margin connotes minority status.
These variables relate in simple ways in the special case where there are only
two parties, an assumption generally adopted in the efficiency gap approach4o
and in much of this Article's analysis. In this case, I refer to the two parties as
party x and party y; that is, P = (x, y}. Because every ballot is cast for, and every
seat won by, one party or the other-ignoring the possibility of a tie-simple

38. Nicholas 0. Stephanopoulos, The Consequences of ConsequentialistCriteria,3 U.C. IRVINE L.

REV. 669, 673 (2013).
39. Under the notation used throughout this Article, the bar accent indicates a share, while
the star superscript indicates a margin.
40. See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 7, at 853.
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relationships apply. The overall vote (seat) total is the sum of the two parties'
vote (seat) totals.
Vx+Vy=V
sx + sy = S
Respective vote (seat) shares sum to one.4 1
V, + VY= 1
Sx + SY = 1
Respective vote (seat) margins sum to zero. 42

sx* + V; = 0
S* + S; = 0

This means that the parties' vote (seat) margins have equal magnitudes but opposite signs: Vx' = -V; and S* = -S*. For this reason, I will sometimes assume,
without loss of generality, that party x enjoys a positive vote (seat) margin and
refer to the vote margin simply as V*instead of V* and the seat margin simply as
S*instead of S*. Each party's vote (seat) share can then be expressed in terms of
the vote (seat) margin. 43
2

1x = --+ VS*; 1, =

2.

2

And the difference between vote (seat) shares is twice the vote (seat) margin."
Vx - Vy = 2V*

Sx -Sy

41. Proof: Vx + Vy==

v

v

42. Proof: Vx* + V;* =Vx

vx+vY
2

-1;& +y=-v~y S x+-L= =1. s
+Y
s
s

44. Proof: Vx

-

= Ix-V

Vy =

-

1

1

+ V*

-)

sx+sy

+ =2 1 -) 11= 0;

1

Thus: V

+V)

y)-

2

1

43. Proof: V* = V

= 2S*

y

= 1 -

= 2V*;Sx
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Political scientists analyze how a party's seat share (9p) does and should vary
with its vote share (Pp) by conceptualizing seat share as a function of vote share. 45
They illustrate this relationship graphically by drawing a seats-votes curveA'
Figure 1 below provides an example of a seats-votes curve. A single point on the
curve represents an electoral outcome, that is, the seat share a party earns at a
given vote share; the curve itself represents a range of outcomes corresponding
to different values of the party's vote share.
Figure 1

1

11

Vote share (V)
Point A represents a single election outcome at which the party earns seat share SP
with vote share p. The curve represents a range of outcomes corresponding to different values of vote share.

Figure 2 below illustrates the concepts of seats-votesproportionalityand seatsvotes responsiveness. Seats-votes proportionality captures the absolute relationship between vote share and seat share. Graphically, it is the slope of the line
connecting the origin (0,0) to the point of the observed electoral outcome. Seatsvotes responsiveness captures the marginal relationship: the ratio between an
incremental change in vote share and the corresponding incremental change in

45. See, e.g., Edward R. Tufte, The RelationshipBetween Seats and Votes in Two-Party Systems, 67
AM. POL. Sa. REV. 540 (1973).
46. A descriptive seats-votes curve estimates the relationship that actually exists in the real
world. A prescriptiveseats-votes curve indicates the ideal relationship that ought to exist
in a healthy, well-functioning democracy.
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seat share. Graphically, it is the slope of the tangent at the point of the observed
electoral outcome. In the language of differential calculus, it is the derivative of
the seats-votes function depicted in Figure 1 above at that point. Seats-votes responsiveness is one measure of electoral competitiveness: The more districts
with close races won by small margins of victory, the more seat flips (and therefore seat share changes) for a given shift in vote share. 47
Figure 2

-75
II
Co.

,25

0
0

25

.75

01

1

Vote Share (V)
Seats-votes proportionality at point A is the slope of the line connecting point A to
the origin (0,0), which is the ratio of Sp to VP* Seats-votes responsiveness at point A
is the slope of the tangent line passing through point A, which is the derivative of

S(V) at Vp.

Only when a seats-votes curve is truly curved can proportionality and responsiveness diverge. If a seats-votes curve is a straight line, proportionality and
responsiveness are equal. For example, strict proportionality, where a party's
seat share is identical to its vote share, corresponds to a straight line from the
point (0,0) (where a party receives no votes and no seats) to the point (1,1) (where
a party receives all the votes and all the seats), passing through the point (0.5,0.5)
(where a party receives half the votes and half the seats). Some argue for an ideal
of strict proportionality between a party's vote share and its seat share and, on
47. See, e.g., Stephanopoulos, supra note 38, at 678 ("[E]lectoral responsiveness indicate[s] both
how competitive individual districts are and how responsive a jurisdiction's electoral
system is as a whole.").
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this basis, propose that we replace our districting-based electoral system with

one explicitly based on proportional representation. 48
In the real world, the seats-votes curves estimated by political scientists are
not straight lines, but rather S-shaped curves that exhibit lower responsiveness
(flatter slopes) when one party enjoys a large majority and higher responsiveness (steeper slopes) when the electorate is more evenly split between the two
parties. Figures 3 and 4 below provide examples of linear (strictly proportional)
and nonlinear (real-world) seats-votes curves.
Figure 3

0

0.25

0.50

0.75

1.00

Vote Share (V)
A linear seats-votes curve satisfying strict seats-votes proportionality.

48. See generally, e.g., DOUGLAS J. AMY, REAL CHOICEs/NEW VOICES: How PROPORTIONAL
REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS COULD REVITALIZE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2d ed. 2002).

1149

Quantifying PartisanGerrymandering
70 STAN. L. REV. 1131 (2018)

Figure 4
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A nonlinear seats-votes curve exhibiting higher responsiveness (steeper slopes)
when the electorate is more evenly split between the two parties and lower responsiveness (flatter slopes) when one party enjoys a large majority.

Political scientists have found that average seats-votes responsiveness is
usually not 1, as strict proportionality would require, but generally closer to 2.49
The result is a "seat bonus": the majority translates a positive vote margin into
an even larger seat margin.5 For example, with a 51% vote share (1% vote margin), a party may earn a 52% seat share (2% seat margin) instead of the 51% seat
share that would be required under strict proportionality. Some argue that seat

49. See, e.g., Nicholas M. Goedert, Redistricting, Risk, and Representation:How Five State Gerrymanders Weathered the Tides of the 2000s, 13 ELECTION L.J. 406, 413 (2014) ("[T]he slope in

U.S. congressional elections is often found to be around 2." (citations omitted)); Edward
R. Tufte, The Relationship Between Seats and Votes in Two-Party Systems, 67 AM. PoL. Sc.
REV. 540, 542 (1973) (finding a "swing ratio" of 1.9 over a period with twelve congressional elections). The Whitford majority emphasized that both parties stipulated that the
simplified formula's "implied 2-to-1 votes-to-seats relationship reflects the 'observed average seat/votes curve in historical U.S. congressional and legislative elections.'"
Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 907 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (quoting Joint Final Pretrial
Report ¶ 105, Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837 (No. 3:15-cv-00421-bbc)), stay granted, 137 S.
Ct. 2289, and jurisdictionpostponed, 137 S. Ct. 2268 (2017).
50. See Mitchell N. Berman, Managing Gerrymandering,83 TEx. L. REV. 781, 806 n.165 (2005)
(discussing the seat bonus and noting that it is sometimes termed the "winner's bonus");
Adam Cox, Commentary, PartisanFairnessand RedistrictingPolitics,79 N.Y.U. L.REV. 751,

765 (2004) (same).
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bonuses are normatively undesirable because of the departure from strict proportionality; 5' others argue that they are normatively desirable because the
bonus incentivizes robust campaigning and promotes a stable, functioning legislative majority. 52

The S-shaped nature of actual seats-votes curves reflects an accommodation
between competing norms, ensuring representation for minority parties while
rewarding majority parties. As Robert Browning and Gary King aptly put it, this
approach "reflects an important principle of-the United States two-party, democratic system. It helps majorities form, yet protects the minority party."53
Specifically, it helps the majority party by exhibiting high seats-votes responsiveness when the two parties earn similar vote shares but protects the minority
party by exhibiting low seats-votes responsiveness when one party earns most
of the vote share. 54
The seats-votes framework helps illustrate how electoral districting implicates tradeoffs between multiple democratic values. This in turn helps explain
why there is no universal agreement on the right way to draw electoral districts.
Of course, the task with which the Supreme Court is currently faced is not to
prescribe ideal districting practices as a matter of policy or abstract democratic
theory, but rather to distinguish valid from invalid districting practices as a matter of federal constitutional law. And the question fracturing the Court is less
whether partisan gerrymandering presents a constitutional problem than
whether the Court can address it. In the language of federal courts jurisprudence,
the question is whether gerrymandering constitutes a justiciable legal claim the
courts can adjudicate or a nonjusticiable political question the courts cannot address, which turns on whether the Court can identify a judicially discernible and
manageable standard to channel and limit judicial intervention. 55
51. See, e.g., AMY, supra note 48, at 34-41 ("This system unfairly diminishes the power of minority parties and artificially enhances the power of the largest party.").
52. See, e.g., Schuck, supra note 28, at 1350-51 ("By raising the returns to victory. . ., [this
system] may attract more talented, entrepreneurial individuals into public life.... Citizens and parties may prefer the stability, power aggregation, and accountability to
voters that a victory bonus encourages.").
53. Robert X. Browning & Gary King, Seats, Votes, and Gerrymandering.Estimating Representation and Bias in State Legislative Redistricting, 9 LAW & POL'Y 305, 313 (1987).
54. See supraFigure 4.
55. See, e.g., Jurisdictional Statement at i, Gill v. Whitford, No. 16-1161 (U.S. Mar. 24, 2017), 2017
WL 1131500. The presence or absence of a judicially discernible and manageable standard is
just one of six factors under the political question doctrine. The first is whether the constitutional text provides for resolution of the issue by a coordinate branch; another is whether
there is "an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made";
and the remaining factors concern whether adjudication would require courts to make policy
determinations they are ill equipped to make, express disrespect to a coordinate branch,
decide issues without "judicially discoverable and manageable standards," or risk embarrassment from interbranch dissensus. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,217 (1962).
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Thus, gerrymandering presents two distinct but related questions: justiciability (is there an adequate standard to guide judicial intervention?) and identification
(what is that standard?). These questions implicate both the relationship between
electoral districting practices and constitutionally significant representational
norms as well as the proper role of the federal judiciary in regulating electoral districting practices pursuant to these norms. Both are democratic problems of
profound constitutional significance on which the Constitution provides limited
explicit guidance. Although political gerrymanders undoubtedly implicate constitutional values, 56 the Constitution's text offers limited procedural guidance on
57
congressional and state legislative elections. And the precise scope of the federal
judicial power to adjudicate federal constitutional claims is also a question without
an explicit textual answer. 58 In this sense, both action and inaction by the Court
on political gerrymandering claims present real but ineffable constitutional risks.

56. See sources cited supra note 2. The Constitution provides that members of the House of
Representatives are to be "chosen ... by the People," U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; "guarantee[s] to every State ... a Republican Form of Government," id. art. IV, § 4; protects
freedoms of expression and association, id. amend. I; enshrines due process and equal protection, id. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1; and prohibits race-based electoral
discrimination, id amend. XIV, § 1; amend. XV, § 1. Each of these provisions codifies values threatened by gerrymandering.
57. Article I vests the federal legislative power in a Congress composed of two multimember
legislative bodies: the House of Representatives, apportioned on a population basis and
popularly elected, see U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, cls. 1, 3, and a Senate, apportioned on the basis
of equal state suffrage, see id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1; id. art. V, with each state's senators originally
"chosen by the Legislature thereof," id. art. I, § 3, cl. I (amended 1913), and now "elected
by the people thereof," id. amend. XVII. But the Elections Clause does not mandate how
to conduct congressional electidns; instead, it gives the choice to individual states and
Congress. See id. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. And while the Constitution assumes that each state has at
least one popularly elected legislative body, see, e.g., id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; id. amend. XVII, it
says nothing about how to conduct state legislative elections, implicitly leaving that
choice to each state as well.
58. Article III, Section 2 provides that "[t]he judicial Power shall extend" to an enumerated set
of "Cases" and "Controversies," the first of which is "all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under" federal law. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. While "[iut is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is," Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803), some "subjects are political" and so "can never be examinable by
the courts," id. at 166. The political question doctrine, like all justiciability doctrines partially discerned from the text of Article III, relates in part to "an idea, which is more than
an intuition but less than a rigorous and explicit theory, about the constitutional and prudential limits to the powers of an unelected, unrepresentative judiciary in our kind of
government." See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004) (quoting
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984)), abrogated in other part by Lexmark Intl, Inc. v.
Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014). One may question whether the
Court, in developing the political question doctrine, has succeeded in divining, from
Article III and its animating structural principles, a discernible and manageable test for justiciability.
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B.

The Efficiency Gap as an Improved Measure of Partisan Symmetry

Because political gerrymandering is so slippery, it has repeatedly eluded the
Court's grasp. The Court has constrained race-based manipulation of district
shape59 and political manipulation of district population size 6 0-meaningfully
limiting mapmakers' packing and cracking abilities. But the Court has repeatedly fractured on whether and how to intervene when political cartographers
manipulate district shape based on party support.
In Davis v. Bandemer,three Justices concluded that "partisan gerrymandering
claims... raise a nonjusticiable political question," 6 1but six Justices insisted that

59. When electoral districting implicates race, the Court and Congress have imposed two
principal legal constraints. First, pursuant to the Reconstruction Amendments, the
Court evaluates a districting plan under strict scrutiny whenever considerations of race
predominate, thereby curtailing intentional race-based cracking or packing. See
Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1464 (2017); Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections,
137 S. Ct. 788, 798 (2017); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642 (1993). Second, the prohibition

on racial vote dilution codified in section 2 of the Voting Rights Act as amended in 1982,
see Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 52 U.S.C.), constrains the ability of a mapmaker to intentionally or in effect dilute the voting strength of racial minorities. See 52 U.S.C.
§ 10301 (2016); Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 11-12 (2009) (opinion of Kennedy, J.);
Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997,1011 (1994) (citing Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 3940 (1993)); Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30,48-51 (1986). Section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965, see Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 5, 79 Stat. 437, 439 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C.
§ 10304), imposed one additional constraint: A covered jurisdiction may only implement
a new districting plan, or any other electoral "standard, practice, or procedure," after
persuading the Attorney General or the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
that the plan would not have a racially retrogressive effect. See 52 U.S.C. § 10304. But
because the Court struck down the coverage formula contained in 52 U.S.C. § 10303, see
Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013), and Congress has yet to adopt a
new one, this third constraint on racial gerrymandering is presently inoperative.
60. For decades, the Court dismissed malapportionment challenges as nonjusticiable political questions, heeding Justice Frankfurter's admonition not to enter the "political
thicket," see Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.), before reversing course, adopting the one person, one vote principle, and thereby
launching the reapportionment revolution, see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 556-58
(1964); Baker, 369 U.S. at 197-98. For examples of scholarship recognizing and exploring
the significance of the reapportionment revolution, see GORDON E. BAKER, THE
REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION: REPRESENTATION, POLITICAL POWER, AND THE
SUPREME COURT 3-6 (1966); GARY W. Cox & JONATHAN N. KATZ, ELBRIDGE GERRY'S
SALAMANDER THE ELECTORAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION

12-13 (2002); Gordon E. Baker, The Unfinished ReapportionmentRevolution, in POLITICAL
GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS 11, 11-16 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1990).
61. See 478 U.S. 109, 144 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (joined by Chief
Justice Burger and then-Justice Rehnquist), abrogated in part by Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541
U.S. 267 (2004).
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such claims were justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause6 2 and agreed that
plaintiffs must demonstrate both discriminatory intent and discriminatory effect.63 Yet those six Justices disagreed among themselves on the correct legal test
for discriminatory effect.6 4 For the next eighteen years, the lower courts applied
the plurality's standard-and rejected at the motions stage every partisan gerrymandering claim they considered. 65
In Vieth v. Jubelirer,the four conservative Justices then on the Court concluded that partisan gerrymandering is a nonjusticiable political question.66 The
four liberal Justices insisted that it is justiciable but offered three different legal
tests.67 Justice Kennedy rejected each standard proposed but suggested that partisan gerrymandering may be justiciable if a suitable standard could be

62. See id. at 113 (plurality opinion) (authored by Justice White and joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun); id. at 161 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (joined by Justice Stevens).
63. See id. at 127 (plurality opinion); id. at 161 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
64. Justice White, writing for a four-Justice plurality, proposed a stringent but vague "consistent degradation" test under which a departure from seats-votes proportionality
would be insufficient to establish discrimination. See id. at 132 (plurality opinion) ("[T]he
mere lack of proportional representation will not be sufficient to prove unconstitutional discrimination.... Rather, unconstitutional discrimination occurs only when the
[challenged plan] ... will consistently degrade a voter's or a group of voters' influence on
the political process as a whole."). Justice Powell, joined by Justice Stevens, proposed a
standard that would have been easier for courts to apply and plaintiffs to meet. See id. at
173-74, 173 n.13 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (proposing consideration of multiple factors, including "the shapes of voting districts," "adherence to
established political subdivision boundaries," "the legislative procedures by which the
apportionment law was adopted," "population disparities," and "disproportionate election results").
65. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 279-80 (plurality opinion) ("[1In all of the cases we are aware of involving that most common form of political gerrymandering, [that involving the
drawing of district lines,] relief was denied."); id. at 280 n.6 (collecting cases).
66. See id. at 281 (authored byJustice Scalia and joined by ChiefJustice Rehnquist andJustices
O'Connor and Thomas).
67. Justice Stevens suggested a "predominant motivation" standard based on the Shaw v. Reno
cause of action for racial gerrymandering. See id. at 339, 341 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, proposed a burden-shifting framework modeled
on Title VII doctrine with a five-factor prima facie case. See id. at 346-51 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer proposed a test based on "unjustified [partisan] entrenchment,"
in which a party with a minority of vote share achieves a majority of seat share through
"partisan manipulation." See id. at 360 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). The
Vieth plaintiffs proposed to demonstrate discriminatory effects by showing that a challenged plan "systematically 'pack[s]' and 'crack[s]' the rival party's voters" and thereby
threatens to "thwart the plaintiffs' ability to translate a majority of votes into a majority
of seats." See id. at 286-87 (plurality opinion) (quoting Brief for Appellants at 19-20, Vieth,

541 U.S. 267 (No. 02-1580), 2003 WL 22070244).
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identified.68 Justice Kennedy emphasized that judicial intervention required
"clear, manageable, and politically neutral standards for measuring the particular burden a given partisan classification imposes on representational rights,"
and he suggested that the First Amendment may offer a better textual basis than
the Equal Protection Clause for such standards. 69 Specifically, Justice Kennedy
wrote that partisan gerrymandering may infringe "the First Amendment interest of not burdening or penalizing citizens because of their participation in the
electoral process, their voting history, their association with a political party, or
their expression of political views.'90
Two years later, in League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry(LULAC),
the Court fractured along similar lines.7 1 Justice Scalia, joined by Justice
Thomas, continued to insist that partisan gerrymandering is a political question.72 The four liberal Justices continued to favor justiciability and suggest
alternative legal tests.7 3 Justice Kennedy again rejected each proffered standard
74
but left open the possibility that an adequate standard may yet materialize.

68. See id. at 306, 308 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
69. See id. at 307-08; id. at 314 ("The First Amendment may be the more relevant constitutional provision in future cases that allege unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering.");
id. at 315 ("Where it is alleged that a gerrymander had the purpose and effect of imposing
burdens on a disfavored party and its voters, the First Amendment may offer a sounder
and more prudential basis for intervention than does the Equal Protection Clause.").
70. Id. at 314.
71. See 548 U.S. 399, 406-07 (2006); supra note 4 and accompanying text. The case fractured
the Court in a particularly severe and complex fashion because it presented both an unsuccessful claim of partisan gerrymandering and a successful claim of racial vote dilution
under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Compare LULAC, 548 U.S. at 423 ("[Aippellants
have established no legally impermissible use of political classifications."), with id. at 442
("[T]he totality of the circumstances demonstrates a § 2 violation.").
72. See LULAC, 548 U.S. at 511 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting

in part).
73. See id. at 447 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 483 (Souter, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (joined by Justice Ginsburg); id. at 491-92
(Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
74. See id. at 414 (majority opinion) (recounting the Vieth majority's refusal to hold partisan
gerrymanders nonjusticiable, declining to "revisit the justiciability holding," and "proceed[ing] to examine whether appellants' claims offer the Court a manageable, reliable
measure of fairness for determining whether a partisan gerrymander violates the Constitution"); id. at 446 (opinion of Kennedy, J.) ("[A]ppellants ... lack any reliable measure
of partisan fairness."); id. at 418 ("[A] successful claim attempting to identify unconstitutional acts of partisan gerrymandering must ... show a burden, as measured by a reliable

standard, on the complainants' representational rights."). Chief Justice Roberts, joined
by Justice Alito, agreed with Justice Kennedy's conclusion that the plaintiffs failed to
provide an adequate standard but declined to weigh in on the question of justiciability.
See id. at 492-93 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part,
and dissenting in part).
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Additionally, the Justices in LULAC considered a new partisan "symmetry"
standard proposed by political scientists Gary King and colleagues. 75 That standard "require[d] that the electoral system treat similarly-situated political parties
equally, so that each receives the same fraction of legislative seats for a particular
vote percentage as the other party would receive if it had received the same percentage" of the vote. 76 This principle of partisan symmetry does not require
strict seats-votes proportionality.7 7 Rather, in the language of the seats-votes
framework, this principle requires that the seats-votes curve be symmetric,
which entails in particular that it passes through the point (0.5,0.5) so that each
of the two major parties gets half the seats when it earns half the votes. Figure 5
below clarifies the difference between partisan symmetry and strict seats-votes
proportionality.
Figure 5
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The nonlinear curve satisfies partisan symmetry but not strict seats-votes proportionality. The linear curve satisfies both partisan symmetry and strict seats-votes
proportionality.

75. See Brief of Amici Curiae Professors Gary King et al. in Support of Neither Party at 4-5,

LULAC, 548 U.S. 399 (Nos. 05-204 et al.), 2006 WL 53994.
76. Id.
77. See id. at 7-8 ("Measuring symmetry and partisan bias does not require'proportional representation' (where each party receives the same proportion of seats as it receives in
votes).").
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If the seats-votes curve accords one party more than half the seats when it
earns half the votes, the additional seats constitute a measure of partisan asymmetry that political scientists often refer to as "bias." Figure 6 below provides an
example of a curve that violates partisan symmetry and thereby exhibits bias.
Figure 6
1.0

0.0

(0.0.5)

I

0.2

O..0

02

0A

0
Vote Share (V)

0.8

1.0

An example of a curve that violates partisan symmetry: With 50% of the votes, one
party earns 60% of the seats while the other earns 40%.

This notion of partisan symmetry is normatively appealing, but it necessarily entails some comparison to a counterfactual hypothetical where the
parties' respective vote shares are switched or each party earns 50% of the votes.
To evaluate this hypothetical, an analyst must make some assumptions about
the geographic distribution of vote-switchers across electoral districts.
The liberal Justices in LULAC expressed interest in the partisan symmetry
concept.78 But Justice Kennedy identified three concerns with this proposal:

78. See LULAC, 548 U.S. at 466 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[Tihe
symmetry standard, a measure social scientists use to assess partisan bias,... is undoubtedly 'a reliable standard' .... " (quoting id. at 418 (opinion of Kennedy, J.))); see also id. at
483-84 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (declining to "rule out the
utility of a criterion of symmetry as a test," noting that "[i]nterest in exploring this notion is evident," and suggesting that "further attention could be devoted to [its]
administrability").
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(1) it involved "conjecture";7 9 (2) it relied on a counterfactual "hypothetical" rather than a directly observed election; 80 and (3) it provided no guidance on how
much departure from the ideal is "too much."81
Since LULAC, partisan gerrymandering has remained in doctrinal limbo.
Without a clear legal test for partisan gerrymandering, plaintiffs have an incentive to attack political gerrymanders as racial gerrymanders, and defendants
have an incentive to justify partisan plans as efforts to comply with the Voting
Rights Act.82 In the context of conjoined polarization-"[t]hemore consistent
alignment of race, party, and ideology since 1965," when the original Voting
Rights Act was enacted 8 3-race and party are easy for litigants to conflate and
hard for courts to distinguish. 84 And perversely, by requiring perennial redistricting, the one person, one vote standard gave mapmakers new opportunities
to manipulate electoral district boundaries, making electoral districting a moving target resistant to judicial oversight.85
It was against this backdrop that McGhee and Stephanopoulos entered the
scene.86 They designed the efficiency gap to operationalize the same principle of
79. Id at 420 (opinion of Kennedy, J.) ("The existence or degree of asymmetry may in large
part depend on conjecture about where possible vote-switchers will reside.").
80. Id. ("[W]e are wary of adopting a constitutional standard that invalidates a map based on
unfair results that would occur in a hypothetical state of affairs.").
81. Id. ("[T]he counterfactual plaintiff would face the same problem as the present, actual appellants: providing a standard for deciding how much partisan dominance is too much.").
82. See Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Appellees, supra note 2, at 27-31.
83. Bruce E. Cain & Emily R. Zhang, Blurred Lines: Conjoined Polarization and Voting Rights,
77 OHIo ST. L.J. 867, 869 (2016); see also Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79
Stat. 437 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 52 U.S.C.).
84. See Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455,1472-81 (2017); Richard L. Hasen, Essay, Race or Party, Race as
Party, or Party All the Time Three Uneasy Approaches to ConjoinedPolarization in Redistricting and
Voting Cases, 59 WM.& MARYL. REv.(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 1-3) (on file with author).
85. SeePamelaS.Karlan,Essay,JohnHartElyand the ProblemofGerrymandering The Lion in Winter,
114 YALE L.J. 1329,1339 (2005) ('TW]e have moved from entrenchment through inaction to a
perhaps even more pathological phenomenon of entrenchment through nonstop action.").
86. The "efficiency gap" proposal was presented in the academic literature through two related articles: a political science article published in 2014 by McGhee, see McGhee, supra note 10, and a 2015
law review article coauthored by Stephanopoulos and McGhee, see Stephanopoulos & McGhee,
supranote 7. The 2014 article introduced the numeric measure and demonstrated its key technical
properties, see McGhee, supra note 10, at 68-70; id app. B, while the 2015 article developed the
measure into a proposed legal standard, see Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 7, at 884-95.
Plaintiffs then adopted an efficiency gap approach in litigation challenging Wisconsin's
state assembly plan (the Whiford litigation) and North Carolina's congressional plan (the
Rucho litigation). See supranote 21. In 2017, McGhee published an article responding to critiques articulated here and elsewhere, addressing previously unexamined technical and
conceptual aspects of the efficiency gap measure, and offering a more refined and generalized conceptualization. See Eric McGhee, Measuring Efficiency in Redistricting, 16 ELECTION
L.J. 417,426-31 (2017) [hereinafter McGhee, MeasuringEfficiency].
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'

partisan symmetry five Justices found appealing in LULAC while addressing
each of Justice Kennedy's concerns. The proponents designed the efficiency gap
to "aggregate[] all of a district plan's cracking and packing choices into a single,
tidy number," thereby distilling "the essence of what critics have in mind when
they refer to partisan gerrymandering." 87 The proponents define a partisan gerrymander as "a district plan that results in one party wasting many more votes
than its adversary."88 "Wasted votes include both'lost' votes (those cast for a losing candidate) and 'surplus' votes (those cast for a winning candidate but in
excess of what she needed to prevail)."89
To calculate the efficiency gap (AW), "[e]ach party's wasted votes are totaled,
one sum is subtracted from the other, and then ... this difference is divided by
the total number of votes cast."90 The proponents then deploy an assumption to
reduce the long-form equation for the efficiency gap into a simplified formula:
the difference between the seat margin and twice the vote margin.9
AW = S* - 2V*
According to this formula, in an ideal world without partisan gerrymandering
(a world in which each party wastes equal votes), each party's seat margin (S*)
would be twice its vote margin (V*). 92
AW = 0 if and only if S* = 2V*
According to this simplified formula, the efficiency gap has a simple interpretation within the seats-votes framework, as illustrated in Figure 7 below.

87. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 7, at 834, 852.
88. See id. at 849-50.
89. Id. at 851.
90. Id. at 851-52.
91. See McGhee, supra note 10, at 68 (presenting equation 5); id. app. B at 79-82 (deriving
equation 5); see also Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 7, at 853.
92. See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 7, at 854 ("[E]ach additional percentage point
of vote share for a party should result in an extra two percentage points of seat share.
This relationship is implied by the efficiency gap formula noted above. If the gap is zero,
it can remain at this level only if any shift in seat share is twice the size of any shift in
vote share.").

1159

quantifying PartisanGerrymandering
70 STAN. L. REV. 1131 (2018)

Figure 7
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The simplified formula corresponds to an ideal seats-votes curve-a straight line passing through the point (0.5,0.5) with a slope of 2. The efficiency gap can be understood
as a measure of undeserved seat share relative to the baseline of this ideal seats-votes
curve. At point A, a party earns 80% seat share with 60% vote share. According to the
simplified formula, the party deserves to earn 70% seat share. The difference between
the seat share actually earned and the deserved seat share is the undeserved seat share.
The efficiency gap measures this undeserved seat share, here 10%.

The efficiency gap represents the vertical distance between the observed
seats-votes combination and the "ideal" seats-votes curve corresponding to outcomes where the parties waste equal votes. On this basis, the proponents present
the gap as a measure of the "undeserved seat share" attributable to partisan ger93
rymandering rather than the party's popularity. For a given vote share, the
ideal curve tells us what seat share a party would achieve under the ideal of partisan symmetry where each party wastes equal votes. Any seat share above that
ideal is undeserved in that it is attributable to partisan asymmetry in which the
favored party wastes fewer votes than the disfavored party.
Like the seats-votes curve for strict proportionality, this ideal seats-votes
curve is a straight line, running through the point where each party equally
splits votes and seats (0.5,0.5). At this one point, both strict proportionality and
equal wasted votes are achieved. But this new seats-votes curve has a slope of 2
instead of 1. This means that according to the efficiency gap, the ideal seats-votes

93. See id. ("The efficiency gap[] ... is a measure of undeserved seat share: the proportion of
seats a party receives that it would not have received under a plan with equal wasted
votes.").
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relationship is one of double responsiveness and double proportionality. As the
proponents explain:
[T]he gap offers what scholars to date have been unable to supply: a normative
guide as to how large [the seat] bonus should be. To produce partisan fairness-in
the sense of equal wasted votes for each party-the bonus should be a precisely two94
fold increase in seat share for a given increase in vote share.

For example, if a party earns 52% vote share, it deserves 54% seat share; if it actually obtains 56% seat share, there is an efficiency gap of 2%. Note that the
proponents defined partisan symmetry as equal wasted votes and then demonstrated that this requirement (under definitions and assumptions I analyze
below) is mathematically equivalent to a requirement that the ideal seats-votes
curve exhibit double proportionality and responsiveness. 95 Thus, the proponents claim that the ratio of seat share to vote share should be 2:1 because that
corresponds to the normative ideal of equal wasted votes.96
The 2015 article proposed a legal test for political gerrymandering based on
the efficiency gap measure. 7 If the plan's efficiency gap exceeds a numeric
threshold and sensitivity analysis suggests that the plan will continue to produce
an above-threshold gap in future elections, it is presumptively invalid.98 This
presumption can be overcome only if the plan's partisan effect can be justified
or explained as the product of legitimate redistricting criteria consistently applied to the jurisdiction's underlying political geography.99 Such criteria include
contiguity, compactness, preservation of local political boundaries, preservation
of communities of interest, and compliance with the Voting Rights Act. 10
The proponents originally proposed a numeric threshold of 8% based on
their analysis of historical practice-gaps above 8% represent outliers relative to
the distribution of gaps produced by modern electoral maps. 10 1 The Whitford

94. Id. (footnote omitted).

&

95. McGhee first made this move in the 2014 article. CompareMcGhee, supra note 10, at 68
(defining the measure algebraically in equation 2), with id. (presenting the simplified formula in equation 5), and id. app. B at 79-80 (deriving the simplified formula).
Stephanopoulos and McGhee followed suit a year later. Compare Stephanopoulos
McGhee, supranote 7, at 851 & n.1 10 (defining the measure linguistically and citing the
algebraic definition in the 2014 article), with id. at 853 & n. 114 (presenting the simplified
formula and citing its derivation in the 2014 article).
96. See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 7, at 854.
97. See id. at 884-95.
98. See id. at 884-85, 891.
99. See id. at 884-85.
100. See id. at 892; see also, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 284 (2004) (plurality opinion).
101. See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supranote 7, at 884, 888-89.
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plaintiffs' expert, Simon Jackman, proposed a numeric threshold of 7% based on
durability-gaps above 7% tend to persist for the life of an electoral map.1 02
The proposed efficiency gap measure and associated legal test were explicitly framed as an effort to improve upon the partisan bias proposal offered by
amici and considered by the Court in LULAC1 0 3 It relies on an intuitive and constitutionally discernible concept of symmetric partisan treatment viewed
favorably by five Justices in LULAC while addressing the inadequacies Justice
Kennedy identified with the symmetry measure proposed by the LULAC
amici. 10 The measure of partisan symmetry proposed by the LULAC amici necessarily relied on assumptions to compare party performance in counterfactual
scenarios.105 The efficiency gap compares party performance directly observed
in actual election results without necessarily relying on inferential techniques. 0 6 And the proposed efficiency gap test answers the question how much
advantage is too mucho7 with a numeric threshold of presumptive validity
based on historical practice and durability. 0 8 An above-threshold efficiency gap
is a concrete indication that the electoral map favors one party in a way that is
likely to persist for the life of the map and that departs from historical practice.
Finally, the measure is distinct from a requirement of strict proportionality, a
standard the Court has already rejected.1 0 9 Unlike strict proportionality, this
double proportionality measure permits some seat bonus but limits the size of
102. See Assessing the Current Wisconsin State Legislative Districting Plan, Simon Jackman,
at 66-69, Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (No. 3:15-cv-00421-bbc),
2015 WL 10091020 [hereinafter Jackman Report].
103. See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 7, at 895.
104. See id. at 895-99.

105. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry (LULAQ, 548 U.S. 399,420 (2006) (opinion of Kennedy, J.) ("Amici's proposed standard does not compensate for appellants'
failure to provide a reliable measure of fairness. The existence or degree of asymmetry
may in large part depend on conjecture about where possible vote-switchers will
reside. ... [W]e are wary of adopting a constitutional standard that invalidates a map
based on unfair results that would occur in a hypothetical state of affairs.").
106. See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 7, at 857. Inferential techniques are, however,
used for sensitivity testing and in the case of uncontested districts. See id. at 866-67, 889-

90.
107. Cf LULAC, 548 U.S. at 420 (opinion of Kennedy, J.) (faulting partisan gerrymandering
plaintiffs for failing to "provid[e] a standard for deciding how much partisan dominance
is too much").
108. SeeJackman Report, supra note 102, at 66-69; Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 7, at

884, 888-89.
109. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 288 (2004) (plurality opinion) ("[The appellants'
proposed] standard rests upon the principle that groups ... have a right to proportional
representation. But the Constitution contains no such principle."); see also LULAC, 548
U.S. at 419 (opinion of Kennedy, J.) ("To be sure, there is no constitutional requirement
of proportional representation .... ").
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this bonus. The limit aligns with electoral reality: Political scientists have consistently found approximately 2:1 seat share to vote share ratios in state
legislative and congressional elections.' 10 And the limit is simple: Seats-votes responsiveness cannot depart significantly from 2.
C.

Two Potential Concerns with the Efficiency Gap

Faced with the competing constitutional risks presented by claims of partisan gerrymandering, the Justices have understandably sought "clear,
manageable, and politically neutral standards" and "rules to limit and confine judicial intervention." 1 1 In an effort to supply such a standard, the LULAC amici
focused on the principle of partisan symmetry, defined in terms of a counterfactual comparison.11 2 The efficiency gap similarly focuses on partisan symmetry
but instead defines it as symmetric efficiency in the sense of equal wasted
votes.113 To help the Court measure and thereby proscribe partisan gerrymandering, the efficiency gap must simultaneously cohere with an individual rights
framework based on a principle of nondiscrimination 114 and with a structural
account of electoral democracy attentive to the multiple values implicated by
electoral districting. To satisfy this double coherence, the efficiency gap must
sensibly define and compare parties' wasted votes in a way that distinguishes
normatively desirable from undesirable plans. Notably, there may be tension between the individual rights framework and the structural account.
This need for double coherence suggests two potential concerns with the
efficiency gap that motivate this Article's analysis: one regarding its coherence
with the individual rights framework, the other regarding its structural implications. First, the efficiency gap addresses concerns with the LULAC amici's
proposed measure by offering an alternative definition of partisan symmetry
based on observed election results rather than counterfactual results. Instead of
requiring that the actual seats-votes curve exhibit (or approximate) symmetry,
the efficiency gap requires that the observed election result fall on (or close to) a
prescriptive seats-votes curve corresponding to an ideal of equal wasted votes.
Thus, the efficiency gap replaces one equality norm (symmetric hypothetical
outcomes) with a new equality norm (equal wasted votes). How intuitive and
compelling this new equality norm is depends on how wasted votes are defined
110. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
111. See, e.g., Vieth, 541 U.S. at 307-08 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
112. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 88-89.
114. This principle of nondiscrimination may be grounded in the Equal Protection Clause
right to be free from unjustified differential treatment or the First Amendment right to
be free from discrimination or punishment on the basis of political affiliation or belief.
Cf Vieth, 541 U.S. at 313-14 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (discussing both
bases and suggesting that the First Amendment may be preferable).
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and compared. This suggests the importance of examining the efficiency gap's
conceptual design. Part II below undertakes this examination.
Second, the principle of partisan symmetry the efficiency gap is designed to
capture may be a necessary but insufficient condition for a well-functioning democracy. Thus, it is worth considering how the efficiency gap relates to other
democratic norms, like seats-votes proportionality and competitiveness, that
are relevant to electoral districting but that the efficiency gap was not designed
to capture. Part III explores these relationships.
II. The Efficiency Gap's Conceptual Design
As it has been defined by its proponents, the efficiency gap reflects a series
of interrelated electoral assumptions and methodological choices that warrant
careful examination. First, the proponents assume that each district's general
election is a two-candidate contest between two candidates, one from each of the
two major parties (to which I refer throughout as party x and party y). This ensures that every ballot is cast for, and every district race is won by, either
party x or party y. Thus, the set of districts (D) can be split into the set of x-won
districts (Dx) and the set of y-won districts (Dy), and voter turnout (Ti) in
district i is simply the sum of the parties' respective vote totals (Vxi and Vy[).
D

Dx U DY
Ti = V, +Vs
=

When a district has an uncontested general election, the proponents use imputation techniques to estimate what the vote totals would have been had the
election been contested.us5
Second, the proponents deploy a cluster of definitions culminating in the
concept of a wasted vote. A lost vote (Lpi ) is one cast for the losing party:
Lpi = Vpj. A surplus, or excess, 116 vote (Ep1 ) is one cast for the winning party beyond the threshold needed to win (Vj): Ept = Vpi - Vnt. The threshold needed to
17
win (in an assumed two-party race) is half of actual district turnout: Vni = ?L1
2
And a wasted vote is a lost or a surplus vote.1 18 Note that the possibility of a tie
is ignored, so every district race is won by one party or the other.

115. See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 7, at 865-67.
116. I use E for "excess" to denote the concept rather than S for "surplus," which could be confused with "seat" or "share."
117. See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 7, at 851.
118. Id. ("Wasted votes include both'lost' votes (those cast for a losing candidate) and 'surplus'
votes (those cast for a winning candidate but in excess of what she needed to prevail).");
id. ("[A]ny vote for a losing candidate is wasted by definition, but so too is any vote beyond the 50 percent threshold needed (in a two-candidate race) to win a seat.").

1164

uantifying PartisanGermandering
70 STAN. L. REV. 1131 (2018)

The total wasted votes (Wp1 ) for a party p in district i is the sum of lost votes
and surplus votes cast for that party: Wpi = Lpi + Epi. A party incurs surplus
votes when it wins a district (i E Dp) and incurs lost votes when it loses a district

(i V

p)

In short, the proponents define wasted votes by equally weighting lost and
surplus votes and defining surplus votes relative to a threshold of half of turnout. Judge Griesbach, the dissenting voice on the Whitford panel, described this
definition as "opaque" and "absurd."" 9 I will argue that the proponents' definition is reasonable but not the only plausible way to define surplus votes. The
proponents' threshold of half of turnout represents a party-centric approach. A
more voter-centric approach would use a threshold based on the votes cast for
the runner-up candidate.
Third, the proponents aggregate values by party and district to produce a
single number for the entire plan.1 20 For each party, the number of wasted votes
over the entire plan (W) is simply the sum of its wasted votes in each district.

wP = Y wp
iED

The plan's efficiency gap (AW) is "the difference between the parties' respective wasted votes, divided by the total number of votes cast in the election."121

AW-AW

LD

yi-

XLED

W~i

LEDVyi + LeDVi

W

-W1

ly + Vx

This approach compares the parties' relative wasted vote totals: It is zero
when each party wastes the same raw number of votes.
Fourth, the proponents adopt an electoral assumption to simplify the longform equation. Specifically, they assume that "each district has exactly the same

119. See Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837,958 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (Griesbach, J., dissenting),
stay granted, 137 S. Ct. 2289, and jurisdictionpostponed, 137 S. Ct. 2268 (2017).
120. See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 7, at 851-52; id. at 852 fig.1 (illustrating the
computation of the efficiency gap for a hypothetical plan by aggregating wasted votes
by party and district).
121. Id. at 851 (emphasis omitted).
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number of voters."122 Under this equal voter turnout assumption, district-level
turnout (T[) is equal to average turnout (T*) for every district (i) in the plan (D).
Ti =

T* =

foDTi
r eachi e D

s

The proponents use this assumption to reduce the long-form equation (AW)
123
to a simple function of seat margin (S*) and vote margin (V*).
AW = S* - 2V*
This simplified formula is much easier to compute, so the proponents use it
when analyzing historical election data, 124 as did Whitford expert Simon Jackman. 125 Moreover, using this simplified formula, the proponents recast the
efficiency gap as a measure of the undeserved seat share attributable to partisan
gerrymandering rather than to the party's popularity. 126
In sum, the efficiency gap measure relies on four conceptual moves: (1) the
two-party assumption; (2) the definition and weight of surplus votes; (3) the aggregation from district to plan to compare the parties' wasted vote totals; and
(4) the equal voter turnout assumption, which allows them to derive the simplified formula and exploit the associated double proportionality seats-votes
interpretation. In this Part, I examine each move to assess whether the efficiency
gap defines and compares wasted votes in a sufficiently discernible and manageable manner. It will prove useful to examine them in reverse order, considering
first the equal voter turnout assumption, then the aggregation method from district to plan, then the definition and weight of surplus votes, and finally the
assumption that every district's general election is a two-party contest. But first,
I briefly examine the principle McGhee has identified as informing these various
methodological choices.
122.

McGhee, supra note 10, app. B at 79.

123. See id. app. B at 79-82.
124. The 2015 article does not specify which computation method (long-form equation or
simplified formula) was used to analyze historical election data. But in a phone conversation with Eric McGhee, I confirmed that this analysis was performed using the
simplified formula. Telephone Interview with Eric McGhee, Research Fellow, Pub. Pol-

icy Inst. of Cal. (Oct. 21, 2016).
125. See Jackman Report, supra note 102, at 16 ("The assumption of equally-sized districts is
especially helpful for the analysis reported below, since the calculation of [the efficiency
gap] in a given election then reduces to using the jurisdiction-level quantities [seat share]
and [vote share] as in [the simplified formula]. For the analysis of historical election results reported below, it isn't possible to obtain measures of district populations, meaning
that we really have no option other than to rely on the jurisdiction-level... [seat share]
and [vote share] when estimating the [efficiency gap].").
126. See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 7, at 854 ("The efficiency gap's second interesting property follows from [the simplified formula]. Simply put, it is a measure of
undeserved seat share: the proportion of seats a party receives that it would not have received under a plan with equal wasted votes.").
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A.

McGhee's Efficiency Principle

McGhee's design of the efficiency gap is guided by an overarching criterion
he calls the efficiency principle
Any measure of efficiency must indicate a greater advantage for (against) a party
when the seat share for that party increases (decreases) without any corresponding
increase (decrease) in its vote share. 127

This principle reflects McGhee's insight that what makes partisan gerrymandering so attractive to partisan mapmakers and so troubling for democracy is
that it permits mapmakers to increase their party's power (seat share) at a constant or even decreasing level of popularity (vote share). According to McGhee,
this principle "is a bedrock condition for a measure of efficiency"; if a measure
violates it, "it might be an adequate measure of something else, but it is missing
the very essence of an efficient gerrymander." 28 This Subpart briefly explores
and critiques this principle.
1.

Implications of the efficiency principle

In one sense, the efficiency principle is quite strict. Mathematically, it requires that a measure be a function of seat share, specifically one that has a
positive partial derivative with respect to seat share.1 29 This means that holding
all else (including vote share) constant, an increase in seat share increases the
measure, and a decrease in seat share decreases the measure. Assuming that seat
share is a function of vote share with a nonnegative derivative, 3 0 then any
measure satisfying the efficiency principle must itself be a function of vote share,
specifically one that has a nonpositive derivative with respect to vote share.
Thus, any measure satisfying the efficiency principle must be a function of both
seat share and vote share with a positive partial derivative with respect to seat
share and a nonpositive partial derivative with respect to vote share. But the
measure cannot depend on any variable independent of seat share and vote
share, such as overall competitiveness or voter turnout. If it did, one could hold
127. McGhee, MeasuringEfficiency, supra note 86, at 418.
128. Id.
129. See id. at 427 ("This can also be phrased more formally: to satisfy the [efficiency principle],
a measure's partial derivative with respect to seat share must be positive."). The partial
derivative of a function with respect to a given variable captures the incremental rate of
change of the function with respect to that variable when all other variables are held
constant.
130. This is a modest assumption, one violated only in the odd event that a party's vote share
goes up but its seat share goes down (or vice versa). McGann and his coauthors call this
the assumption of "nonnegative responsiveness" and describe it as "a minimal requirement that is met by every reasonable single vote electoral system, including the firstpast-the-post system used in the United States." See McGann et al., supranote 20, at 30203 (emphasis omitted).
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vote share constant, increase seat share and thereby increase the measure, but
then modify the independent variable so as to return the measure to its original
value. The result would be an increase in seat share at constant vote share without any corresponding increase in the measure-a violation of the efficiency
principle.
Thus, any measure satisfying the efficiency principle must be a function only
of seat share and vote share, with a positive partial derivative with respect to
seat share, a nonpositive partial derivative with respect to vote share, and no
dependence whatsoever on any variable independent of vote share and seat
share. This means that we can set the measure equal to zero and then solve for
seat share as a function of vote share. The result is a seats-votes curve corre131
The
sponding to symmetric partisan efficiency as defined by this measure.
deoutcome
electoral
given
a
to
which
extent
the
represent
then
measure must
efficiency
the
sum,
In
curve.
seats-votes
parts from this ideal symmetric
principle implicitly requires that the analyst specify a single ideal seats-votes
curve and then measure the extent to which an electoral outcome departs from
that ideal curve. Each measure that complies with the efficiency principle corresponds to exactly one such ideal curve.
In another sense, though, the efficiency principle is quite flexible because it
imposes minimal constraints on what the ideal seats-votes curve may be. A function satisfies the efficiency principle so long as it is a function of seat share (S)
and vote share (V) with properly signed partial derivatives. If we impose the further requirement that the measure is linear in both 9 and V, the unsurprising
result is a linear seats-votes curve, and the only remaining task is to determine
its slope-that is, its degree of proportionality and responsiveness. As we shall
see, when we define the efficiency gap in terms of parties' relative wasted vote
totals, the result is a linear seats-votes curve, with the degree of proportionality
and responsiveness determined by the definition and weight of surplus votes.
Any measure that satisfies the efficiency principle will encounter several
challenges. First, the measure may be better suited to plans involving a large
number of districts, like state legislative plans and congressional plans in populous states, than to plans involving fewer districts, like congressional plans in
less populous states or plans for local bodies like city councils and school boards.
The reason is that when plans have a small number of districts, seat share (S) is
constrained to a few values, so the observed electoral outcome will necessarily
depart significantly from the ideal seats-votes curve unless the system happens

131. For example, the simplified formula satisfies the efficiency principle because it depends
only on seat margin and vote margin. If one sets the simplified formula to zero and then
solves for seat margin as a function of vote margin, the result is the seats-votes curve
illustrated in Figure 7 above.
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to exhibit the right vote share (17). For example, if a state (like Idahol 32) has only
two congressional districts, there are only two possible values for seat margin:
zero (each party wins one district) or fifty percent (one party wins both districts).
Unless this state has the right vote margin, it will necessarily have a large efficiency gap.133 This suggests that the efficiency gap measure may prove more
useful when analyzing state legislative plans like the one at issue in Whitford
than congressional plans like the one at issue in Rucho.134
Second, any measure that satisfies the efficiency principle is vulnerable to
the perverse risk that partisan voter suppression will reduce the apparent severity of a partisan gerrymander as quantified by the measure. If a party's supporter
is unable to cast a ballot, assuming that this ballot does not determine the outcome of the district election, the result will be that the party achieved the same
seat share with less vote share, indicating greater efficiency for that party. This
suggests that partisan voter suppression could reduce the apparent severity of a
partisan gerrymander. I explore this risk in greater detail in Part II.E.2 below.
2.

A modified efficiency principle

The proponents assume that a partisan mapmaker's goal is to maximize her
party's seat share at a fixed level of vote share.135 The efficiency principle aligns
the measure with this objective. But this may be a simplification of the strategic
calculus motivating real-world partisan mapmakers. It may be more accurate to
assume that the mapmaker seeks to maximize her party's expected seat share
over a plausible range of vote shares. 136 If the mapmaker is too confident in her
132. See Directory of Representatives, U.S. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES, https://perma.cc/JB87
-SC8K (archived Feb. 24, 2018).
133. For a detailed treatment of the efficiency gap's difficulty handling plans with low numbers of districts, see Wendy K. Tam Cho, Measuring PartisanFairnessgHow Well Does the
Efficiency Gap Guard Against Sophisticatedas Well as Simple-Minded Modes of PartisanDiscrimination?, 166 U. PA. L. REv. ONLINE 17, 21-27 (2017).
134. Whitford involved a challenge to the Wisconsin State Assembly, a body currently subdivided into ninety-nine districts. See Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 843 (W.D. Wis.
2016), stay granted, 137 S. Ct. 2289, and jurisdictionpostponed, 137 S. Ct. 2268 (2017); 2017
Wisconsin State Representatives, WIS. ST. LEGISLATURE, https://perma.cc/N2QJ-GS94 (archived Feb. 24, 2018). Rucho, conversely, involved a challenge to North Carolina's
thirteen congressional districts. See Common Cause v. Rucho, 279 F. Supp. 3d 587, 597
(M.D.N.C. 2018), stay granted, No. 17A745, 2018 WL 472142 (U.S.Jan. 18,2018), and appeal
docketed, No. 17-1295 (U.S. Mar. 14, 2018); Directory ofRepresentatives, supra note 132.
135. See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 7, at 850 ("Our analysis begins with the premise that the goal of a partisan gerrymander is to win as many seats as possible given a
certain number of votes." (emphasis omitted)).
136. See Guillermo Owen & Bernard Grofman, Optimal Partisan Gerrymandering, 7 POL.
GEOGRAPHY Q. 5, 7 (1988) (arguing that efforts to maximize expected seat share "lead to
strategies for sophisticated optimal partisan gerrymandering which differ from the classic 'recipe' of seeking to control as many districts as possible by paper-thin margins").
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prediction of vote share and too greedy in her desire to maximize seat share at
137
predicted vote share, the result may be a "dummymander" that inures to the
benefit of the other party when actual vote share departs from the mapmaker's
prediction.138 To account for this strategic calculus under conditions of electoral
uncertainty, I propose the following modified efficiency principle'
Any measure of efficiency must indicate a greater advantage for (against) a party
when the seat share for that party increases (decreases) without any corresponding
increase (decrease) in its vote share unless its expected seat share decreases (increases)
under plausible variationin that vote share.

To see the difference between the original principle and this modified one,
consider a mapmaker who alters a plan so that the majority party wins more
seats by smaller margins with the same number of votes. This change allows the
majority party to increase its seat share at constant vote share, but only by making the plan more competitive and thereby increasing the risk that seats will flip
to the other party under plausible variation in vote share. In this scenario, a
measure that satisfies the original efficiency principle would indicate greater advantage for the majority party because it won more seat share with the same
vote share. In contrast, a measure that satisfies the modified efficiency principle
might indicate less advantage for the majority party because its expected seat
share over plausible variation in vote share could decrease. Unlike the original
efficiency principle, the modified one permits a measure to take into account the
plan's increased competitiveness.
B.

The Equal Voter Turnout Assumption

Recall that McGhee derives the simplified formula (AW = S* - 2V*) by ex139
plicitly assuming that "each district has exactly the same number of voters."

137.

Bernard Grofman & Thomas L. Brunell, TheArtof the Dummymander The Impact ofRecent
Redistrictingson the PartisanMakeup of Southern House Seats, in REDISTRICTING IN THE NEW
MILLENNIUM 183, 184 (Peter F. Galderisi ed., 2005) ("A dummymander is a gerrymander by

one party that, over the course of the decade, benefits the other party .... ").
138.

This is why Justice O'Connor, arguing for nonjusticiability in Bandemer, suggested that
"political gerrymandering is a self-limiting enterprise." See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S.
109, 152 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment), abrogated in part by Vieth v.
Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004).

139. McGhee, supra note 10, app. B at 79. The first line of McGhee's derivation explicitly assumes that "each district has exactly the same number of voters" so that "proportions can
be substituted for raw votes in all of the formulas ... (such that] the total vote in each
district becomes equal to 1.0" and the sum of district vote totals "is simply the total number of districts in the electoral system." See id.; see also Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra
note 7, at 853 & n.1 14 (incorporating this derivation).
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Under this equal voter turnout assumption, for every district (i) in the plan (D),
district-level turnout (Ti) is equal to average turnout (T*).
Ti = T* for each i eD
Thus, the simplified formula, by design, does not account for interdistrict
variation in voter turnout. 140 If a real-world election were to satisfy this assumption, the long-form formula and the simplified seats-votes formula would
compute the same number.
If Ti = T* for each i e D then WY-Wx = S* - 2V*
vy+ Vx

However, questions of plausibility and robustness arise whenever an assumption (like equal voter turnout) underlies a shorthand equation (like the
simplified formula) for a measure. 141 How plausible is the assumption of equal
voter turnout in each district? How sensitive is the efficiency gap to departures
from this condition? To address these questions, I relax the equal voter turnout
assumption and derive a more generalized simplified formula that expresses the

140. See McGhee, supra note 10, at 68 & 83 n.6 ("This necessarily assumes away differences in
efficiency due to turnout.... [B]ut turnout variation is still a worthy topic of study. In
fact, future research could use [the long-form equation] instead of [the simplified formula] to explore the subject.").
141. Two Terms ago, the Court clarified that a state may-but declined to address whether it
must-comply with the one person, one vote principle by equalizing the number of people (as opposed to the number of eligible voters, for instance) in each district. See
Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120,1126-27 (2016). Thus, equal total population might be
constitutionally required, but neither equal voter population nor equal voter turnout is
constitutionally required. For example, "it is plainly permissible for jurisdictions to
measure equalization by the total population of state and local legislative districts," id. at
1126-27 (emphasis added), even if this produces an electoral map that "measured by a
voter-population baseline ... [exhibits a] maximum population deviation exceed[ing]
40%," id. at 1125 (emphasis added).
The scholarship presenting the efficiency gap proposal, published before Evenwel, characterized the relevant equality conditions in a way that may generate confusion. See
districts are equal in
McGhee, supra note 10, at 68 ("In the special case where ...
population[] ... [the long-form equation] reduces to [the simplified formula]." (emphasis
added)); id. at 83 n.6 ("Ignoring turnoutdifferences in this way is legally mandatedfor redistricting in the United States...." (emphasis added)); Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra
note 7, at 853 (stating that the simplified formula "assume[s] that all districts are equal in
population (which is constitutionally required)" (emphasis added)). If the assumption used
to derive the simplified formula were constitutionally required, it would necessarily be
satisfied in real elections, and so questions of plausibility and robustness would be moot.
Yet the relevant assumption is not equal total population but rather equal voter turnout.
This assumption is not constitutionally required; a constitutionally valid electoral map
may exhibit small interdistrict variation in total population but large variation in the
population of eligible voters and even larger variation in actual voter turnout. Thus,
there is no guarantee that real elections will exhibit (or even approximate) equal voter
turnout, and so questions of plausibility and robustness warrant attention.
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efficiency gap in terms of statewide seat and vote margin but makes no ex ante
assumption about interdistrict variation in voter turnout.
1.

The turnout gap

To explain the effect of turnout variation on the efficiency gap, I first introduce the concept of a turnout gap. When we relax the equal voter turnout
assumption, we can still denote by T* the average turnout across all districts:
T* =

S

.

But now each district may have a turnout above or below (or equal to)

average turnout. Let ATj denote the proportional difference between actual turnout in district i and average turnout over all districts: AT =
-IL
142 Let ATp
Zi EDp T'i 143
=
ATp
p:
party
denote the average value of AT over districts won by
Sp

Define the turnout gap (AT)1 44 as the product of party x seat share (9x) and the
average proportional difference in x-won districts (ATx).
AT = SxAT

142.

AT, is therefore positive when district i has higher-than-average turnout, negative when
district i has lower-than-average turnout, and zero when district i's turnout is identical
to the average. For example, AT, = 0.05 when that district's turnout is 5% higher than
average turnout.

143. By design, with only two parties, the seat-share-weighted sum of ATx and AT, is zero.

0

=

LED AT

=

LED, AT + EieD, AT,

Equivalently, SxAT

= SxAT

+

SyAT,

= SxATx + SYATY.

= -SyATy. This makes intuitive sense because x-won districts will

have above-average turnout only if y-won districts have correspondingly below-average turnout (and vice versa).
144. Relying on the fact that

= -SyAT,

SAT

(as derived in note 143 above), the turnout gap

can also be expressed as half the seat-share-weighted difference of ATx and ATy.

sx ATx + sxATX

s ,ATx

- SAT,
2
Alternatively, the turnout gap can be expressed as the sum of proportional turnout differences over x-won districts divided by the number of districts.

AT =S(AT=

-

AT = SATx=

22

S, Zi D, ATi

_i

-tDAT

sSx,
= - Ss
S
This is essentially how McGhee defines the turnout gap. See McGhee, Measuring Efficiency, supra note 86, at 427 (presenting equations 4 and 5); id. app. at 438-39 (deriving
equation 4). Thus, McGhee and I derive equivalent turnout-generalized seats-votes formulas. Note that I discussed turnout effects with McGhee while preparing this Article, a
draft of which McGhee cites in his 2017 piece. See id. at 428,437.
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The turnout-generalized seats-votes formula is: 145
AW = S*

-

2V* + AT.

This more generalized simplified formula is similar to the proponents', except that it now contains an additional term, AT, that precisely quantifies the
effect of voter turnout on the efficiency gap. The long-form equation reduces to
the original simplified formula if and only if the turnout gap is zero. Note that
S, is never negative, so the sign of the turnout gap depends on the sign of ATx,
which captures whether turnout in x-won districts is above or below average
turnout. When x-won districts exhibit above-average turnout, ATx-and thus
the turnout gap-is positive and the long-form equation produces a higher number than does the simplified formula, registering greater advantage for party x.
When x-won districts exhibit below-average turnout, ATx-and thus the turnout gap-is negative and the long-form equation produces a lower number than
does the simplified formula, registering greater advantage for party y.
2.

The size of the turnout gap

In some cases, the turnout gap may be so small that it has no meaningful
effect on the efficiency gap analysis and can thus be safely ignored. The 2012
Wisconsin State Assembly election under the plan challenged in W/hitford appears to be one such case. Consider the analysis of Kenneth Mayer, one of the
plaintiffs' experts in the W/hitford litigation. Of the 2,844,676 votes cast in the
2012 election, Democrats wasted 877,445 votes while Republicans wasted only
544,893, leading to an efficiency gap of 11.69% according to the long-form calculation.'" In this plan, Republicans received only 1,389,958 (48.86%) of the total
votes cast but won 57 of 99 (57.58%) districts, producing an efficiency gap of
9.85% according to the simplified formula. 147 The long-form value exceeds the

145. For a proof of this result, see Benjamin Plener Cover, Mathematical Supplement 1 (2018),

https://perma.cc/M3FD-SRMG [hereinafter Mathematical Supplement].
146. See Analysis of the Efficiency Gaps of Wisconsin's Current Legislative District Plan and
Plaintiffs' Demonstration Plan, Kenneth R. Mayer, at 46 tbl.10, Whitford v. Gill, 218 F.

Supp. 3d 837 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (No. 3:15-cv-00421-bbc), 2015 WL 10091018 [hereinafter
Mayer Report]. The long-form calculation is:
W, - W,

_ 877,44s-s44,893

V3,+ Vx

2,844,676

See id. at 45-46,46 tbl.10.
147. See id. at 46 tbl.10. The simplified calculation is:
S* - 2V* =

(7

99

0.5)

-

2 1,

ess _ 0.5) = 0.0985.

(2,844,676
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short-form value because there is a turnout gap of 1.84% in favor of Republicans.1 48 But both values indicate above-threshold gaps in favor of
Republicans.1 49 For this reason, even though the Whitford majority regarded the
long-form equation as "preferable" to the simplified formula, it was "not troubled" by the choice of computational technique given that "both methods yield
an historically large, pro-Republican" efficiency gap. 50
But the turnout gap is not always insignificant. Consider Indiana's 2014 congressional election, the results of which are provided in Table 1 below.151

148. AT = (wy- Wx)

-

(S* - 2V)

=

0.1169 - 0.0985

= 0.0184.

149. Interestingly, Simon Jackman, the Whitford plaintiffs' other expert, computed a gap of

13% for the 2012 election using the simplified formula. See Jackman Report, supra
note 102, at 16, 36. However, in addition to employing different computation methods
(long-form versus simplified formula), Jackman and Mayer may have also employed different imputation methods to account for uncontested assembly races. See id. at 24-30;
Mayer Report, supra note 146, at 44-45. Of 99 assembly races in the 2012 election, 27 were
uncontested. See Mayer Report, supra note 146, at 44. For a discussion of the efficiency
gap's sensitivity to alternative imputation strategies, see Part II.E.1 below. Note that the
Whitford panel majority, in assessing the efficiency gap evidence, compared the value
Mayer computed using the long-form equation to the value Jackman computed using
the simplified formula-not the values Mayer computed with each formula. See
Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837,904-05,907 (W.D. Wis. 2016), stay granted, 137 S. Ct.
2289, and jurisdictionpostponed, 137 S. Ct. 2268 (2017).
150. See Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 907-08. This argument neglects the fact that both the academic proponents and Jackman analyzed historical election data using only the
simplified formula and not the long-form equation. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text. In other words, the majority relied on the fact that the 11.69% gap Mayer
calculated using the long-form equation is larger than gaps calculated for historical election data with the simplified formula. Essentially, the majority assumed a high
correlation between the results produced by the two computation methods. Such a high
correlation may very well exist, but it would ideally be computed rather than assumed.
The Whitford majority also emphasized that the defendants' expert Nicholas Goedert
"described the simplified method as 'an appropriate and useful summary measure'" and
that both parties stipulated that the simplified formula's "implied 2-to-1 votes-to-seats
relationship reflects the 'observed average seat/votes curve in historical U.S. congressional and legislative elections."' See 218 F. Supp. 3d at 907 (quoting Use of Efficiency Gap
in Analyzing Partisan Gerrymandering, Report for State of Wisconsin, Nicholas

Goedert, at 5-6, Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837 (No. 3:15-cv-00421-bbc), 2015 WL
10091017). Finally, the Whitford majority cautioned that "[w]ere there record evidence
indicating that [the simplified formula] did not correlate highly with both the [longform equation] and electoral reality, we would have reason to doubt [the simplified for-

mula's] validity." Id. at 907-08.
151. Table I relies on election results as reported by the Indiana Secretary of State. See Indiana
General Election, November 4, 2014, IN.Gov, https://perma.cc/D8CD-LNPG (last updated
Mar. 11, 2015, 10:01 AM). It includes results for Republican and Democratic candidates
but omits votes for third-party candidates from the "Total Turnout" column.
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Table I
Results of Indiana's 2014 Congressional Election
Total Votes by Party
District

R

D

Total Turnout

1

51,000

86,579

137,579

2

85,583

55,590

141,173

3

102,889

39,771

142,660

4

94,998

47,056

142,054

5

105,277

49,756

155,033

6

102,187

45,509

147,696

7

46,887

61,443

108,330

8

103,344

61,384

164,728

9

101,594

55,016

156,610

Totals

793,759

502,104

1,295,863

Out of 1,295,863 ballots cast, the Democrats wasted 379,150 votes, but the
Republicans wasted only 268,782 votes, for an efficiency gap of 8.5% in Republicans' favor according to the long-form equation.1 52 With only 61.3% of the
statewide vote share, the Republicans won 7 of 9 (77.8%) districts, resulting in an
efficiency gap of 5.3% according to the simplified formula. 153 The discrepancy
between the efficiency gap under the long-form equation (8.5%) and that under
the simplified formula (5.3%) is a function of the turnout gap. District turnout is
143,985 on average, but it ranges from a low of 108,330 in Democrat-won
District 7 to a high of 164,728 in Republican-won District 8, and turnout in Republican-won districts is 4.2% above average, for a turnout gap of 3.2%.154 The
turnout gap is the difference between the long-form and simplified computations (3.2% = 8.5% - 5.3%). Note that the long-form value (the departure from
equal wasted votes) is greater than the short-form value (the departure from
double proportionality) because Republican-won districts exhibit above-average turnout, producing a positive turnout gap. If the "real" efficiency gap is
defined by the long-form equation, the simplified formula underestimates it. If
an 8% threshold were used for congressional plans-as the proponents originally

152. AW = Wy - Wx
vY+ vx

379,150 - 268,782 =
1,295,863

0.085. For a demonstration of this calculation, see

Mathematical Supplement, supranote 145, at 2.

- 0.5) - 2(0.613 - 0.5) = 0.053.

153. S* - 2V* =
154. AT = gXAT

=

7(0.042)

= 0.032.
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recommended I 5 5-whether this election produced an above-threshold or below-threshold gap would depend on the choice of computation method.
Data analysis beyond the scope of this Article can compute the turnout gaps
(and thus the efficiency gaps under the long-form equation) for historical elections, but historical patterns do not guarantee future trends. Any factor that
disproportionately decreases Democratic turnout will generally tend to generate a turnout gap in Republicans' favor, and vice versa: Democrat-won districts
have more Democrats, so a uniform decrease in Democratic turnout will have a
larger impact on the turnout in Democrat-won districts than in Republicanwon districts. This suggests that the turnout gap has a tendency to systematically
increase whenever electoral rules have this differential partisan impact on turnout. Many believe, with good reason, that this is precisely the impact and intent
of many recent electoral reforms.1 56
However common or rare the occurrence, when the turnout gap is large
enough, the choice of computation method matters, presenting questions of robustness and correspondence.1 57
Partly in response to a draft of this Article, McGhee recently published a
new piece addressing several features of the efficiency gap measure, including its
relationship to turnout, that were previously unexamined. 158 In that piece,
McGhee derives the same turnout gap as presented above.1 5 9 McGhee views the
efficiency gap's dependence on turnout as a violation of his efficiency principle.1 60 To see why, consider a district where party x wins but wastes fewer votes.
Keep constant the parties' respective vote shares in that district, but increase district turnout. This change will increase the wasted vote disparity in that district
and thus the efficiency gap as originally defined, indicating greater advantage
for party x. But party x has increased its vote share with no change in seat share,
suggesting less advantage for party x.
To solve this problem, McGhee essentially proposes a new definition of
wasted votes in which the threshold needed to win (Vnt) is not half of district

155. See supratext accompanying note 101.
156. See infra Part II.E.2.
157. In Part V below, I discuss in detail the questions of robustness and correspondence raised
by this and other issues.
158. See McGhee, MeasuringEfficiency, supra note 86, at 426-32.
159. See id. at 427; id. app. at 438-39.
160. See id. at 427-28 (calling the turnout problem "the opposite of what would be expected"
and a "clear violation" of the efficiency principle).
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turnout ( 2) but half of average turnout ( ).161 This definition eliminates the
turnout gap from the equation so that the simplified formula expresses the efficiency gap not approximately based on electoral assumptions, but rather exactly
based on the new definition. 162 Full consideration of this new approach lies beyond the scope of this Article, which focuses on the efficiency gap as originally
presented in scholarship and litigation. But note that this new definition reflects
the view of a mapmaker assessing an entire plan rather than of a voter participating in an individual district.1 63
C. The Aggregation Method from District to Plan
That the efficiency gap, traditionally defined, compares the total numbers
of wasted votes is noteworthy for two reasons. First, it facilitates an analytical
technique that defines a plan's gap as a turnout-weighted average of district-level
wasted vote disparities.'1' Second, there is an alternative aggregation method
that compares wasted vote shares rather than wasted vote totals.' 6 5
1.

The analytical technique: from district-level disparity to plan-level gap

The proponents' approach involves a two-step aggregation process: first,
sum wasted votes over districts; second, compute the difference using the total

161. McGhee does not claim to be changing the definition of a surplus vote from
Epi = Vpj - 1to En w = Vp_ -T. Instead, he writes that a party's total wasted votes

iD

(P2

-

2

)

(W) must be adjusted by adding an "effective vote deviation," defined as

See id. at 427 (equation 6). But adding this effective vote deviation term is equivalent to
changing the definition of a surplus vote.

Then: W

+

EDp
+

= ZiEDp(Vpi -

=

LEDp

EpieW

')

+

2-

ieD, L

'2)

+

ZigDP

= L
+~

pi, and let Wnew =

Epi
pED,
+

LeDp Lp

p

= ZiEDp(Vpi -

eD, Enw

+ LGDp

p

TDp TED

'

To see this, let Wp = ZiEDp E

2)+

ZiD

Lpj

= W.new

162. See McGhee, MeasuringEfficiency, supra note 86, at 427-28.
163. Consider a plan with average turnout of 100, a high-turnout district that party x wins
105-95, and a low-turnout district that party x wins 40-10. If surplus votes are defined
relative to a baseline of half of average turnout (100 / 2 = 50), then party x incurs 55 surplus votes in the high-turnout district (105 - 50 = 55) and negative 10 surplus votes in the
low-turnout district (40 - 50 = -10).
164. See infra Part II.C.1.
165. See infra Part II.C.2.
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number of votes cast.16 6 One can switch the order of aggregation by defining
district-level wasted vote disparity and then expressing a plan's efficiency gap as
the weighted average of district-level disparities. Specifically, define the districtlevel wasted vote disparity (Aw) between party x and party y in district i as the
parties' relative wasted votes in that district, expressed as a proportion of district-level voter turnout (T).
yi - Wx i

AWj

A plan's efficiency gap is the weighted average of district-level wasted vote
disparities, where each district's wasted vote disparity is weighted by its turnout. 167
AW

= L.ED TAM
ZLED Ti

Under the equal voter turnout assumption, the plan's efficiency gap is
simply the unweighted average district disparity.1 68
AW =LE

i
S

Formally, define the set of zero-disparity districts (19) as the set of districts
that produce a wasted vote disparity of zero, and define the set of zero-gap plans
(H 0 ) as the set of plans that produce an efficiency gap of zero.
Uo = (D I Aw =0}
Ho = {D | AW = 0}
Thus, because a plan's efficiency gap is an average of its districts' disparities,
one simple way to achieve a zero-gap plan is to maintain zero disparity in each
district.
Do = U Di where for each i Di CFH

166. See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 7, at 851-52.
167. By definition: AW = WY- W.
VxT+ Vy=

168. S

=

Ti. Thus: AW

lAW

W = LED Wpi, V = LED1V7i, and

= WY

= W- Wx _ LED Wyi- Wxt _ 6DTIED ,) LEDTLAWL
ELED Vxl+Vyl
vx+vy

LEDT(

LEDTI

LeD 1, and under the equal turnout assumption, Tj = T* for each i e D. Thus:
-W

LED T-

T. LD T,

-

LED T*AW, S
EL.D I

LED A'i

=

LED AML

fiED T
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I call such a plan a simple zero-gap plan. By design, it maintains an efficiency
gap of zero. 169 Note that the simple zero-gap plan is not the only zero-gap plan.
More generally, a plan can achieve an efficiency gap of zero even if it exhibits
nonzero district-level wasted vote disparities, provided those disparities average
out such that both parties waste the same number of votes overall. But so long
as we restrict our attention to plans with equal voter turnout in each district,
each zero-gap plan can be converted to (and from) a simple zero-gap plan by performing the appropriate series of voter swaps, whereby two districts swap two
voters-one party x supporter for one party y supporter-without altering any
district election outcome. A voter swap corresponds to a marginal change in the
electoral boundary between two adjacent districts. A significant change to a district boundary can be understood as a series of incremental voter swaps. By
design, a swap changes the wasted vote disparities in the participating districts
but maintains the same number of wasted votes for each party overall. Starting
with a simple zero-gap plan, such a swap produces a plan that is still zero-gap
but is no longer simple.
This provides a useful way to investigate the efficiency gap: Construct a simple zero-gap plan, examine its properties, and determine which properties vary
under gap-preserving voter swaps. I use this technique in Part III below.
2.

The alternative approach: comparing wasted vote shares

The proponents compare the parties' total number of wasted votes:

= WY -x.
A W AW-

vy +vx

Anthony McGann and his coauthors have criticized this approach, arguing that
"it is not obvious that each party having an equal absolute number of wasted
votes is uniquely fair" and noting that one could alternatively require that each
party should waste the same share of votes rather than the same number of
votes. 170 Following this suggestion, John Nagle has developed what he calls a
"voter-centric" measure (AWv) that compares relative wasted vote shares rather
than relative wasted vote totals as a proportion of all ballots cast.171
AWv =

W
Y
V

W
V

169. Because both parties waste the same number of votes in each district, the parties must
waste the same number of votes overall.
170. McGann et al., supra note 20, at 296.
171. See Nagle, supra note 20, at 201-02.
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The two aggregation methods superficially appear nearly identical, but they
can produce markedly different results. Suppose 6 million votes are cast, with
4 million for party x and 2 million for party y, and suppose each party wastes
1.5 million votes. This means that 75% of ballots cast by party y supporters are
wasted while only 37.5% of ballots cast by party x supporters are wasted.1 72 Each
party wastes the same number of raw votes, but a party y supporter is twice as
likely as a party x supporter to waste her vote. While a party may care more
about the total number of votes it wastes, an individual voter may care more
about the likelihood her vote will be wasted, which depends on the share rather
the total of votes wasted by her preferred party. This is why Nagle describes relative wasted vote totals as "party-centric" and relative wasted vote shares as
"voter-centric." 173 One could argue that this voter-centric approach better coheres with an individual rights framework based on a particular voter's equal
protection or First Amendment interest in participating free from discrimina74
tion based on political affiliation, belief, or expressive conduct.1
Note that the choice between a party-centric (wasted vote totals) and votercentric (wasted vote shares) scale for the asymmetry comparison may be particularly consequential for minor parties that earn a small number of total votes
and usually waste all of them (because they win no seats). Such a minor party
will have a low wasted vote total but a high wasted vote share-possibly 100%.
Thus, a voter-centric scale may facilitate greater receptivity to a claim that an
electoral map is gerrymandered to disadvantage a minor party.
Nagle explored the mathematical properties of a wasted vote measure using
a voter-centric scale of wasted vote shares.17 5 But he defined a surplus vote as
half the victory margin rather the full victory margin, noting that the alternative was mathematically equivalent to unequal weighting of lost and surplus
votes.176 Nagle then rejected unequal weighting of lost and surplus votes on the
ground that it would violate McGhee's efficiency principle.17 7 Part IV below
proposes a new measure that compares the shares of wasted votes, with surplus
votes defined as the full victory margin. This new measure is voter-centric in
terms of both the scale of comparison and the definition of wasted votes.

172. That is, 1,500,000 / 2,000,000 = 0.75 and 1,500,000 / 4,000,000 = 0.375.
173. See Nagle, supra note 20, at 201.
174. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
175. See Nagle, supra note 20, at 201-03.
176. See id. at 199 & n.16, 203 & n.24.
177. See id. at 203 ("However, as Eric McGhee has kindly pointed out, the possibility that different values of S for the same vote V may give the same value of bias violates a
fundamental principle for bias measures, namely, gerrymandering might be able to increase S for the same V and not be detected by the measure of bias." (citation omitted)).
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D. The Definition and Weight of Surplus Votes
Both the definition and the weight of surplus votes are methodological
choices, not self-defining concepts. They are susceptible to competing interpretations, and selecting among them requires deliberation and transparency. The
proponents and the Whitford litigants define surplus votes using a threshold of
half of total votes, and they equally weight lost and surplus votes. 178 But these
two distinct yet related methodological choices have not been adequately explained.
The proponents simply define a wasted vote as a lost or surplus vote, assuming implicitly and without explanation that lost and surplus votes should be
equally weighted.' 79 When considered from the perspective of the party, equal
weighting makes sense: Whether lost or surplus, a vote is equally wasted in the
sense that it could be more effective if cast in another district. But when considered from the perspective of the individual voter, lost and surplus votes may not
be equivalent. True enough, both the voter who casts the lost vote and the voter
who casts the surplus vote may regret that her vote could have been more effective in another district. But the voter who casts a surplus vote gets to be
represented by the candidate of her choice. Not so for the voter who casts a lost
vote. Faced with a choice between casting a lost vote and casting a surplus vote,
I would prefer the latter option, and I suspect most other voters would, too.
The definition of surplus votes is similarly unexplained and even less intuitive. The proponents define a surplus vote as one "cast ... for a winning candidate
but in excess of what [the candidate] needed to prevail"180 Thus,
EpL=Vpi-Vni,

where Vni denotes the number of votes the "winning

candidate ... needed to prevail." 81 But what is Vnt? Let Vj and V2 t denote the
number of ballots cast for the first- and second-place candidates, respectively.
Recall that under the two-party assumption, the sum of the parties' respective
vote totals is the district's total voter turnout: Tj = Vy, + Vx.l 82 The difference

178. See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text.
179. See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 7, at 850-51 ("[A]ny vote for a losing candidate
is wasted by definition, but so too is any vote beyond the 50 percent threshold needed (in
a two-candidate race) to win a seat.").
180. Id. at 834 (emphasis added); see also id. at 851.
181. See id. at 851.
182. See supra text accompanying note 115.
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between Vii and V2 i is the victory margin (M1), which is itself a measure of electoral competitiveness.1 83

VMt- Vy

iE Dxv

Under a plurality voting system, the candidate with the most votes wins. 184
This suggests that the number of votes the winning candidate "needed to prevail"
is the number of votes earned by her most popular opponent-that is,
V =V2l1 85 Under this definition, the number of surplus votes (Ep) is simply
the victory margin.
Epi = Vpi - Vni = Vi -2=

Mi

For example, if 100 ballots are cast and the victor prevails with a vote tally of 65
to 35, then V, = V2 i = 35 and Epi = Vpi - V'i = 65 - 35 = 30.
But this is not the proponents' definition. Instead, they define necessary
votes (Vnt) as half of actual voter turnout (2 ).186 Under this definition, the number of surplus votes is half the victory margin.
V

Ti =
2

+ V2
2

For example, if the victor prevails 65 to 35, Vn =
= 65 -

_

V 1 -V
2

2i =

Mi
2

= 50 and Ep1 = Vpi - Vni

50 = 15.187

The proponents justify this approach by invoking "the 50 percent threshold
188
It is true that a candidate must
needed (in a two-candidate race) to win a seat."
earn more than half the votes to win a two-way race. But the proponents' invocation of the 50% threshold fails to clarify the basis for their definition because
183. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 38, at 678 ("Metrics such as average margin of victory ...
indicate both how competitive individual districts are and how responsive a jurisdiction's electoral system is as a whole.").
184. See Plurality-MajoritySystems, FAIRVoTE, https://perma.cc/VBY8-JS7A (archived Feb. 25,

2018).
185. Technically, the number of necessary votes is one more than the runner-up's vote total.
Like others engaged in efficiency gap analysis, see, e.g., Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra
note 7, at 834 n.14, I ignore this "plus one" technicality.
186. See supratext accompanying notes 117-18.
187. See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 7, at 851 n.107 ("Assume, for example, that
Candidate A receives 65 percent of the vote and Candidate B receives 35 percent. Then
15 percent of Candidate A's votes ... are wasted .... ").
188. See id. at 851; see also id at 834 n.14 ("For the sake of simplicity, we also assume that 50
[out of 100] votes are needed to win a district .... "); id. at 851 n.107 ("[V]ictory in a twocandidate race is achieved with 50 percent of the vote .... ").
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both definitional approaches-theirs and the one defined in terms of the victory
margin-can be explained with reference to a 50% threshold. The distinction between surplus and necessary votes logically entails a counterfactual in which a
candidate earns fewer votes but still prevails. If the victor earned the same vote
total as the runner-up (Vii = V2i), half of turnout would be the runner-up's vote
total: L'=
2V 2 i = V2i. But the proponents, without adequate explana2
2
2
tion, apply the 50% threshold to the actual vote total rather than the vote total
in the counterfactual.
This is the definition of surplus votes Judge Griesbach, the dissenting judge
on the Whitford panel, attacked as "opaque" and "absurd."189 Judge Griesbach suggested that surplus votes must be defined as the entire vote margin rather than
half the vote margin:
_____=

Just as a baseball game is not decided by reference to total runs, an election is not
decided by a fraction of total votes. Instead, the number of votes needed to win is
simply the number one more than the losing candidate won, and therefore anything beyond that should be counted as a "wasted" vote .. 190

The proponents' definition of surplus votes could be explained more clearly.
It simply defines surplus votes as the number of voter swaps possible without
altering the outcome. Each swap exchanges one party x supporter for one
party y supporter and accordingly decreases the victory margin by two votes, so
the total number of possible outcome-preserving swaps is half the victory margin. This reflects the perspective of the mapmaker under the equal voter turnout
assumption. Each voter swap represents a marginal adjustment to the district
boundaries-one that changes the district of only the two homes where the respective swapped voters reside.
This definition of surplus votes is not absurd, but it does privilege the mapmaker's party-centric perspective under the assumption of equal voter turnout.
From the perspective of an individual voter who supports a particular party, her
choice is either to cast her ballot or to stay home. Her vote is wasted if she could
have stayed home without altering the outcome. From the perspective of the
mapmaker focused on that partisan voter, his choice is to which district she
should be assigned; he could leave the voter in her current district or swap her
with a voter from another district supporting the other party. From the perspective of the mapmaker, then, the partisan voter's vote is wasted if he could swap
her without altering the outcome in the original district.
Judge Griesbach's baseball analogy implicitly adopts a voter-centric approach. Judge Griesbach considers a single baseball game just as a voter considers
only the district to which she is assigned. But in a real election, there are multiple
189. See Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837,958 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (Griesbach, J., dissenting),
stay granted, 137 S. Ct. 2289, and jurisdictionpostponed, 137 S. Ct. 2268 (2017).
190. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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districts, and a partisan mapmaker is concerned with the total number of districts won. To put this in baseball terms: Suppose multiple baseball games are
played simultaneously, each game between one team from each of two leagues.
Further suppose that a run for team x in one game could be swapped for a run
for team y in another. Each league's ultimate goal is to win as many games as
possible with a fixed number of runs. This two-league competition has the salient features of partisan districting. Under these conditions, it is not absurd to
define a team's surplus runs as more than half of a game's total runs, as that is
simply the number of run-swaps possible without altering a game's outcome.
In short, the proponents' party-centric approach is one plausible way to define and weight surplus votes. But it is neither the only way nor necessarily the
most intuitive way. Just as Nagle has recently considered McGann's suggestion
19
of comparing wasted vote shares, 1he has also noted that surplus votes can alternatively be defined as the entire vote margin and that wasted votes can be
192
generalized as a weighted sum of lost and surplus votes. Part III.F below similarly alters the definition and weight of surplus votes, and it derives a more
generalized formula that quantifies the precise impact of these methodological
choices on the efficiency gap measure. My results accord with Nagle's, but my
approach demonstrates the critical role these methodological choices play in calibrating the measure's relationship between the competing norms of electoral
competitiveness and seats-votes proportionality.
E.

The Two-Party Assumption

The proponents make the assumption that "there are only two parties" in
any election.1 93 The efficiency gap measure is by definition a bilateral comparison-it takes two parties and compares their relative efficiency by calculating
the difference in their respective wasted vote totals. I use the term focal partiesto
refer to the two parties that are the focus of the measure's bilateral comparison
and the term peripheralcandidatesto refer to candidates unaffiliated with either
94
of the two focal parties. I call the two focal parties party x and party y.1 When
the proponents assume that there are only two parties, they necessarily ignore

191. See supratext accompanying notes 171-77.
192. See Nagle, supra note 20, at 199 & n.16, 200, 203 & n.24.
193. See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 7, at 853.
194. The efficiency gap is a signed measure: Its absolute value indicates the extent of the gerrymander, while its sign indicates which party the gerrymander favors. I define all
relevant concepts so that a positive gap favors party x and a negative gap favors party y.
Obviously, the two primary parties of interest are the major political parties. Whenever
I discuss the efficiency gap between Republicans and Democrats, I treat Republicans as
party x and Democrats as party y.
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any ballot cast for a peripheral candidate. 195 Because the proponents emphasize
partisan fairness between the two major political parties, 196 they make the simplifying assumption that every district race is a contest between one party x
candidate and one party y candidate. This two-party assumption actually consists of three related assumptions: In each district's general election (1) no ballots
are cast for peripheral candidates; (2) no more than one candidate runs from each
focal party;1 97 and (3) no race is uncontested.1 9 8

Subpart E.1 below examines the consequences when the third assumption
fails and analysts must impute results for uncontested races. Implicit in the efficiency gap approach is a final assumption: that the vote shares earned by the two
parties reflect their relative popular support among the electorate. Subpart E.2
examines the consequences when this final assumption fails because electoral administration differentially prevents or discourages supporters of one party from
casting ballots.
1.

Uncontested races

When a district race is uncontested, the proponents suggest a strategy of imputation to estimate what would have occurred had the race been contested:
Going forward, we encourage other scholars to explore a range of imputation techniques to ensure that the direction of a gerrymander (ifnot its size) is robust to any
particular strategy. But this catholic philosophy has its limits. We strongly discourage analysts from either dropping uncontested races from the computation or
treating them as if they produced unanimous support for a party. The former approach eliminates important information about a plan, while the latter assumes
that coerced votes accurately reflect political support. Neither correctly represents
how the gerrymandering party itself would view its plan.199

Uncontested district races present problems of normative correspondence, robustness, and scope for the efficiency gap measure. If imputation were
impermissible or impossible, we could either omit uncontested elections from
195. See McGhee, supranote 10, at 68 (defining the

system as one "with two parties"). The pro-

ponents' 2015 article offers no definition of surplus votes outside the two-party context.
See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 7, at 851.
196. See, e.g., Stephanopoulos &McGhee, supra note 7, at 838-39 (characterizing the efficiency
gap as a "new measure of partisansymmetry" designed to capture "the idea that a plan
should treat the major partiessymmetrically" (emphasis added)).
197. The 2015 article defines the measure in terms of the parties' wasted votes and defines
wasted votes in terms of ballots cast for party-affiliated candidates, implicitly assuming
that each party has only one candidate. See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 7, at
851.
198. The proponents explicitly recognize this assumption and apply imputation'techniques
when races are uncontested to estimate what would have happened if those races had
been contested. See id. at 866-67.
199. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 7, at 867.
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the dataset (presenting a problem of scope) or count uncontested districts as registering unanimous support for the winning party (presenting a problem of
normative correspondence). If imputation is permitted, we must choose a fair
and accurate method of imputation (presenting a problem of robustness).
The need to impute election results in uncontested districts prompts two
analytical points related to our overall assessment of the efficiency gap measure.
First, the imputation method chosen may, under the right circumstances, have
a significant, even outcome-determinative, effect on a plan's efficiency gap. Second, uncontested races are a sign of uncompetitive districts, so there may be an
unfortunate association between a plan's uncompetitiveness and the sensitivity
of the efficiency gap calculation to imputation method.
My first point is practical. The proponents recognize that employing different imputation methods may present robustness problems200 but do not
quantify how significantly the choice of imputation method might affect the resulting efficiency gap. It is possible, however, to mathematically estimate how
sensitive the gap is to different imputation approaches. Consider the simplified
efficiency gap formula: AW = S* - 2V*. When an analyst imputes vote share for
an uncontested district, she changes only the vote totals, not the winning party.
The seat margin (S*) stays the same, but the vote margin (V*) changes. Imagine
two analysts employing different imputation methods that produce different
imputed vote margins in uncontested races. Consider the notation in Table 2
below.
Table 2
Notation for the Effect of Imputation
Notation

Description

91

the proportion of districts that are uncontested
the average district vote share in contested districts

Vc

VIa

the average district vote share in uncontested districts as estimated by
Analyst 1

V2 U

the average district vote share in uncontested districts as estimated by
Analyst 2

V,

the overall vote share as estimated by Analyst 1
the overall vote share as estimated by Analyst 2

V2
AW 1 ,2

the difference between the efficiency gap estimated by Analyst 1 and
the efficiency gap estimated by Analyst 2

200. See, e.g., id. at 866 ("[I]mputation approaches can be more or less sophisticated, and can
bring varying amounts of information to bear on the problem.").
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We can then quantify the impact of imputation under the equal voter turnout
assumption: 20 1
AW1,2 = 2Su(V 2u - Vi).

The greater the difference between imputed average vote shares, the greater
the difference in computed gaps. Note that the analyst who imputes the higher
average vote share will compute the lower gap. By increasing the estimate of
party x support, the analyst increases the estimate of deserved seat share, thereby
decreasing the estimate of undeserved seat share and the estimate of the extent
to which the plan favors party x.
Moreover, the more uncontested races there are, the more the imputation
technique matters. For example, assume that one-third of districts in a state hold
uncontested elections. Assume also that Analyst 1 concludes that party x would
have, on average, earned 70% of the vote in uncontested races, but Analyst 2 concludes that party x would have, on average, won 73% of the vote in uncontested
races. In that scenario, Analyst 1 would compute an efficiency gap 2% higher
than that computed by Analyst 2.202
This effect of the imputation method upon the statewide efficiency gap is not
merely a theoretical concern; the imputation method could have significant practical consequences for the overall validity of a given districting plan. In the 2012
Wisconsin State Assembly election, for instance, 27 of 99 assembly races were uncontested and therefore had to be imputed in order for the experts to calculate that
election's efficiency gap. 203 Applying the simplified formula to this election, but
using different imputation methods, the Whitford plaintiffs' experts reached different results: Mayer's efficiency gap would have been 9.85% under the simplified
formula, whereas Jackman's gap was 13%.204 The difference between these two estimates is greater than the difference between Mayer's estimate and the numeric

201. The proportion of contested districts is 1 - S,. Therefore, V, = S1 Vj, + (1 - Sy)Vc,
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203. See Mayer Report, supranote 146, at 39 (noting that 23 Democrats but only 4 Republicans
ran unopposed); id. at 44-45 (discussing imputation); see also Jackman Report, supra
note 102, at 22-31 (discussing imputation).
204. Compare Mayer Report, supra note 146, at 46 tbl.10, withJackman Report, supranote 102,
at 16, 36. For more on the experts' use of the simplified formula, see notes 147-49 and
accompanying text above.
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threshold for presumptive invalidity, 205 suggesting that selecting an imputation
method could have a nontrivial impact on efficiency gap analysis.
There may be real-world elections for which the existence of an abovethreshold efficiency gap depends on the imputation method selected to assess
uncontested races.206 If the efficiency gap were adopted as the definitive legal test
for unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering, plaintiffs alleging such a gerrymander might strategically employ imputation methods that would produce
larger gaps; defendants might strategically employ competing methods to produce lower gaps; and the resulting battle of the experts over the imputation
method could be outcome-determinative.
Given that analysts calculating the efficiency gap often must impute hypothetical election results, one of the purported advantages of the measure over other
measures of partisan symmetry is actually quite limited. The efficiency gap may be
particularly appealing-especially to Justice Kennedy-because it relies upon directly observed election data rather than hypothetical results.207 But if calculating
the gap requires imputing hypothetical results, and if the size of the gap depends in
substantial part on which method an analyst selects, the gap is less of a straightforward measure of real-world data. It is possible that the Court might restrict
efficiency gap analysis to circumstances in which a plan produces a durable abovethreshold gap under any plausible imputation method. This would address the concern with hypotheticals and avoid a battle of the experts-but at the cost of limiting
the circumstances in which plaintiffs can deploy the measure and, potentially, when
those plaintiffs can prevail on their partisan gerrymandering claims at all.
It is particularly troubling that the efficiency gap calculation is more sensitive
to imputation method when a plan has more uncontested races because an uncontested race is a signal that a district is highly uncompetitive.208 Thus, a highly
uncompetitive plan may produce a relatively larger number of uncontested races,
rendering efficiency gap analysis more sensitive to imputation method. That efficiency gap analysis may be more difficult for uncompetitive plans could perversely
create a (further) incentive for mapmakers to draw uncompetitive plans. In Part Ill
below, I argue that adopting the efficiency gap as the definitive measure of partisan
gerrymandering may also unintentionally incentivize uncompetitive plans because
205. The academic proponents suggested a threshold of 8% based on historical trends. See
Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 7, at 884, 888-89. Jackman suggested a threshold
of 7% based on durability analysis. SeeJackman Report, supranote 102, at 66-69.
206. Cf Jackman Report, supra note 102, at 22 ("Uncontested races are common in state legislative elections, and are even the norm in some states.").
207. Cf League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), 548 U.S. 399, 419-20 (2006)
(opinion of Kennedy, J.) ("[W]e are wary of adopting a constitutional standard that invalidates a map based on unfair results that would occur in a hypothetical state of
affairs.").
208. See Mayer Report, supra note 146, at 39 ("[U]ncontested races occur largely when one
party sees zero probability of winning because the majority party has such overwhelming majorities in the district.").
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the sensitivity of the efficiency gap to vote swings is a function of a plan's responsiveness. Combined, these considerations suggest that overreliance on the efficiency
gap may present the risk of a vicious cycle: Endorsing the efficiency gap as the definitive measure may unintentionally encourage mapmakers to draw uncompetitive
plans that produce a high number of uncontested races, and courts may struggle to
evaluate the resulting plans because the high proportion of uncontested races renders efficiency gap analysis more sensitive to imputation methods.
2.

Voter suppression

Because the efficiency gap is a measure of the relative number of wasted
votes for each party, the only data points it requires are ballots cast and seats
won. In the measure's most direct application, an analyst computes the efficiency
gap produced by a given plan in a given election by inputting into the long-form
equation (or simplified formula) the actual votes cast in that election by district
and party (or the vote margin and seat margin produced by that election) after
imputations for uncontested races. In a more advanced application, an analyst
estimates the results of a hypothetical election by running regression techniques
on historical and contemporaneous data correlated with election outcomes and
then inputs those results into the relevant equation to compute the efficiency
gap a given plan would likely produce in that hypothetical election.
The efficiency gap's focus on ballots cast means that it cannot detect any obstacles voters face in casting ballots and is blind to rules of electoral administration that
disproportionately affect supporters of one party. If one such rule-for example, a
stringent photo identification requirement for in-person voting-thwarts a voter's
effort to cast a ballot for a party y candidate, the measure detects no problem; it
simply assumes that party y has one ballot less support from the electorate.
This dynamic may unintentionally reward, and thereby further incentivize,
voter suppression efforts because suppression may make a gerrymander seem less
like a gerrymander-that is, suppression can hide gerrymanders from the efficiency
gap. Suppressing one party's statewide vote total can have the effect of reducing the
overall gap. If, for instance, the Democrats enact a partisan gerrymander and then
adopt electoral reforms that disproportionately burden Republican voters, any resulting decrease in Republican turnout would operate to reduce the efficiency gap's
measure of the pro-Democratic advantage conferred by the districting plan.209
209. To be clear, I do not claim that this lack of sensitivity to voter suppression is a problem
unique to the efficiency gap. It is a feature of any measure of partisan gerrymandering
that quantifies an ideal or acceptable relationship between votes and seats won. Specifically, it is a feature of any measure that satisfies the efficiency principle. Any definition
that uses popular support as demonstrated by ballots cast to justify the number of seats
won may incentivize voter suppression because political actors seeking to demonstrate
greater relative support can inflate the appearance of that support by making it harder
for their competitors' supporters to vote.
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-

Unfortunately, the Court is considering the efficiency gap at a moment
in U.S. politics when electoral administration is a partisan issue, with Democrats more likely to support "ballot access" measures ostensibly designed to
reduce the perceived risk that an eligible voter will encounter difficulty casting a ballot and Republicans more likely to support "ballot integrity"
measures ostensibly designed to reduce the perceived risk that an ineligible
voter will cast a ballot. 210 In the years since the Court invalidated the Voting
Rights Act's coverage formula and thereby rendered inoperative its preclearance regime, 211 twenty states have adopted "ballot integrity" lawS 2 12
including notably the two states currently defending against partisan gerrymandering claims based on efficiency gap approaches, Wisconsin 2 13 and

210. See Stephen Ansolabehere, Access Versus Integrity in Voter Identification Requirements, 63

N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 613, 613-16 (2008).
211. See Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013); see also supra note 59.
212. See Brennan Ctr. for Justice, New Voting Restrictions in America 2-11 (2017),
https://perma.cc/8BDU-GKAC (detailing as of May 2017 that Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas,
Virginia, and Wisconsin had enacted at least one type of voting restriction).
213. See id. at 8 (discussing Wisconsin's restrictions on the right to vote). In 2011, two years
before the Court decided Shelby County, Wisconsin adopted a stringent voter identifica-

tion law. See Act of May 25, 2011, No. 23, 2011 Wis. Sess. Laws 104 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of the Wisconsin Statutes). A federal district court concluded that
the law violated the Fourteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights Act. See Frank v.

Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837, 863, 879 (E.D. Wis.), rev'd, 768 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2014). Before
the Seventh Circuit heard argument in the appeal, the state supreme court softened the
effects of the law by requiring the state to issue photo identifications free of charge. See

Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744,747 (7th Cir. 2014); Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP v.
Walker, 851 N.W.2d 262, 281 (Wis. 2014); see also Richard L. Hasen, Softening Voter ID
Laws Through Litigation- Is It Enough?, 2016 Wis. L. REv. FORWARD 100, 110-11 (detailing
much of the litigation challenging Wisconsin's voter identification law in federal and
state courts). The state also places restrictions on individual voter registration and early
voting. See Brennan Ctr. for Justice, supra note 212, at 8.
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North Carolina. 214 It is difficult to confidently estimate the effect of electoral
reforms on voter turnout,2 15 and it is not the objective of this Article to advance the debate about whether, and to what extent, "ballot integrity"
measures such as those adopted in Wisconsin and North Carolina differentially burden and thereby reduce participation among Democratic-leaning

214. See Brennan Ctr. for Justice, supra note 212, at 11 (discussing North Carolina's re-

strictions on the right to vote). North Carolina was subject to preclearance prior to
Shelby County because some of its counties fell under the coverage formula. See Jurisdictions Previously Covered by Section 5, U.S. DEP'T JUST., https://perma.cc/LY5X-QX9V
(last updated Aug. 6, 2015). Once the Court struck down the coverage formula, the
North Carolina legislature quickly enacted an omnibus electoral reform bill with five
key provisions: (1) a voter identification requirement (for in-person but not mail-in
voting) limited to forms of identification that "African Americans disproportionately
lacked"; (2) a reduction in early voting days; (3) elimination of same-day registration;
(4) elimination of out-of-precinct voting; and (5) elimination of preregistration. See

N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 216-18 (4th Cir. 2016),
cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1399 (2017); see also Act of July 26, 2013, No. 381, 2013 N.C. Sess.
Laws 1505 (codified in scattered sections of the North Carolina General Statutes). The
Fourth Circuit concluded that the omnibus bill constituted intentional racial discrimination, "target[ing] African Americans with almost surgical precision," see N.C. State
Conference, 831 F.3d at 214-15, and "[ulsing race as a proxy for party ... to win an election," see id. at 222. See also id. at 225 (noting that North Carolina is a state where
"African-American race is a better predictor for voting Democratic than party registration" (quoting one of the state's experts in the litigation)).
215. Turnout may go down after an electoral reform, but this correlation does not tell us
how much of the turnout effect was caused by the reform as opposed to other factors
such as reduced enthusiasm for candidates. We may be able to estimate the number
of people potentially affected by an electoral reform-for instance, the number of
registered voters who lack required voter identification. But this does not tell us the
number of voters actually affected-for instance, the number of registered voters
,turned away on election day for lack of proper identification. Another complicating
factor is that voter suppression efforts may affect turnout through information or
misinformation. For example, an individual may actually be permitted by law to
cast a ballot but decline to try to vote based on the mistaken assumption that she is
not.
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voters. 216 My only claim is that if electoral administration reform had the
differential turnout effect some fear, that in turn would affect the efficiency
gap analysis.
Consider the following. In the Whitford litigation, the plaintiffs proposed a
numeric threshold of 7%,217 and their expert Kenneth Mayer computed an efficiency gap for the actual plan (using the simplified formula) of about 9.85%.218
According to the simplified formula (AW = S* - 2V*), holding seat share constant, every 0.5 percentage point decrease in Democratic vote share decreases by
1 percentage point the Republican advantage conferred by the electoral map.
About 2.8 million ballots were cast in the 2012 Wisconsin State Assembly election;2 19 0.5% of this number is 14,000 ballots. Thus, if 14,000 fewer Democrats
cast ballots, the pro-Republican efficiency gap would decrease by about 1 percentage point. If about 40,000 fewer Democrats cast ballots, the pro-Republican
efficiency gap would decrease by about 2.86 percentage points-and would fall
below the proposed 7% threshold. If 140,000 fewer Democrats cast ballots, the
pro-Republican efficiency gap would be eliminated entirely.

216. For a sampling of this debate, see Jack Citrin et al., The Effects of Voter ID Notification on
Voter Turnout Results from a Large-Scale Field Experiment, 13 ELECTION L.J. 228, 235 (2014)
(finding "little support for the hypothesis that notification of ID requirements depresses
turnout"); Shelley de Alth, Essay, ID at the Polls:Assessing the Impact of Recent State Voter ID
Laws on Voter Turnout, 3 HARV. L. & POL'Y REv. 185, 186 (2009) ("[Plhoto and non-photo
ID laws decreased turnout by between 1.6 and 2.2 percentage points ... , [but] states that
amended their ID laws more recently experienced increased voter turnout, whereas
states that changed their voting laws prior to 2004 showed a decline in turnout."); Robert
S. Erikson & Lorraine C. Minnite, Modeling Problems in the Voter Identification-Voter Turnout Debate, 8 ELECTION L.J. 85, 98 (2009) ("[T]he existing science regarding vote
suppression [is] incomplete and inconclusive ... not because of any reason to doubt the
suppression effect but rather because the data that have been analyzed to date do not allow a conclusive test."); Samuel Issacharoff, Ballot Bedlam, 64 DUKE LJ. 1363, 1381 (2015)
("To date, empirical studies... have been unable to find any substantial decline either in
overall turnout or in the turnout of racial minorities as a result of [voter identification]
laws."); id. at 1381 n.67 (collecting studies); Pamela S. Karlan, Turnout, Tenuousness, and
Getting Results in Section 2 Vote DenialClaims, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 763, 774 (2016) ("[A]s a practical matter, determining whether a challenged practice has depressed minority turnout
can be extraordinarily complex."); id. at 774 n.63 (collecting studies); Spencer Overton,
Voter Identification, 105 MICH. L. REV. 631, 659-61 & nn.136-41, 143-44 & 150-53 (2007) (citing studies suggesting that senior citizens, young people, people of color, people with
disabilities, low-income people, and transient people differentially lack driver's licenses);
Michael J. Pitts, Empirically Assessing the Impact of Photo Identification at the Polls Through
an Examination of ProvisionalBalloting, 24 J.L. & POL. 475, 480 (2008) (concluding that a
study of provisional ballots cast in Indiana's 2008 primary election "likely provide[s] a
little something for both proponents and opponents of photo identification").
217. SeeJackman Report, supra note 102, at 66-69.
218. See Mayer Report, supra note 146, at 46 tbl.10; see also supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text (explaining the calculation of the 9.85% gap).
219. See Mayer Report, supra note 146, at 46 tbl.10.
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A real-life example puts this into perspective. A federal judge in the challenge to Wisconsin's voter identification law concluded that over 300,000, or
roughly 9%, of all registered voters in Wisconsin lacked the necessary identification, that "[a] substantial number of the 300,000 plus eligible voters who lack a
photo ID are low-income," and that "it is likely that a substantial number" of
those voters without a qualifying identification "will be deterred from voting."220 These considerations do not establish the intent or effect of Wisconsin's
photo ID law. But they do suggest the risk inherent in the efficiency gap's focus
on ballots cast. A party eager to construct a partisan gerrymander capable of
withstanding any legal challenge based on the efficiency gap would have a
strong incentive to engage in voter suppression efforts that reduce the turnout
of its opponents' supporters.
The only way to avoid this perverse relationship between the measure of
partisan gerrymandering and the turnout effects of partisan voter suppression
is to explicitly account for partisan turnout effects in the measure. This can be
accomplished by applying the efficiency gap measure to a hypothetical election
result estimated in a way that controls for turnout-reducing electoral reforms
or practices. In essence, this technique would ask what efficiency gap a plan
would produce without voter suppression rather than what efficiency gap a plan
did produce with voter suppression. The drawback is that this accommodation
of the voter suppression problem makes the measure further reliant on hypotheticals and more sensitive to modeling assumptions. But it would avoid the
risk of rewarding and further incentivizing partisan voter suppression. At the
very least, this approach warrants consideration under the circumstances present in Wisconsin and North Carolina, where the same lawmakers who enacted
the challenged maps also enacted electoral reforms-subsequently called into
question by federal courts 221-that risk partisan voter suppression and a corresponding underestimation of the extent of advantage those maps conferred on
Republicans. More generally, if efficiency gap measures are to play a role in partisan gerrymandering claims, this problem warrants further consideration.
HI. The Efficiency Gap's Relationship to Proportionality
and Competitiveness
Part II above focused on the efficiency gap's conceptual design and its underlying methodological choices. This Part turns to the efficiency gap's relationship
to seats-votes proportionality and competitiveness. The efficiency gap was explicitly designed to capture asymmetrical partisan efficiency, not
proportionality or competitiveness. Yet the efficiency gap bears a relationship

220. Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837,854,862 (E.D. Wis.), rev'd, 768 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2014).
221. See supra notes 213-14.
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to proportionality and competitiveness that warrants better understanding and
consideration.
As vote margin increases, the efficiency gap approves increasing departures
from strict seats-votes proportionality. A party with 75% vote share can win
every seat and achieve an efficiency gap of zero. In fact, the efficiency gap will
report a disadvantage for a party with more than 75% vote share even if that
party wins every seat. More realistically, a party with 59% vote share can win a
75% supermajority in the legislature and still produce a below-threshold efficiency gap.222
The efficiency gap bears a more nuanced relationship to competitiveness.
The efficiency gap is a measure of differential, not overall, competitiveness, but
the gap's sensitivity to vote swings is a function of seats-votes responsiveness,
which depends on the proportion of relatively competitive districts. This relationship reveals that scholars and jurists focusing on competitiveness may be
referring to the efficiency gap without realizing it. And it suggests that adopting
the efficiency gap as the exclusive measure of partisan gerrymandering would
permit and perhaps encourage mapmakers to draw uncompetitive plans.
The analysis proceeds as follows. Subpart A below explains why proportionality and competitiveness matter. Partisan symmetry may be a necessary but
insufficient condition for a well-functioning democracy. We should be concerned by extreme departures from proportionality and competitiveness,
especially when they occur simultaneously.
Subpart B then adopts the analytic technique introduced in Part II.C. 1 above
to offer a more intuitive understanding of the efficiency gap's operation. At the
level of an individual district, the wasted vote disparity is a function of the district's competitiveness: It is zero when one party wins 75-25, such that the
victory margin is precisely half of turnout, and it jumps discontinuously when
the district flips from one party to the other. From this district-level analysis,
we can derive key features of the measure's plan-level operation.
Subpart C examines the efficiency gap's relationship with proportionality.
The proponents recognize an extreme vote share problem, one in which a party
with 75% vote share can win all the seats and still achieve an efficiency gap of
zero. I argue that the problem is not confined to this point. For example, a majority with 59% vote share can win a veto-proof 75% supermajority in the
legislature with a below-threshold gap.223
Subpart D examines the efficiency gap's relationship with competitiveness.
I define the competitiveness gap as the seat-share-weighted difference in average
222. See infraPart III.C.
223. Such a supermajority would also ward off filibusters in states with that procedure. See
Paige Scobee, Ahoyl The Futureof the Filibuster,NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES: NCSL BLOG
(June 29, 2016), https://perma.cc/BU52-VXUK ("Approximately 10 states have a cloture
rule that requires more than a simple majority." (citing Meghan Reilly, States Limiting

Legislative Debate, CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY (July 8,2009), https://perma.cc/K3DQ-YDPA)).
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competitiveness between x-won and y-won districts and show that under the
equal voter turnout assumption, the efficiency gap is equal to the competitiveness gap. This means that a mapmaker can reduce the efficiency gap by
unpacking, and thereby increasing overall competitiveness, or by decracking,
and thereby decreasing overall competitiveness. While a zero gap can be
achieved at any level of competitiveness, a zero gap can only be maintainedat a
relatively low level of competitiveness because the gap's sensitivity to vote
swings is a function of seats-votes responsiveness.
Subpart E offers a normative assessment of the efficiency gap's relationship
with proportionality and competitiveness. I suggest that this relationship presents two problems: a false positive problem, in which the measure flags as
suspect normatively desirable plans that reflect efforts to promote proportionality or competitiveness; and a false negative problem, in which it fails to detect
normatively problematic plans such as skewed bipartisan gerrymanders with
excessive seat bonuses and insufficient representation for minority parties. I suggest that the doctrinal tools of intent, justification, and sensitivity analysis only
partially address the false positive problem and fail to address the false negative
problem for want of a mechanism to overcome the presumption of validity triggered by a below-threshold gap.
Finally, Subpart F demonstrates how the efficiency gap's relationship with
proportionality and competitiveness depends on the definition and weight of
surplus votes.
A.

The Relevance of Proportionality and Competitiveness

The efficiency gap's proponents, like the LULAC amici,224 have good reason
to focus on partisan symmetry rather than other democratic norms like seatsvotes proportionality and competitiveness. For one thing, proportionality and
competitiveness are in tension with each other. A maximally competitive system, one in which each district race is a razor-thin nail-biter, may depart
radically from proportionality because a small uniform swing across all districts
in favor of one party would result in that party's winning every seat with just
over half the votes. Conversely, a strictly proportional system exhibits relatively low competitiveness because any incremental change in vote share must
translate into an equal change in seat share, and so the number of competitive
districts is necessarily limited.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has demonstrated deep skepticism about the
constitutional significance of proportionality and competitiveness. The Court
has repeatedly insisted that the Constitution does not require strict seats-votes

224. See supra Part I.B.
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proportionality. 225 And in Gaffney v. Cummings, a majority of the Court was untroubled by the uncompetitiveness of a bipartisan gerrymander that carved the
state up into safe Democratic districts and safe Republican districts so as to
achieve seats-votes proportionality. 226 Thus, the Court might reject as foreclosed by precedent any legal test that essentially requires strict proportionality
or maximal competitiveness. In contrast, five Justices have expressed interest in
partisan symmetry, a normatively appealing standard that closely tracks nondiscrimination principles familiar to both equal protection and First
Amendment law. 227

But even if strict proportionality is not required, a significant departure
from proportionality may be relevant to assessing a districting plan. So too with
competitiveness. A plan need not maximize competitiveness, but we may be
rightly concerned if a plan needlessly and intentionally minimizes it. And we
ought to be particularly concerned by a plan that simultaneously departs significantly from both proportionality and competitiveness. Note that Gaffney
approved a bipartisan gerrymander that reduced competitiveness to achieve
seats-votes proportionality, not a plan that departed from both competitiveness
and proportionality. 228
If proportionality and competitiveness matter, the principle of partisan
symmetry proposed by the LULAC amici and invoked by the efficiency gap proponents may constitute a necessary but insufficient condition of a wellfunctioning electoral system. Take some extreme examples. In a winner-takeall system, whichever party earns more votes gets all the seats. This system satisfies the principle of partisan symmetry and maximizes competitiveness, but it
permits an extreme departure from seats-votes proportionality and thus denies
any representation to the minority party. In contrast, consider a system in
225. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 288 (2004) (plurality opinion) ("[Appellants']
standard rests upon the principle that groups ... have a right to proportional representation. But the Constitution contains no such principle. It guarantees equal protection of
the law to persons, not equal representation in government to equivalently sized
groups.").
226. See 412 U.S. 735, 752-54 (1973) ("[J]udicial interest should be at its lowest ebb when a State
purports fairly to allocate political power to the parties in accordance with their voting
strength....").

227. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), 548 U.S. 399, 483-84 (2006)
(Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[N]or do I rule out the utility of a
criterion of symmetry as a test. Interest in exploring this notion is evident. Perhaps further attention could be devoted to the administrability of such a criterion at all levels of
redistricting and its review." (citations omitted) (citing id at 419-20 (opinion of Kennedy,
J.); id. at 465-68 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); and id. at 491-92
(Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part))); see also supra note 114 (discussing
the equal protection and First Amendment conceptions of the nondiscrimination principle embodied in the notion that partisan gerrymandering is unconstitutional).
228. See 412 U.S. at 752, 754.
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which each party gets half the seats no matter how many votes it earns. This
system satisfies the principle of partisan symmetry and ensures minority representation, but it eliminates competitiveness. Whereas competitive races
promote accountability, 229 safe districts shift the action from the general election to the primary, which pushes legislators to ideological extremes, promotes
polarization and gridlock, 230 and reduces the responsiveness of legislators to the
general electorate. 23 1 The proliferation of safe districtS 232 may also discourage
high-quality challengers, reduce party mobilization, and depress voter participation, 233 giving incumbents an advantage unrelated to their prior performance

229. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 38,

at 676-77.

230. See, e.g., Lillian V. Smith, Note, Recreating the "RitualCarving" Why Congress Should Fund

IndependentRedistrictingCommissions and End PartisanGerrymandering,80 BROOK. L. REV.
1641, 1644 (2015) ("[P]artisan gerrymandering plays a significant role [in creating congressional stagnation] by reducing the competitiveness of elections, contributing to the
systemic entrenchment of partisan interests, and perpetuating congressional
deadlock . . . ."). Recent Congresses have been notoriously unproductive. See Drew
DeSilver, In Late Spurt of Activity, Congress Avoids "Least Productive" Title, PEW RES. CR.:
FACT TANK (Dec. 29, 2014), https://perma.cc/AA34-QSLR. But see Drew DeSilver, Congressional Productivity Is Up-But Many New Laws Overturn Obama-Era Rules, PEW RES.
CTR.: FACT TANK (Aug. 29, 2017), https://perma.cc/2B7Q-7N6E (reporting that the 115th
Congress "is among the most productive in recent years"). When legislators fear primary
challengers but take general elections for granted, the predictable result is increased
partisanship and gridlock. See MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 13-16,
19 (2003).
231. SeeJosh Chafetz, Essay, The Phenomenology ofGridlock, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2065, 2086
(2013) (considering the possibility that "the combination of partisan primaries and bipartisan gerrymandering are resulting in a legislature that cannot be said to be broadly
responsive to the American people"); Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Where to
Draw the Line JudicialReview of PoliticalGerrymanders, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 574 (2004)
("The perverse consequence of the incumbent gerrymander is that it skews the distribution politically by driving the center out of elected office at the legislative level.").
232. By one count, the number of swing congressional districts plunged from 103 in 1992 to
35 in 2012. Nate Silver, As Swing DistrictsDwindle, Can a Divided House Stand?, N.Y. TIMES:
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Dec. 27, 2012, 9:46 AM), https://perma.cc/5WJ9-EEZT; see alsoJohn
Nichols, Why Redistricting Threatens Democracy, NATION (Feb. 1, 2012), https://perma.cc
/9NQN-EQQ5 (arguing that redistricting "explains why the vast majority of races are
not competitive").
233. See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), 548 U.S. 399, 471 n.10
(2006) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining multiple ways
in which "[s]afe seats may harm the democratic process," including by decreasing voter
turnout); Richard H. Pildes, The Constitution and Political Competition, 30 NOVA L. REV.
253, 260 (2006) ("[I1t is well documented that competitive elections encourage the appearance of strong challengers to incumbents and increase voter turnout and party
mobilization."). Note that some scholars and jurists emphasize voter participation as a
primary democratic value in itself. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 37, at 297 (describing
Justice Breyer's, Christopher Elmendorfs, and Spencer Overton's views on the "primacy
of voter participation").
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or present popularity. For these reasons, it may be problematic if the Court defines unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering in a way that entirely neglects
norms of competitiveness and seats-votes proportionality.
One approach would be to account for different norms with different causes
of action: a partisan gerrymandering claim for excessive departures from partisan symmetry, a bipartisan gerrymandering claim for excessive departures from
competitiveness, and a minority protection claim for excessive departures from
seats-votes proportionality. This approach warrants consideration going forward. But at this moment, when no other political gerrymandering claim exists,
it is prudent to consider the implications for other democratic norms of a partisan gerrymandering test designed to vindicate only the principle of partisan
symmetry. If mapmakers can avoid excessive partisan asymmetry by sacrificing
competitiveness, minority representation, or both, and if the Court prohibits
excessive partisan asymmetry without offering any legal protection or incentive for competitiveness or minority representation, the result may be skewed
incentives to produce problematic electoral plans. This is not a criticism of the
efficiency gap measure itself, which was sensibly designed with the exclusive
goal of quantifying partisan asymmetry. Rather, it is a call for careful study and
use of the measure with the understanding that partisan symmetry is a necessary
but insufficient condition of a well-functioning democracy.
B.

The Simple Zero-Gap Plan

To develop a deeper understanding of the efficiency gap's relationship to
proportionality and competitiveness, this Subpart examines the characteristics
of districts and plans in which the same number of votes are wasted.
1.

Measuring competitiveness

I begin the analysis by defining and deriving some properties of a district
election's victory margin. Recall that V1L and V2j respectively denote the number
of ballots cast for the first- and second-place candidates in a given district. The
sum is the district's total voter turnout: T = V1 + V2j = Vyl + Vx. The difference
is the victory margin (M1).
M = V1i - V2i =Vi - Vy|
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The proportional victory margin (mi) is the district-level victory margin (M)
expressed as a proportion of district-level voter turnout (Ti): mi = . Rearranging, we can express V, and V2 j in terms of victory margin (M) and turnout (T,). 234
Vi-

T + M = Ti
(1+ mL)
2
2
Ti - M
2

Ti (1 -mi)
2

V2_-

Let mp =

EDp

the average proportional victory margin in p-won

Mdenote

districts and let m = -D

denote the average proportional victory margin

S

over all districts. Note that the seat-share-weighted sum of mx and my is m and
the seat-share-weighted difference of mx and my is twice the vote margin (V*). 235
m = Sxmx + SYMY
2V* = Sxmx - Symy

This means we can express mx and my in terms of m, V*, and S*. 236
m + 2V*
. mx= 1 +
2S*
m

m - 2V*
=

1

-

2S*

234. These expressions can be derived as follows:
________

~)

(VV~+V 2 1)+(V 1 i-V 2
(z+V)211Vi

_VV)___

-

2
(Vit+V 2 0)(Vzi-V20
2

-jM

Li__T
1

(

-

')(ggVg
=
2
2
(2V 2i+o)
(V21+V 2 d+(VIf-V 1 )
Vi =
2
2

2
T1

2

-

v-(2V~i+O)

Vii =

2

2~i

1

m)

235. Using the equal voter turnout assumption, the second of these expressions can be derived
as follows:

2V* 2V= I-Vx-V ST'_

ST*

ioVXi-IED Vyl _

-

:tEDX(VXLVYi)-YiEDY

(VYfrV)

STx

= ZIEDx Tjm1-FiEDY Timi
ST

Eoxr*m-EDY TMj = LEDxMi-LEDYmL
ST*

ZED(Vxi-Vyi)

= Sxmx-S mY

S

S

=Sxmx - SYMY.

236. These results can be derived as follows:
mx
my

2S m+O
2Sx

-2ymy+O

29y

(§xmx+9ymy)+(9xmx-9ymy)
2(¾S*)

(

m+2V*
1+2S*,
m-2V*
-yMy)-(9xMx-9yMy)

x

2(q S*)

1-2S'
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These equations will prove critical in Part IV below.
2.

A district's wasted vote disparity is a discontinuous linear function
of its margin of victory

At the level of an individual district, the wasted vote disparity (Awi) is a discontinuous linear function of the victory margin mi.

Awi =

Wyi -

x.i

2

.

Mi
m-

iE Dx,

1E

With ties excluded, the disparity (Awe) is zero if and only if the victor prevails by half of turnout 237-regardless which party wins. With this victory
margin, three-quarters of ballots are cast for the winner and one-quarter for the
loser. For example, suppose 100 ballots are cast, 75 for party x and 25 for party y.
Party x wins 75% vote share and prevails by a margin of victory of 50 votes, precisely half of turnout. Under the proponents' formulation, party y has wasted 25
lost votes while party x has wasted 25 surplus votes (75 - 50), so each party wastes
238
the same number of votes and the district's wasted vote disparity is zero.
Call one-half the minimizing victory margin mo and define the competitiveness score (cL) as the difference between the minimizing (mo) and the actual
(mi) victory margin: ci = mo - mi. The wasted vote disparity is then:

Awl =-ci

i e Dx
iE DY, and

ci

Aw = cL = 0 if and only if mi = mo = 0.5.
A district's wasted vote disparity, then, is simply its competitiveness scorethe difference between the minimizing and actual victory margins-with a sign
convention such that a relatively competitive district favors the winning party
while a relatively uncompetitive district favors the losing party. When mi exceeds mo, ci is negative because the district is less competitive than the
minimizing level. This favors the losing party because surplus votes exceed lost
votes. When mi is less than mo, ci is positive because the district is more competitive than the minimizing level. This favors the winning party because lost
237. This makes intuitive sense. The proponents note that in single-memberidistrict elections featuring two candidates, precisely half of all votes are wasted. See Stephanopoulos
& McGhee, supra note 7, at 851 & n.107. Thus, equal wasted votes occur when each party
wastes one-quarter of ballots cast. See Mira Bernstein & Moon Duchin, Opinion, A Formula Goes to Court Partisan Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap, 64 NOTICES AM.
MATHEMATICAL Soc'Y 1020, 1022 (2017).
238. For this reason, Bernstein and Duchin accuse the measure of "[fletishiz[ing] three-to-one
landslide districts." See Bernstein & Duchin, supra note 237, at 1022.
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votes exceed surplus votes. The district-level disparity is positive (favors
party x) when x wins a relatively competitive district or y wins a relatively uncompetitive district; the disparity is negative (favors party y) when x wins a
relatively uncompetitive district or y wins a relatively competitive district.
The simple zero-gap plan has a competitiveness gap of zero because each
district has a competitiveness score of zero. Given that each district is won by
half of turnout (mi

= mo =

and party x earns

fewer votes in y-won districts. Because the plan must assign

party x earns
2

2

more votes in x-won districts,

each voter to one district, the seat margin must be double the vote margin.

V
V

ST*

2S

Recall that the simple zero-gap plan can be transformed to or from any zerogap plan with the appropriate series of voter swaps. By design, a voter swap preserves equal voter turnout 239 and statewide vote share. Because no swap alters a
district's election outcome, the series preserves seat share. And because the series
preserves vote share, seat share, and equal turnout, it must necessarily preserve
the efficiency gap. Thus, the equality S* = 2V* is a feature of any zero-gap plan,
not just the simple zero-gap plan. This offers another way to understand the
double proportionality and double responsiveness that emerges from the proponents' approach240: It is the seats-votes relationship exhibited by a simple
minimizing plan composed exclusively of minimizing districts. When each
party earns half the votes, the simple minimizing plan accords each party half
the seats. When one party earns 75% of the votes, the simple minimizing plan
accords that party all the seats because that party wins each district 75 to 25.
Figure 8 below illustrates the relationship between a district's disparity and
the vote share difference between parties x and y. It looks like a double backslash-two downward-sloping lines with a discontinuous jump at the 50% mark
when the seat flips from one party to the other. Much of the measure's operation
at the plan level can be intuited from this district-level relationship. Given that
a party can win a single seat with 75% of the votes in a zero-disparity district, a
party can win all the seats with 75% of votes and an efficiency gap of zero. Because a district's disparity is its competitiveness score, the efficiency gap is the
seat-share-weighted difference in average competitiveness. And because a district's disparity jumps discontinuously when a seat flips, the sensitivity of a
plan's efficiency gap to vote swings is a function of how many of its districts are
competitive.
239. Each participating district exchanges one voter for another and thus maintains the same
voter turnout.
240. See McGhee, supra note 10, at 68 (presenting equation 5); id. app. B at 79-82 (deriving
equation 5); Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 7, at 853 & n. 114.
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Figure 8

1.0

A

0.5

party ywastes fewe votes

-0.5
Partyxxins

4

Party y wins

-1.0
1.0
0.5
0.0
VA V,
At point A, there is maximal competitiveness and maximal wasted vote disparity. At
point B, there is zero wasted vote disparity and a low level of competitiveness, with a
minimizing proportional margin of victory of 50%. There is a discontinuous jump
when the winning party flips.
-1.0

C.

-0.5

The Efficiency Gap and Proportionality

The efficiency gap measures undeserved seat share relative to a baseline of
24 1
That the efficiency gap is
double proportionality, not strict proportionality.
may be a doctrinal virtue
proportionality
strict
of
distinct from a requirement
because it avoids the argument that its use is foreclosed by precedent holding
242
But the effithat the Constitution does not require strict proportionality.
ciency gap's departure from strict proportionality is normatively problematic,
particularly as one party's vote share increases. A party with 75% vote share can
win every seat and still achieve an efficiency gap of zero. In fact, the efficiency

241. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
242. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 288 (2004) (plurality opinion); see also supra
note 225 and accompanying text.
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gap will report a disadvantagefor a party with more than 75% vote share-even
243
if that party wins every seat.

The academic proponents recognize that the efficiency gap measure "fails to
capture the idea of fairness at stake in redistricting" in such a case, but they conclude that "this is not a problem that is especially relevant to real-world
redistricting" because "results this lopsided are extremely rare." 244 In other
words, the proponents concede the normative correspondence problem but address that problem by limiting the scope of the measure's operation: "All an
analyst must do is flag elections in which a party received at least 75 percent of
the statewide vote and 100 percent of the seats." 245 The proponents, writing in
2015, noted that "[n]o party has received more than 75 percent of the aggregate
vote in state legislative elections since 1982, and there are only 18 such cases out
of 800 in congressional elections (all of them either in the South or in states with
fewer than four House districts)." 2 46

The proponents provide strong evidence that it is historically rare for a majority party to enjoy a vote share above 75%. But this fact does not eliminate the
concerns highlighted by this scenario. Eighteen cases out of 800 (about 2%) is a
tiny proportion, but it is a significant absolute number of cases. Five of the eighteen cases involved a state exhibiting high vote share for a single congressional
election-Wyoming in 1984, Mississippi in 1990, South Dakota and West Virginia in 1998, and Louisiana in 2000.247 The other thirteen cases involved a state
exhibiting high vote share in multiple congressional elections-twice for North
Dakota (1984 and 1986); thrice for Alaska (2000, 2002, and 2004) and Hawaii
(1984, 1992, and 2008); and five times for Vermont (1982, 1984, 1990, 1992, and
1996).248 For this latter group of states, the efficiency gap would repeatedly "fail[]
to capture the idea of fairness at stake" in the election results. 249
Moreover, the proponents presented only those cases where majority vote
share exceeded 75%, the vote share needed to win every seat with an efficiency
gap of zero. The problem may reach its apex at this point, but it is not confined

243. For example, if party x wins every seat (S* = 0.5) with 80% vote share (V* = 0.3), the
simplified formula computes a gap of negative 10%.
AW = S* - 2V* = (0.5) - 2(0.3) = -0.1
The negative sign indicates that the gap disadvantages party x and favors party y, even
though party x won every seat with only 80% of the vote.
244. See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 7, at 863-64.
245.

U at 863.

246. U
247. See id. at 863 & n.148.
248. See id.
249. See id. at 863.
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to this point.250 The proponents' standard does not require a gap of zero; it requires only a gap below the numeric threshold above which election plans are
presumptively invalid. Let AW* denote this threshold. The efficiency gap will
fall below this threshold whenever the following inequality obtains: 25 1
2

With the proponents' suggested threshold of AW* = 0.08,252 this reduces to:
IV >

2

+ 0.21.

Thus, a party with vote share exceeding 71% can win every seat with a below-threshold gap.253 If the presumption of validity were irrebuttable, a
majority with this vote share could capture every seat with a plan impervious
to judicial scrutiny.
Thus far, we have assumed that the majority insists on every last seat. But if
the majority is willing to throw the minority a bone, it can enjoy less-than-total
domination and a below-threshold gap at lower vote share. For example, with a
vote share above 59%, the majority can achieve 75% seat share with a belowthreshold gap. 254 Presumably, 71% vote share is more common than 75% vote
share, and 59% vote share is more common still.
Finally, historical patterns do not necessarily predict future trends. In the
coming decades, more states may consistently exhibit high vote share. And if the
Court were to adopt a legal standard for partisan gerrymandering that gave free
rein to majorities with sufficiently high vote share, majorities would have an
ever-stronger incentive to achieve it. This could encourage desirable behavior
(like voter persuasion) or undesirable behavior (like voter suppression). Even if
a majority party earned a sufficiently high vote share through legitimate means,

250. Compare id. (arguing that the problem "is easily identified" whenever a party receives 75%
of the vote share and 100% of the seats), with id. (recognizing, presumably for elections
even where the vote share is under 75%, "the unexpected results that begin to emerge
when one party receives an extraordinarily high vote share").
251. BecauseS*=S 2 V

2 and AW = S* - 2V*(under the simplified formula),

this inequality ensures a below-threshold gap:

If V >

S-AW+W.
2',then
.22

V> -

+ 2-andso2(-V\2

) > (S-)-AW.
'21

Thus: S* - 2V* < AW*, and so AW < AW*.
252. See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 7, at 884, 888-89.
253. S = 1 if the party wins every seat, so V > 0.5 + 0.21 = 0.71.
0.75

254. This is because 0.59 > -

2

+ 0.21 = 0.585.
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courts might be unable to regulate that majority's subsequent redistricting decisions.
For these reasons, the proponents may be too quick to conclude that the operation of the measure in cases of relatively high vote share "is not a problem
that is especially relevant to real-world redistricting." 255
D. The Efficiency Gap and Competitiveness
The efficiency gap bears a more nuanced relationship to competitiveness.
The value of the efficiency gap at a specified level of vote share is a function of
differential average competitiveness between x-won and y-won districts-a
function I call the competitiveness gap. The sensitivity of the efficiency gap to
changes in vote share is a function of responsiveness, which is closely related to
a plan's overall competitiveness. Subpart D.1 below explains the competitiveness gap, while Subpart D.2 explains the relationship between responsiveness
and the efficiency gap's sensitivity to changes in vote share.
1.

The competitiveness gap

This Subpart explains the relationship between the efficiency gap and the
competitiveness gap. I first define the competitiveness gap and show that it
equals the efficiency gap under the equal voter turnout assumption. I then explore two implications of this equality. First, scholars and jurists may invoke the
competitiveness gap (or something close to it) without recognizing its relationship to the efficiency gap. Second, at a given level of vote share, mapmakers can
achieve a gap of zero with either high or low overall competitiveness. Specifically, mapmakers can eliminate or reduce an efficiency gap in one of two ways:
unpacking, which increases a plan's overall competitiveness; or decracking, which
decreases a plan's overall competitiveness.
Definition and equality

a.

denote the average competitiveness score in p-won districts,

Let cp =
and let c =

s

denote the average competitiveness score over all districts.

Note that average competitiveness is the difference between the minimizing and
the average victory margin (c = mo - m and cp = mo - mp),2 56 and c is the seat-

255. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 7, at 864.
256. Proof: c

cp

= s

_

EE
s

e

e(mo-m)
s
s

=E-mo-LEDm

s

_ smo-sm

s

- MO _ M

m

s
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share-weighted sum of c, and cy (c = $xcx + gycy). Define the competitiveness
gap (AC) as the seat-share-weighted difference of c, and cy.
AC = Scx - SYCY
While c measures a plan's overall average competitiveness, the competitiveness
gap AC measures a plan's differential average competitiveness, comparing the
average competitiveness of x- and y-won districts.
Under equal voter turnout, then, the efficiency gap is the competitiveness
gap.
AW

LED Aw

S

iEDx C[

+
S

LEDy _C

SxCx

-

S

SYCY

=xcx - Sycy = AC

And the competitiveness gap reduces to the simplified seats-votes formula.
AC= SxCx-SyCy= Sx(mo-mx)-

y(

m

= 2 (gx - gy) - (gxmx - ymy) = S* - 2V*
Thus, under the equal voter turnout assumption, one can frame the measure as
relative wasted votes, undeserved seat share, or differential average competitiveness.
AW = S* - 2V*= AC
An efficiency gap of zero does not necessarily entail equal average competitiveness in x- and y-won districts. This equality obtains only in the special case
in which each party wins half the seats. In the more general case, the relative
competitiveness of x- and y-won districts needed to achieve an efficiency gap of
zero will depend on the relative seat shares. Formally, let e = E denote the comcy

petitiveness ratio and § = x denote the seat ratio. The sign of the efficiency gap
sy
(AW) then depends on whether the product of the seat ratio (§) and the competitiveness ratio (e) is greater than, equal to, or less than one.257
AW>0
AW= 0
AW<0

§e>1
E=1
§e<1

When the product of the seat ratio and the competitiveness ratio is greater
than one, the competitiveness gap and thus the efficiency gap are positive, indicating an advantage for party x. When the product is less than one, the
257. The equality can be derived as follows: AW = 0 if and only if Sxcx - Sycy = 0 if and
only if Sxcx = Sycy if and only if-

= 1 if and only if §e = 1. The inequalities can be

derived analogously.
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competitiveness gap and thus the efficiency gap are negative, indicating an advantage for party y. And when the product is equal to one, the competitiveness
gap and thus the efficiency gap are zero, indicating partisan fairness in the sense
of equal wasted votes. Thus, when each party wins half the seats (§ = 1), an efficiency gap of zero requires that x- and y-won districts exhibit equal average
competitiveness (e = 1). When party x wins a majority of seats (9 > 1), an efficiency gap of zero requires that y-won districts are more competitive than xwon districts on average (e < 1). Specifically, if party x wins two-thirds of the
seats (§ = 2), an efficiency gap of zero requires that y-won districts be twice as
competitive as x-won districts on average (e = 0.5).
Unacknowledged measure convergence

b.

The equivalence of the efficiency gap and the competitiveness gap suggests
that scholars and jurists may in fact be referring to the efficiency gap measure
(or something quite like it) without realizing it. For example, Samuel Wang recently proposed three tests for partisan gerrymandering, including the
following lopsided outcomes test
Compare the difference between the share of Democratic votes in the districts that
Democrats win, and the share of Republican votes in the districts that Republicans
win. This test works because in a partisan gerrymander, the targeted party wins
lopsided victories in a small number of districts, while the gerrymandering party's
wins are engineered to be relatively narrow. To compare the winning vote shares
258
for the two parties, I use a grouped t-test, an extremely common statistical test.

Just like the efficiency gap, the lopsided outcomes test measures differential
average competitiveness. There are three differences between this test and the

efficiency gap, but only one is substantive. First, the efficiency gap focuses on the
competitiveness score (cL), whereas the lopsided outcomes test focuses on the victor's vote share (v!)-"the share of Democratic votes in the districts that
Democrats win, and the share of Republican votes in the districts that Republicans win."259 These two variables are linearly related v =E-2 4 .260 Second, the
lopsided outcomes test uses a statistical test-"a grouped t-test"261-to estimate
the likelihood that the average competitiveness in x-won districts is different
from the average competitiveness in y-won districts, whereas the efficiency gap
simply computes the difference.
258. Samuel S.-H. Wang, Three Tests for PracticalEvaluation of PartisanGerrymandering, 68
STAN. L. REv. 1263, 1306 (2016) (footnote omitted).
259. Id.
260. This relationship can be derived as follows:
1
11
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261. Wang, supra note 258, at 1306.
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The third difference is the substantive one: The lopsided outcomes test does
not account for seat share. The test measures unweighted differential average
competitiveness, assuming that the competitiveness ratio should be 1, whereas
the efficiency gap measures seat-share-weighted differential average competitiveness, assuming that the competitiveness ratio should be equal to the seat
ratio. As the seat ratio approaches 1, this last difference drops out; but when the
seat ratio departs significantly from 1, the two tests will diverge. When one
party wins most seats, the efficiency gap-but not the lopsided outcomes testpermits a competitiveness bonus: A party with a positive seat margin can win
relatively more competitive districts while maintaining a competitiveness gap
of zero, so long as the competitiveness ratio equals the seat ratio.
The Whitford litigation provides another example of this unacknowledged
measure convergence. The majority of the three-judge district court in that case
separated its discriminatory effect analysis into two steps. First, it discussed evidence of discriminatory effect other than the efficiency gap. 262 Only after
concluding that the other evidence "ma[de] a firm case on the question of discriminatory effect" did the majority proceed to discuss how "that evidence [was]
further bolstered by the plaintiffs' use of the'efficiency gap."' 263 But as part of its
initial discussion, the majority focused on competitiveness, noting that Democrat-won districts were far less competitive on average than Republican-won
districts-that is, Democrats were packed into "safe" districts. 264 The majority
did not seem to realize that in talking about differential competitiveness, it was
actually talking about the efficiency gap.
c.

Unpacking versus decracking

The equivalence of the efficiency gap and the competitiveness gap also clarifies that plans with low efficiency gaps can, but need not, exhibit
competitiveness. The efficiency gap is a function of differential competitiveness,
not overall competitiveness. To achieve an efficiency gap of zero, the competitiveness ratio must equal the seat ratio, but overall competitiveness can take on
any value. Mapmakers can design minimizing plans with districts as competitive or uncompetitive as they please while still achieving an efficiency gap of
zero. They can even make some districts more competitive than others, provided the relative competitiveness of the average x-won district and the average
y-won district is proportional to the relative number of seats won by parties x
and y.
What mapmakers cannot do (assuming they want a zero or low efficiency
gap) is systematically vary competitiveness by party so that the competitiveness
262. See Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 898-903 (W.D. Wis. 2016), stay granted, 137 S.
Ct. 2289, and jurisdictionpostponed, 137 S. Ct. 2268 (2017).
263. See id. at 903.
264. See id. at 898-99.

1208

Quantifying PartisanGerrymandering
70 STAN. L. REV. 1131 (2018)

ratio departs from the seat ratio. For example, the mapmaker cannot achieve a
zero or low efficiency gap by drawing a plan that awards each party half the seats
but has party x generally winning competitive races and party y generally winning by landslides. That competitiveness gap would entail an efficiency gap in
favor of party x, systematically packing and cracking party y supporters and
producing an efficiency gap (party y wastes more votes) as well as, equivalently,
a competitiveness gap (x-won districts would be excessively competitive) and an
undeserved seat share relative to the ideal 2:1 seats-votes ratio.
To eliminate (or limit) this undeserved seat share, mapmakers must flip one
or more seats from the favored party to the disfavored party. But just as there
are two fundamental gerrymandering strategies-packing and cracking-so too
are there two analogous strategies for flipping the requisite seats to eliminate (or
reduce) a large efficiency or competitiveness gap: unpacking and decracking. Unpacking flips the requisite seats by transferring supporters of the disfavored
party from relatively uncompetitive districts won by the disfavored party. This
unpacking strategy makes the districts won by the disfavored party, and thus
the plan in general, more competitive. Decracking flips the requisite seats by
transferring supporters of the disfavored party from relatively competitive districts won by the favored party. This decracking strategy makes the districts
won by the favored party, and thus the plan in general, less competitive. Table 3
below demonstrates these two strategies in a hypothetical ten-district election.
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Table 3
Hypothetical Ten-District Election Demonstrating the
Unpacking and Decracking Strategies
DistrictI--

Original Plan

Unpacking Plan
--

- '.

Decracking Plan
x

y

300

800

200

300

800

200

300

700

300

440

560

440

560

460

440

560

440

560

x

y

x

700

300

700

2

700

300

700

3

700

300

700

4

540

460

5

540

1

I

y

6

540

460

540

460

540

460

7

540

460

540

460

540

460

8

540

460

540

460

540

460

9

350

650

450

550

350

650

10

350

650

450

550

350

650

Total Won

8

2

6

4

6

4

In both the unpacking plan and the decracking plan, districts 4 and 5 swap
enough x voters for y voters to flip those seats from x-won to y-won, thereby
producing a seat margin twice the vote margin and a zero efficiency gap. But the
unpacking plan swaps voters out of y-won districts 9 and 10, making those districts and the plan overall more competitive. In contrast, the decracking plan
swaps voters out of x-won districts 1 and 2, making those districts and the plan
overall less competitive.
2.

Sensitivity and responsiveness

Subpart D.1 above illustrated how both competitive and uncompetitive
plans can produce an efficiency gap of zero. But while a plan of any competitiveness level can achieve a zero (or low) gap at one level of vote share, only a plan
with a specified level of competitiveness can maintain a zero (or low) gap over a
range of vote share. This is so because the sensitivity of the efficiency gap is a
function of overall competitiveness.
a.

Sensitivity as a function of responsiveness

Ignoring turnout effects, the efficiency gap (AW) is a function of two variables:
the statewide vote margin (V*) and the statewide seat margin (S*): AW = S*- 2V*.
But the statewide seat margin is itself a function of the statewide vote margin:
S* = S*(V*). This latter function is the real-world-rather than the ideal-seats1210
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votes curve. The responsiveness (r) of this curve tells us how much the seat margin changes for a given incremental change in vote margin. Mathematically,
responsiveness is the derivative of the function S*(V*) with respect to V*:
r =

. Graphically,

it is the slope of the tangent to the seats-votes curve at a

specified point. Responsiveness is a measure of competitiveness because the more
districts feature small victory margins, the greater the change in seat margin for a
given change in vote margin will be.
The sensitivity of the efficiency gap to a change in statewide vote margin is
captured by the derivative with respect to V* of AW = S*(V*) - 2V*.
dAW
dV* = r-2
dV*
According to this equation, the sensitivity of the efficiency gap to a change
in vote margin depends on the responsiveness of the actual seats-votes curve. If
responsiveness is precisely equal to two, the increase in seat margin perfectly
offsets the increase in vote margin, and the efficiency gap remains constant. If
responsiveness is greater than two, the increase in vote margin triggers an overcompensatory increase in seat margin, and the efficiency gap increases. If
responsiveness is less than two, the increase in vote margin triggers an undercompensatory increase in seat margin, and the efficiency gap decreases.
This relationship means that both highly competitive (r> 2) and highly uncompetitive (r < 2) plans entail a risk: They may produce a zero gap at expected
vote share but an above-threshold gap if vote share departs sufficiently from the
expectation. However, highly competitive plans may present a greater risk because they require smaller shifts in vote share to produce above-threshold gaps.
With a highly competitive plan, a small change in vote share can flip many seats,
and that large change in seat share can produce an above-threshold gap. With a
highly uncompetitive plan, conversely, a small change in vote share will flip no
seats, so a 4% vote swing is needed to produce an 8% gap.265
b.

The robust, minimizing plan

Now consider a mapmaker who knows (or can estimate well) the current
statewide vote margin but who recognizes that the vote margin may vary over
265. Assume that the plan produces a zero gap (S* - 2V* = 0) at expected vote margin V* and
a 4% uniform vote swing fails to flip a single seat. Thus, the seat margin is still S*, but the
vote margin is now V* + 0.04, so the efficiency gap is S* - 2(V* + 0.04)
= S* - 2V* - 0.08 = -0.08. For both the highly competitive and highly uncompetitive plans, the above-threshold gap may not be durable under sensitivity analysis. But as
we await a ruling from the Court in Whitford and possible elaboration in future cases,
there is uncertainty about whether and how sensitivity analysis will play a role doctrinally. Will mapmakers prefer to avoid generating unstable above-threshold gaps? If so,
they may prefer less competitive plans.
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time with changing electoral circumstances. Suppose this mapmaker wishes to
design a plan that is both minimizing, in the sense that it produces an efficiency
gap of zero under the current statewide vote margin, and robust, in the sense that
it maintains a zero (or low) efficiency gap if the vote margin varies. How can the
mapmaker design such a robust, minimizing plan? The trick is to find a plan that
produces a particular seats-votes relationship-one that exhibits the right ratio
at the current vote margin (double proportionality) and that flips seats at the
right rate as vote margin varies (double responsiveness).
In the example provided by Table 4 below, the statewide vote margin is
5%.266 To produce an efficiency gap of zero, the statewide seat margin must
therefore be 10%.267 Thus, party x must win 6 of the 10 seats. 268 And for every
5% change in vote margin, one seat must flip.269 Assuming uniform swing, this
means that the proportional vote margin in each district must be a distinct multiple of 5%. The result is to spread out the competitiveness of each district so that
seats flip at the right rate.
Table 4
The Robust, Minimizing Plan
District

Total Votes by Party
x

y

V

Winner
x

1

775

225

.275

2

725

275

.225

x

3

675

325

.175

x

4

625

375

.125

x
x

5

575

425

.075

6

525

475

.025

x

7

475

525

-.025

y

8

425

575

-.075

y

9

375

625

-.125

y

10

325

675

-.175

y

Note that only 2 of 10 districts are relatively competitive: District 6 currently favors party x but would flip if party y earned a 5% uniform vote swing,

266. Party x wins 5500 votes, or 55%, and party y wins 4500 votes, or 45%.

267. 0 =S*-2(0.05),soS* = 0.1.
268. S* = 9x

2,so 0.1 = S 2

1
2

and thus 9 = 0.6.

269. For example, with a 5% increase, V* = 0.1, so to maintain an efficiency gap of zero, we
need 0 = S* - 2(0.1) = S* - 0.2, so S* = 0.2, and thus , = 0.7, or 7 out of 10 seats.
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and district 7 currently favors party y but would flip if party x earned a 5% uniform vote swing. Under a 5% uniform vote swing, all other districts would have
the same winning party. As this example illustrates, a mapmaker eager to produce and maintain an efficiency gap of zero has an incentive to limit the
competitiveness of the plan she draws. Most districts must be safe seats.
E.

False Negatives and False Positives

The preceding examination reveals how the efficiency gap measure privileges a form of symmetric partisan efficiency over electoral competitiveness and
strict seats-votes proportionality. If proportionality and competitiveness matter, the efficiency gap's relationship to them presents two problems of
normative correspondence: The measure may favor normatively undesirable
plans (the false negative problem) and may disfavor normatively desirable plans
(the false positive problem). Consider each problem in turn.
First, a plan may be gerrymandered in a way the measure cannot detect,
achieving the ideal of equal wasted votes at the expense of both competitiveness
and seats-votes proportionality. In this sense, the efficiency gap measure has a
significant false negative problem: It approves plans that exhibit one democratic
ideal (equal wasted votes) even if those plans subvert competitiveness, seatsvotes proportionality, or both.
Second, the measure may flag normatively desirable plans as suspect. A plan
that produces rough proportionality even when one party enjoys a significant
popular majority will necessarily produce a large efficiency gap in favor of the
minority party. While both competitive and uncompetitive plans can produce
low efficiency gaps, a more competitive plan may present a greater risk of an
above-threshold gap in the face of vote swings. In this sense, the efficiency gap
measure has a significant false positive problem: It flags as suspect plans that depart from the ideal of equal wasted votes even if that departure reflects an effort
to promote democratic norms like competitiveness and seats-votes proportionality.
For both reasons, the efficiency gap measure may promote fairness in the
sense of symmetric partisan efficiency but unintentionally encourage uncompetitive elections that accord one party a legislative majority disproportional to
its popular support.
The efficiency gap proposal consists not only of the measure itself but also
of sensitivity analysis, analysis of partisan intent on the part of the mapmakers,
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and an opportunity for state justification. 270 These other doctrinal tools may
mitigate the false positive problem: If a highly competitive plan produces a large
efficiency gap in one election, that gap will likely be unstable under sensitivity
analysis. And a plan that promotes competitiveness or proportionality is more
likely to be justified by legitimate districting principles and less likely to be
branded the result of discriminatory intent. But these tools do not eliminate the
problem altogether because mapmakers may fear not only liability but also litigation. An above-threshold gap may be unstable or justified, but it is likely to
invite legal challenge, and the state may only prevail after the considerable delay, expense, and risk of a trial before a three-judge federal district court.
Perhaps more significantly, these doctrinal tools do not address the false
negative problem because the proponents offer no mechanism to overcome the
presumption of validity triggered by a below-threshold gap.27 1 If the Court were
270. The academic proponents suggested that "sensitivity testing" be "incorporat[ed] into the
thresholds," see Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 7, at 889-90, and that states ought
to be able to offer nondiscriminatory justifications to rebut the presumptive invalidity
of an above-threshold efficiency gap, see id. at 891, but they did not include any requirement of showing partisan intent, see id. at 832 n.2 ("Our conception of gerrymandering
is strictly effects-based...."). The Whitford plaintiffs chose to offer evidence of partisan
intent as a relevant portion of the test for an unconstitutional gerrymander, and the district court concluded that the Wisconsin State Assembly plan at issue was drawn in part
"to entrench the Republican Party in power." See Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837,
890-96 (W.D. Wis. 2016), stay granted, 137 S. Ct. 2289, and jurisdictionpostponed, 137 S. Ct.
2268 (2017).
271. The proponents repeatedly refer to both the invalidity of an above-threshold gap and
the validity of a below-threshold gap as presumptive rather than irrebuttable. See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 7, at 884 ('C]ourts would need to choose an efficiency
gap threshold above which district plans would be presumptively unlawful and below
which they would be presumptively valid."); id. at 886 (arguing that the Supreme Court
could avoid the concerns raised in Vieth by "specifying an efficiency gap level above
which plans would be presumptively unlawful and below which they would be presumptively legitimate"); id. at 890 ("[Clourts may be reluctant in early cases to set
particular levels above which plans are presumptively unlawful and below which they
are presumptively legitimate."); see also id. at 891 ("Throughout our discussion to this
point, we have spoken of presumptive rather than irrebuttablevalidity and invalidity.").
While the proponents explain in detail how a state could rebut the presumption of invalidity, see id. at 891-95, they say nothing about how a plaintiff could rebut the
presumption of validity triggered by a below-threshold efficiency gap. Moreover, the
proponents suggest that their "approach would neatly slice Vieth's Gordian knot, informing lower courts and political actors, in clear quantitative terms, exactly '[how
much political ... effect is too much.'" Id. at 886 (alterations in original) (quoting Vieth v.
Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 297 (2004) (plurality opinion)). This characterization suggests that
a plan producing a below-threshold gap must be valid because its partisan effect is not
too much. Finally, the Whitford panel majority seems to have understood the plaintiffs'
proposal to include an irrebuttable presumption of validity for low-gap plans. See 218 F.
Supp. at 908 ("[A] challenge to a map enacted with egregious partisan intent but demonstrating a low [efficiency gap] also will fail because the plaintiffs cannot demonstrate the
required discriminatory effect.").
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to embrace the efficiency gap as the definitive measure of partisan gerrymandering, plans that consistently produced low efficiency gaps would be judicially
bulletproof. This would be problematic in jurisdictions where one party enjoys
a large majority, as the majority party could achieve a low gap by carving the
state up into safe districts that accorded it most or all of the seats.
F.

Definition and Weight of Surplus Votes

This Subpart demonstrates how the efficiency gap's relationships with proportionality and competitiveness vary once we modify the definition of wasted
votes. Specifically, I alter the definition and weight of surplus votes using parameters a (alpha) and fl (beta) and derive a more generalized simplified formula
as a function of these parameters. 272
The parameter a captures weighting of surplus votes. The efficiency gap, as
proposed, measures the number of wasted votes through the equation.
Wpi = Lp, + Epi

To weight lost (LpL) and surplus (Epi) votes differently, we can simply multiply
the number of surplus votes by the parameter a, which we can adjust to capture
how heavily we wish to weight surplus votes as compared to lost votes. The
wasted votes equation becomes:
w = Li+

aEpL.

Under the proponents' definition, a is set to 1.273 If, alternatively, we set a to
zero, then we would ignore surplus votes entirely. If we set a to one-half, then
we would weight surplus votes half as heavily as lost votes. If we set a greater
than 1, we would weight surplus votes more heavily than lost votes.
The parameter fl captures the definition of surplus votes. The efficiency gap
as proposed defines the number of surplus votes as one-half the victory margin.
1
Epi = - Mi
But surplus votes could also plausibly be defined as the entire victory margin. 274
Thus, we can replace the number one-half with the parameter fl to allow an analyst to vary the definition of a surplus vote. If we do so, we get the following
generalized equation defining surplus votes:
M1

.

Epi =

272. I use the term parameterto denote a variable for which an analyst selects a real number
rather than a variable an analyst observes.
273. Cf Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supranote 7, at 851.
274. See, e.g., Nagle, supranote 20, at 199 & n.16, 203 & n.24.
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We can set ft to one-half (using proponents' definition) or to 1 (using the alter275
native definition)-or at some intermediate value.
The parameter y (gamma) captures the combined effect of weight and definition. It is simply the product of a and ft.
y

=

aft

We can now repeat all the relevant steps of our prior analysis, this time in
terms of these parameters, to quantify the precise effect of how we define and
weight surplus votes. The long-form definition-generalized efficiency gap is:
=

AW(y)

w -wx
V + V

where

iED

and
Epi = yM,

W

ILtr

=

iE Dp
i iD*

Vpj

As we will soon see, it will prove useful to define the measure's generalized
ideal responsiveness as the following function of parameter y: r(y) = 1 + 2y.
Note that when a = 1 and ft = 2, as under the proponents' traditional definition,
2

y

=

aft

= ~,

and r

1 + 2y

=

=

2: the responsiveness of the ideal seats-votes

curve associated with the simplified formula.
At the level of an individual district, the wasted vote disparity (Awe) remains
a simple linear discontinuous function of the proportional victory margin (mi),
276
but that function now depends on ideal responsiveness (r).

1-rm)
Awi = f

le Dx

1
2 (1 - 2yrmi)

i E Dy

275. An analyst might use an intermediate value if she thought that both definitions had some
merit and some flaws and that the best approach was somewhere in between.
276. Because V2L

l- (1

-

2

mi), both surplus and lost votes can be expressed in terms of mi:

Epi = yMi = ym T and so
Lpi = V

= V2i

By definition Awi =

L(

2

-

yix

Tj

m)

ymi;
and so Td2bi
=

(

mi).

andr = 1 + 2y, so Aw[ can be expressed interms of mi.
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Excluding ties, this function is zero if and only if mi

=

. Call

this the generalized

and

f

=!,

22

as under

the

proponents'

traditional

definition,

y = afl =

,

minimizing proportional victory margin, denoted mo (y). For example, when a = 1
r= 1+2y=2,andmo =-=. This is the minimizing victory margin, derived
r

2

above, in which the victor earns 75% vote share.277
Define the generalized competitiveness score c,(y) as the difference between this new minimizing victory margin (mo(y)) and the actual victory
margin (mi): c,(y) = mo(y) - mi. At the level of an individual district, the

Fort ED

Aw

For iE DY, Awi _

Ti
Wy-x,_

Tj

-

i

T
T

TL

=

= 1(1
2

mi)

ym -1(1
2

Tj

277. See supra text accompanying notes 237-38.
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wasted vote disparity Awi is a simple function of ci (y) and r (y)

AW,=1c2

278

:

iE Dx

With this new competitiveness score, define average competitiveness in
p-won districts as cp (y) = LiED Ciy). Note that c, (y) = mo (y) - mp where m is
SP

the average victory margin in p-won districts. Finally, define the competitiveness gap as the seat-share-weighted difference between average competitiveness
in x- and y-won districts.
AC(y) = SxcxlY) - Sycy(y)
With these new definitions, the efficiency gap and the competitiveness gap
are related by the factor r.279
2
r
2

AW(y) = -AC(y)

The definition-generalized simplified formula is:
AW(y) = S* - r(y)V*.
This is the traditional simplified formula with the constant 2 replaced by function r(y). Of course, under the proponents' traditional definition, y = 12 and
r

=

2, so the definition-generalized simplified formula reduces to the tradi-

tional formula. More generally, the definition-generalized simplified formula

m and mo =

278. By definition, ci =

1- rmi

=

Awj

2

1- r

- ci) = 1

-

mi =

r

- ci. Thus:

1 + rci = rci. And so:

(1 - rmi)

l E Dx
ED

-2(1 - rmi)

i E Dy

c

-. Rearranging:
r

i e Dx

279. Using the equal voter turnout assumption, this result is readily derived by expressing
the efficiency gap as the average wasted vote disparity:
wEDAM
=IEDxCi+ELEDy-c]

AW

S

S

=[Sxcx-Syc]= r[c
S
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and the definition-generalized competitiveness gap are also related by the same
factor

r.
2
r
2

-AC(y)

= S* - rV*

Combining these results with the new, generalized definitions-and under
equal voter turnout-the efficiency gap, competitiveness gap, and simplified formula are related as follows.
r
AW(y) = -AC(y) = S* - rV*
2
Because r is 2 under the proponents' definition, the long-form equation and simplified formula equal the competitiveness gap. In the general case, the long-form
equation and simplified formula equal the competitiveness gap multiplied by the
factor -.
2

As the preceding examination reveals, even when we alter the definition
and weight of surplus votes, the measure still captures relative wasted votes, undeserved vote share, and differential competitiveness. The measure still
generally privileges equal wasted votes over competitiveness and seats-votes
proportionality. But the precise tradeoffs between these competing norms are
determined by the precise values the analyst selects for parameters a and ft.
Table 5 below summarizes the effects of varying these two parameters.
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Table 5
Effects of Varying the Definition and Weight of Surplus Votes
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A simple function of y, r = 1 + 2y, determines the responsiveness of the
ideal seats-votes curve. The generalized simplified formula is just like the traditional one, except vote margin (V*) is multiplied by responsiveness (r), which is
a function of y. The minimizing victory margin (mo) is the multiplicative inverse of r: m0 =
of MO: v* =

2

1.r The winner's minimizing vote share (v*) is a simple function
And the vote share a party must exceed to maintain a gap be-

low threshold AW* with a seat share of 9 is 1ggy.

=

2

280 Note that

the winner's minimizing vote share is the vote share a party needs in order to
win every seat (S = 1) with an efficiency gap of zero (AW* = 0): 1,0 = v-.281
This makes sense because a simple plan composed exclusively of x-won districts
will produce a gap of zero, a seat share of one, and a statewide vote share equal
to the winner's minimizing vote share.
As Table 5 above shows, the parameter y is like a dial the analyst can turn to
calibrate the relationship among the efficiency gap, competitiveness, and seatsvotes proportionality. When y is one, the minimizing district is won 67% to 33%,
mitigating the competitiveness problem, but the minimizing plan exhibits triple
seats-votes proportionality, exacerbating the proportionality problem. When y
is zero, the minimizing district is won 100% to 0%, exacerbating the competitiveness problem, but the minimizing plan exhibits strict seats-votes
proportionality, eliminating the proportionality problem.
The proponents eschew either of these "pure". approaches. 282 Rather than
turning the dial all the way in one direction or the other, they adjust the dial to
an intermediate position, setting y equal to one-half. This intermediate calibration avoids the most extreme tensions with proportionality and
competitiveness, opting instead for more moderate tension with both norms.
There are two mathematically equivalent ways to set y equal to one-half:
(1) defining a surplus vote as half the vote margin while equally weighting lost
and surplus votes, and (2) defining a surplus vote as the entire vote margin while
weighting a surplus vote half as heavily as a lost vote. In the latter approach, the
definition is more intuitive, but the weight is more arbitrary and therefore

280. Because S = S - 2, V* =

V- , and

AW = S* - rV*(under the generalized simplified

formula), this inequality ensures a below-threshold gap.
if

V>

+ 21, then rF-

r

> (-

and AW < AW*.
281.

1,o

V0 -i-o
r

+1=1(1+mo)=V*
2
2

282. See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 7, at 851.
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harder to discern and justify. The proponents opt instead for the former approach, adopting a more intuitive weight but a less intuitive definition.
IV. A New Wasted Vote Measure
In this Part, I suggest the plausibility and superiority of a measure that compares shares rather than absolute numbers of wasted votes, with a surplus vote
defined as the full vote margin and lost and surplus votes weighted equally. This
measure better accords with the prevailing individual rights framework because
it is voter- rather than party-centric in both scale and its definition of surplus
votes. And the measure is more structurally resonant because it coheres more
closely with electoral reality and with the democratic values of seats-votes proportionality and competitiveness.
Consider a modified efficiency gap measure (AWv) with a voter-centric scale
and definition of surplus vote.
AWV =

V

V

where

tED

and
w*

ie

=yM

Dp

Recall that we can express vote totals, and thus wasted votes, in terms of victory
283
margin and turnout.

i E Dp

IyTimi
T-P (1 - mi)
Wp=

W=
jED

1 0 D,

T(1 - mi) +

ieDp

If we apply equal voter turnout (Ti = T*),then
and V, = ST* (1 -

yTm
LEDP

S

= 9,1-S = 1 - S, V = ST*,

V). We can therefore express each party's wasted vote share

283. See supranote 234 and accompanying text.
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as a function of these variables, the parameter y, and the average victory margin
in x- and y-won districts (mx and my). 284
Wy =

(E62)

2S-2Smx +4y(1-Smy
4(1-V)

VY
=-

4yfmx +2(1-S)-2(1-Smy
4V

Vx

(E.2)

284. By definition, the following equalities hold:
s

s

-

I=vx=yx,so1-v=-v

- Y
V= V V,sol-V=PY=
=x=

T* = , so V

ST* V =

s'~
V' ;

VVx = ST*V,

and Vy = VV =ST*(1 - V);

EDx1=Sx=S9and LEDy1=Sy=S(l-S);
mx =

,so

my =

XioEDx m = Sxmx = Sgmx;

,so S ED,Mi = SYmY = S(1 -S)my.

Using these equalities:

-- SS

Y 2
--

wy

2
2

Smx + yT*S(1

- 9)my =

ST*

--4 (2S - 2Smx + 4y(1

29-29mx +4y(1-S)m

(2-2§mx+4y(1-S)my)

EiED mi;
- S)my);

4(1-V)

ST(1-V)

vy

1 - 1 -*2ieDx mi + yT*
aEDx

(1 - mi) + LeDy yT*mi =

-

=

XiEox
T*

(

W, =
W

And:
Wx =

iEDx yT*mj

+

LEo

Wx = yT*Sgmx + LS(1
2
Wx
Vx

-

)

-- (1 -mi) = yT*

- 24S(1-Shm, =

4y9mx+2(1-_)-2(1-9)my)
ST*V

EDx m +TiEDY

iEDyMi;

(4ygmx + 2(1 - S) - 2(1 - S)my);

4y§mx +2(1-S-)-2(1-9)my
4V
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Nagle proceeded as though mx and my were independent variables. 285 But
recall that the seat-share-weighted sum of mx and my is the average victory margin over all districts (m), and the seat-share-weighted difference of mx and my is
twice the vote margin. 286
m = Sxmx + Sym
2V* = Sxmx - Sym

Let 9 and
and V* = V

-

V denote seat and vote share for party x. Then

x =

S, S,,= 1 -S,

2. Thus, we can express these relationships in terms of S and V.
m = 9mx, + (1 - S)my

(E3)

2V - 1 = Smx - (1 - 9)my

(E4)

Rearranging, we can express mx and my in terms of m, V, and S.
2Smx = m + 2V - 1

(E5)

2(1 - 9)my = m - 2V + 1

(EQ6)

Substituting E5 and E6 into EQ1 and EQ2 and simplifying, we can express
each party's wasted vote share as a function of S, V, y, and m.
±y =

Vy
wr

Vx

2S-m(1-2y)-2V(1+2y)+1(1+2y)
4(1-V)
-2S-m(1-2y)+2V(1+2y)+1(1-2y).
4V

(EQ7)
(E98)

The new measure is the difference between each party's wasted vote share.
Subtracting EQ8 from EQ7 and simplifying, we get EQ9.
aWV

= 2S-2V(1+2y)-(1-m(1-2y))(1-2V)+2y
4V(1-7)

(E9)

Setting AW ' to zero yields the following ideal seats-votes formula.
S = (1 + 2y)? + -

(1 - m(1 - 2y)) (1 - 2V) - y

285. Nagle called his parties A and B instead of x and y and focused on "the average A vote for

those districts won by A and the average A vote for those districts won by B." See Nagle,
supranote 20, app. B at 208. These two values are related to the parties' respective average
victory margins. Only after setting equal the parties' respective wasted vote shares did
Nagle conclude that these two values "are not independent; [one] can be determined from
[the other] through a quadratic formula." See id. at 201; id app. B at 209. However, even
when respective wasted vote shares are not equal, the two values are related to one another, as demonstrated in E3 and E64 below.
286. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
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We can now express the ideal seats-votes formula in terms of seat margin
(S* =.

2) and vote margin (V* = 1
S* = (2y - m(2y - 1))V*

With equal weighting of lost and surplus votes (a = 1) and the proponents'
definition of surplus votes based on half the vote margin (f =) such that y =
the victory margin term (m) drops out entirely, and the ideal seats-votes relationship reduces to strict proportionality.
S*= (2

(1)

-

m (2

)-

1)) V* = (1

-

m(0))V*= V*

This result accords with Nagle's. 287 However, if we maintain equal
weighting of lost and surplus votes (a = 1) but alternatively define surplus votes
based on the entire vote margin (fl = 1) so that y = 1, then the victory margin
term m remains and the ideal seats-votes relationship reduces to the following:
S* =

(2(1) - m(2(1) - 1))V* = (2 - m)V*.

Under maximal uncompetitiveness, when each prevailing candidate
earns all the votes (that is, as m approaches 1), this reduces to strict proportionality. Under maximal competitiveness, when each prevailing candidate
wins by a single vote (that is, as m approaches 0), this reduces to the same
double proportionality that emerges from the proponents' party-centric approach based on equal wasted vote totals and surplus votes defined as onehalf of the victory margin. But unlike the proponents' approach, this seatsvotes curve depends on the victory margin term m. As m varies from 0 to 1,
the curve's slope varies from 2 to 1. The seat bonus is still capped at 2, but
now the majority party can achieve that maximal seat bonus only if it maximizes competitiveness. If the system is less than maximally competitive, the
seat bonus must be less than 2.
Nagle recognized that his voter-centric approach under an alternative definition of surplus votes would produce an ideal seats-votes curve that depended
on competitiveness. 288 But Nagle, following McGhee, views this dependence on

287. See Nagle, supra note 20, at 202 (equation 6).

&

288. See id. at 203 ("Making districts more competitive allows a [majority] party ... to increase
its [seat share] with no change in this measure...."). Nagle used the proponents' definition
of surplus votes as half the victory margin but noted that the alternative definition was
equivalent to doubling the relative weight of surplus votes. See id. at 199 & n.16, 203

n.24.

1225

uantifingPartisanGerrymandering
70 STAN. L. REv. 1131 (2018)

competitiveness as an undesirable-indeed, a fatal-feature of the measure under
the alternative definition of surplus votes (y

:

However, as Eric McGhee has kindly pointed out, the possibility that different values of [seat share] for the same vote [share] may give the same value of bias violates
[the efficiency principle] .. .. Making districts more competitive allows a gerrymandering party that has (a majority vote share] to increase its [seat share] with no
change in this measure of bias when [y > ].289
2

Nagle and McGhee are right that when y = 1, or more generally when
y > , the majority party can increase its seat share while maintaining constant
vote share and equal wasted vote shares by increasing average district competitiveness. And this property violates McGhee's strict efficiency principle, which
defines efficiency as increasing seat share at constant vote share. 290 But this
property does not necessarily violate the modified efficiency principle that defines efficiency as increasing expected seat share at constant vote share. 291 This
is because the majority party can only increase its seat share at current vote share
by increasing the competitiveness of the system, which makes the outcome less
robust to vote swings. 292
But there is another way to address the measure's dependence on competitiveness when y > 1. Rather than using the system's actual average victory
margin (m), the analyst can compare the difference in wasted vote shares that
would have obtained if the system exhibited an ideal baseline level of average
victory margin (ift). Political scientists estimate that real-world seats-votes
curves tend to exhibit competitiveness that varies with vote share, exhibiting
high competitiveness when the majority enjoys a modest vote margin and low
293
This
competitiveness when the majority enjoys a significant vote margin.
produces an S-shaped curve that is relatively flat far away from the (0.5,0.5) point
where each party earns half the votes but relatively steep near the (0.5,0.5)
point.294 This accommodation between competitiveness and proportionality favors the majority when the minority is large but protects the minority when it

289. See Nagle, supra note 20, at 203.
290. See McGhee, MeasuringEfficiency, supra note 86, at 418.
291. See supraPart IIA.2.
292. See supraPart III.D.2.
293. See Browning & King, supra note 53, at 312 fig.1, 313.
294. See, e.g., id. at 312 fig.1.
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is small. Because the seat bonus decreases with majority vote share, the majority
must earn almost all the votes in order to win all the seats.
This suggests an alternative wasted vote measure. First, construct an average victory margin measure ir-(V*) that aligns with these features of electoral
reality. Second, compute the difference in the parties' wasted vote shares (rather
than wasted vote totals)-using the full (not one-half) definition of surplus votes
(y = 1)-that would obtain under in-(V*). 295 This measure may be more intuitive
given that it adopts more voter-centric approaches to scale and definition. And
it may avoid the extreme vote share problem in which a majority can completely (or effectively) shut out a minority and capture all (or most) of the seats
while maintaining a gap of zero. Moreover, this measure satisfies McGhee's
strict efficiency principle. The drawback, of course, is that it relies on a baseline
competitiveness measure selected by the analyst, which introduces conjecture.
However, the analyst could derive this relationship from real election data. 296
Thus the baseline could be what the relationship has generally been in realworld elections, not the analyst's subjective judgment about what the relationship ought to be. A large gap would indicate that the majority has won
significantly more seats than the majority would have won had the plan equalized the parties' respective wasted vote shares under a level of competitiveness
consistent with the generally prevailing electoral relationship between competitiveness and vote share.
V. Doctrinal Implications and Conclusions
This Article has analyzed the methodological choices underlying the efficiency gap measure as well as the tensions between the measure and democratic

295. To make this idea more concrete, I offer an example for illustrative purposes. Suppose the
2
analyst selected the following competitiveness measure: fn-(V*) = 4V* . This is the simplest
function that satisfies three sensible properties: maximal competitiveness at minimal vote
margin, fni(0) = 4 * 0 = 0; minimal competitiveness at maximal vote margin,
(1) = 4 (1)2 = 4

Q)

2

= 1; and symmetric treatment of parties, fi(-V*) = 4(-V*)

2

= 4V* = fn (V*). The analyst would then substitute this competitiveness measure into the
seats-votes formula S* = (2 - m) V*.

S*(y = 1) =. (2 - ?ii(V*))V* = (2 - (4V*2)) V*

=

2V* - 4V

3

Expressed in terms of seat share and vote share, the relationship is:

(v

1
2

- 4 (V-)31- )3+ -.
2

2

This equation represents a nonlinear seats-votes curve exhibiting higher responsiveness
when vote margin is small and lower responsiveness when vote margin is large.
296. Such a statistical exercise lies beyond the scope of this Article but warrants future consideration.
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norms of proportionality, competitiveness, and voter participation. This analysis has implications for the Court as it decides Whitford. I suggest that the Court
should reaffirm the justiciability of partisan gerrymandering claims, adopt the
conclusion of the majority of the three-judge district court that the Wisconsin
State Assembly plan constitutes an unlawful partisan gerrymander, and
acknowledge that efficiency gap analysis provides evidence of that plan's discriminatory effect. As its architects intended, that plan packed and cracked
Democratic voters such that many more Democratic voters than Republican
voters cast votes that had no effect on electoral outcomes. The efficiency gap
analyses performed by the plaintiffs' experts Mayer and Jackman capture this
effect by computing efficiency gap values that indicate a significant advantage
for Republicans, one that constitutes a historical outlier compared to modern
elections and that is likely to persist in future elections.
While the Court should view efficiency gap analysis as helpful evidence
supporting the panel's conclusion, it should not adopt the efficiency gap as the
exclusive definitional measure of partisan gerrymandering in such a way that a
plan would be an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander if and only if it produced a sufficiently large, durable, and unjustified efficiency gap. Instead, the
Court should recognize the efficiency gap as one indicative measure of partisan
gerrymandering while affording some flexibility for courts, litigants, and scholars to refine measurement approaches over time. Both methodological and
normative considerations support this approach.
A.

Methodological Considerations

Were the Court to proclaim the efficiency gap the definitive measure of partisan gerrymandering, it would place a heavy burden on the measure: the need
to be able to assess the validity of all future plans in a way that yields a single
correct answer. Yet the answer efficiency gap analysis yields depends on a series
of methodological choices analysts are still exploring: what imputation methods
to use for uncontested races, how to account for variation in voter turnout, how
to define and weight surplus votes, and whether to compare wasted vote totals
or shares.297 Each choice has the potential to change the calculated gap. If, as proposed, a challenged plan's efficiency gap is compared to some numeric threshold,
both the challenged plan's gap and the numeric threshold itself may depend
heavily on methodological choices.
At the level of a single plan, methodological choices may (1) change the sign
of the gap and thereby toggle the assessment of which party is favored; (2) drive
the gap above or below the numeric threshold; or (3) change the magnitude of
the gap enough to influence the justification analysis (for example, a proffered
297. Another question is whether to look to statewide or district-level races when calculating
the efficiency gap. See, e.g., Krasno et al., supranote 20, at 5 (arguing in favor of the use of
statewide rather than district-level races).
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excuse may suffice to justify a gap of 10% but not a gap of 20%). And while used
to assess an individual plan's efficiency gap, the numeric threshold is itself based
on a claim about the distribution of gaps associated with modern elections-and
is therefore dependent on methodological choices.
Consider how the proponents arrived at an 8% threshold for state legislative
maps. The proponents' 2015 article used only the simplified formula to compute
the efficiency gaps for a large number of congressional and state legislative elections between 1972 and 2012.298 Based on the distributions, the proponents
advocated for an 8% numeric threshold for state legislative maps. 299 They reasoned, "A gap of at least eight points placed a [state legislative] plan in the worst
12 percent of all plans in this period,... about 1.5 standard deviations from the
mean." 30
However, this 8% threshold depends on all the methodological choices discussed above. Variation in imputation method, as described in Part II.E.1 above,
can sometimes produce significant changes in the gap. Because the gaps were
calculated using the simplified formula rather than the long-form calculation,
all differential turnout effects were ignored. And of course, all gaps were calculated with the proponents' definition and weighting of surplus votes and by
comparing wasted vote totals rather than shares. The precise impact of all of
these methodological choices can only be quantified by recalculating all the
historical gaps with alternative methodological approaches-an intensive project that is certainly worth undertaking but lies beyond the scope of this
Article. Thus, there is substantial uncertainty as to whether and to what degree
the 8% threshold would change were the underlying methodological choices
to change.
It should be noted that the proponents set a different threshold for congressional plans-two undeserved seats-than the 8% threshold for state legislative

298. See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supranote 7, at 867-68.
299. See id. at 887-89. In the Whitford litigation, Jackman, one of the plaintiffs' experts, used
only the simplified formula to compute the efficiency gaps for a similarly large number
of elections. Jackman Report, supra note 102, at 16. Based on these distributions, he pro-

posed a 7% threshold. See Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837,860 (W.D. Wis. 2016), stay
granted, 137 S. Ct. 2289, and jurisdictionpostponed, 137 S. Ct. 2268 (2017).
300. See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 7, at 888-89.
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plans. 30 1 In arriving at this threshold, the proponents added a new methodological choice to the mix: When calculating the historical undeserved seat share in
congressional races, they omitted all election results from states with fewer than
eight districts. 302 They justified this choice on the ground that "redistricting in
303
smaller states has only a minor influence on the national balance of power."
Yet twenty-two states (whose representatives make up more than one-fifth of
the House of Representatives) have more than one but fewer than eight congressional districts.3W Removing these states from the full data set eliminates those
data points from consideration and may significantly change the historical analysis.
Special problems do arise in trying to apply the efficiency gap measure to
plans with low district numerosity, such as congressional maps for small states
or electoral maps for small local governing bodies. If the threshold is set at two
undeserved congressional seats, then voters in many small states could never
make political gerrymandering claims because there could never be two undeserved seats. Conversely, if the threshold is set at 8%, maps with low district
numerosity may be particularly likely to exhibit above-threshold gaps. For example, if a state has only two congressional districts, there are only two possible
values for seat margin: 0% (each party wins one district) or 50% (one party wins
both districts).30 5 Unless this state has the right vote share, it will necessarily
have a large efficiency gap. There is, then, a problem of scope. The efficiency gap
either works poorly or does not work at all in capturing gerrymandering dynamics in plans with low district numerosity.

301. See id at 837 ("To take into account both the severity and durability of gerrymanders, we
recommend setting the bar at two seats for congressional plans...." (emphasis omitted)).
Note that the League of Women Voters in the Rucho litigation has focused not on the
two-seat threshold but rather on a numeric efficiency gap threshold. It appears that in
calculating historical gaps across congressional plans and evaluating the extent of North
Carolina's deviation from historical norms, the Rucho plaintiffs excluded states with low
district numerosity from the historical baseline. See Common Cause v. Rucho, 240 F.
Supp. 3d 376, 380-81 (M.D.N.C. 2017) (per curiam) ("According to the League Amended
Complaint, the Plan produced an efficiency gap of 19 percent in the 2016 election, which
is'in approximately the worst 4 percentof the historical distribution, and the single worst
score of all relevant congressional plans in the country in 2016.'" (quoting Amended

Complaint It 61-62, Rucho, 240 F. Supp. 3d 376 (No. 1:16-cv-01164-WO-JEP), 2017 WL
6887476)).
302. See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 7, at 868.
303. Id.
304. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CONGRESSIONAL APPORTIONMENT:
2010 CENSUS BRIEFS 2 tbl.1 (2011), https://perma.cc/7WPB-BTFH. In total, these states
were allocated ninety-one representatives-approximately 21% of the total number of
representatives nationwide. See id.
305. See supra text accompanying notes 132-33.
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In short, efficiency gap analysis is not robust to methodological choices and
electoral circumstances. And those methodological choices are currently the
subject of dynamic debate. For example, the Whitford panel majority viewed the
simplified formula as a "shortcut" and the long-form equation as "preferable." 6
But McGhee now suggests that the long-form equation violates his efficiency
principle and that the simplified formula represents the proper definition of the
efficiency gap.30 7 Nagle has suggested comparing wasted vote shares rather than
totals.308 And I have proposed a new wasted vote measure that compares wasted
vote shares rather than totals, as Nagle suggests, while defining surplus votes as
the full victory margin.3 My proposal could allow responsiveness to vary with
vote share in a way better aligned with democratic values and electoral reality,
but like all the methodological choices implicated by efficiency gap analysis, it
warrants further exploration.
If the efficiency gap is the measure of partisan gerrymandering, courts will
struggle when a plan's validity depends on methodological approach, and litigants will have a powerful incentive to advance the methodological approach
that best supports their cause. If conversely the efficiency gap is only an indicative measure of partisan gerrymandering, courts will have more flexibility to
give it more or less weight depending on whether the measure's assessment of
the plan at issue is more or less robust to methodological choices.
B.

Normative Considerations

The other reason the Court should recognize the efficiency gap as an indicative but nondefinitive measure is that it exhibits tensions with democratic
norms of electoral competitiveness, seats-votes proportionality, and voter participation.
The efficiency gap measure is at best agnostic and at worst antagonistic toward the goal of electoral competitiveness. Because the measure privileges the
perspective of mapmakers serving party interests, it does not recognize harm to
voters when elections are uncompetitive. The measure may fail to recognize
even extreme bipartisan gerrymanders. And more competitive plans pose a
greater risk of above-threshold gaps in the face of vote swings. 310

306. See Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 907-08 (W.D. Wis. 2016), stay granted, 137 S. Ct.
2289, and jurisdictionpostponed, 137 S. Ct. 2268 (2017).
307. See supranotes 160-62 and accompanying text.
308. See supranotes 171-77 and accompanying text.
309. See supra Part IV.
310. See supra Part III.D.
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With a simplifying assumption of equal voter turnout across districts, the
efficiency gap is equivalent to double seats-votes proportionality. It idealizes districting plans in which a party supported by 75% of the electorate wins all the
seats. To the extent that normative intuitions support a system in which vote
share and seat share should be roughly equal, the efficiency gap undermines that
3 11
norm-and not only in extreme scenarios.
Finally, the efficiency gap measure, like other measures justifying seats won
in terms of ballots cast, registers voter suppression simply as reduced support
for the targeted party. In some circumstances, suppressing the disfavored party's
voters will actually serve to lower the gap. Thus, the efficiency gap does not con3
demn-and may in fact encourage-voter suppression. 12
The efficiency gap also gives rise to both false positive and false negative
concerns.3 13 The proposed test's other doctrinal elements-sensitivity analysis,
intent, and state justification-only partially address the false positive problem.
In pursuit of competitiveness or proportionality, a mapmaker may devise a districting plan that produces an above-threshold gap but still avoid a finding of
invalidity unless that gap is durable, unjustified, and intentional. But these doctrinal tools are imperfect; they may not always work, and even when they do,
they help avoid ultimate invalidation, not litigation. Moreover, because belowthreshold efficiency gaps trigger an apparently irrebuttable presumption of validity, the other doctrinal elements do nothing to address the false negative
problem.
Were the Court to embrace the efficiency gap as the definitive measure of
partisan gerrymandering, any plan that wastes (roughly) equal votes would enjoy absolute immunity from judicial scrutiny under the partisan
gerrymandering doctrine-regardless how severely it subverted other democratic norms like competitiveness or seats-votes proportionality. In this way,
the efficiency gap proposal would provide mapmakers a powerful incentive to
draw uncompetitive plans that give the majority a double proportionality seat
bonus. Such plans can sensibly be called gerrymanders if that term implicates
norms of competitiveness and seats-votes proportionality. Yet those are precisely the plans the efficiency gap would be most likely to approve and thus the
plans mapmakers would be encouraged to design.
Because electoral districting implicates-and gerrymandering threatensmultiple democratic norms, it is unsurprising that a single measure would fail
to adequately address them all. Indeed, it may be that no one measure can satisfactorily reduce to a single number the multiple democratic norms at stake. I do
not fault the efficiency gap measure for failing to perform an impossible task.
And I recognize that the efficiency gap does measure one significant democratic
311.

See supraPart III.C.

312.

See supraPart II.E.2.
See supraPart III.E.

313.
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norm, which may powerfully capture, and thereby help curb, certain partisan
gerrymanders. For this reason, the efficiency gap is a helpful indicative measure
courts can and should consider when analyzing claims of partisan gerrymandering-so long as courts recognize its technical and normative limits.
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